LIBERTY UNIVERSITY RAWLINGS SCHOOL OF DIVINITY

WOULD AN OMNIBENEVOLENT GOD ALLOW SOME TO BE LOST WHO WOULD
HAVE BEEN SAVED IN DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES? A NEW MOLINIST
THEODICY AGAINST THE PROBLEM OF THE CONTINGENTLY LOST

A Dissertation Thesis
Submitted to Dr. Edward Martin of the
Liberty University Rawlings School of Divinity
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Zachary Breitenbach

Copyright © 2019 by Zachary Paul Breitenbach
All Rights Reserved

APPROVAL SHEET

WOULD AN OMNIBENEVOLENT GOD ALLOW SOME TO BE LOST WHO WOULD
HAVE BEEN SAVED IN DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES? A NEW MOLINIST
THEODICY AGAINST THE PROBLEM OF THE CONTINGENTLY LOST

Zachary Breitenbach

Chair: Dr. Edward Martin

Reader: Dr. Leo Percer

Reader: Dr. Ronnie Campbell

Dedication

To my parents, Larry and Sheri Breitenbach, who have been crucial supporters of my pursuit of
doctoral studies and have always been living examples to me of what it means to be a committed
follower of Christ

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 1
Overview of the Issue ............................................................................................................................... 1
Research Purpose and Hypothesis ............................................................................................................ 3
Research Significance ............................................................................................................................... 9
Research Scope ....................................................................................................................................... 10
THE SOTERIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF EVIL ..................................................................................... 14
Salvation is Found Only in Jesus ............................................................................................................ 14
Definition of the Soteriological Problem of Evil .................................................................................... 15
First Preliminary Objection: Should Not God Ensure Universal Salvation? .......................................... 18
Second Preliminary Objection: Should Not God Provide Universal Access to Salvation? .................... 23
Practical Relevance: Concern for the Unevangelized Fuels Religious Pluralism ........................... 25
Inclusivism versus Exclusivism: A Spectrum of Views among Christians ..................................... 30
Exclusivism: The Centrality of the Gospel in Scripture .................................................................. 34
Three Biblical Indicators Pointing Toward Universally Accessible Salvation ............................... 36
First Biblical Indicator: God’s Universal Salvific Will ........................................................... 37
Second Biblical Indicator: Unlimited Atonement ................................................................... 46
Third Biblical Indicator: General Revelation .......................................................................... 49
How Might the Unevangelized Have an Opportunity to be Saved on Exclusivism? ...................... 51
The Remaining Objection: God’s Omnibenevolence and the Contingently Lost ................................... 57
Table 1.1. Summary of Premises Introduced in Chapter One..................................................................... 62
AN EXPLANATION AND DEFENSE OF MOLINISM .......................................................................... 63
A Brief History of Molinism................................................................................................................... 64
An Explanation of Molinism................................................................................................................... 70
Evidence for Molinism ........................................................................................................................... 75
Biblical Evidence for Molinism ...................................................................................................... 76
God’s Counterfactual Knowledge of Creaturely Actions........................................................ 76
Human Libertarian Freedom ................................................................................................... 79

iii

God’s Sovereignty, Providence, and Election of Individuals .................................................. 86
Philosophical Defense of Molinism ................................................................................................ 93
The Truth of Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom ............................................................. 94
God’s Knowledge of Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom .............................................. 107
ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING MOLINIST THEODICIES ................................................................... 116
Molinism’s Relationship to Theories of Election and Predestination ................................................... 119
Category #1 of Molinist Theodicies Against the PCL: Appeals to Postmortem Salvation .................. 125
The Theodicies of Donald Lake and Jerry Walls .......................................................................... 125
Difficulties with the Theodicies of Lake and Walls ...................................................................... 127
The Theodicy of Jason Marsh ....................................................................................................... 130
Difficulties with the Theodicy of Marsh ....................................................................................... 132
Category #2 of Molinist Theodicies Against the PCL: The Lost Lack a Soul...................................... 134
The Theodicy of David Hunt ......................................................................................................... 134
Difficulties with the Theodicy of Hunt.......................................................................................... 136
Category #3 of Molinist Theodicies Against the PCL: Optimizing the Soteriological Balance ........... 139
The Theodicy of William Lane Craig............................................................................................ 140
Advantages of Craig’s Theodicy ................................................................................................... 144
Difficulties with Craig’s Theodicy ................................................................................................ 148
Jesus’ Statement Concerning Sodom, Tyre, and Sidon ......................................................... 149
The Possibility of Apostasy ................................................................................................... 154
Craig’s Appeal to Inclusivism ............................................................................................... 169
The Theodicy of Kirk MacGregor ................................................................................................. 173
Difficulties with MacGregor’s Theodicy ...................................................................................... 179
A NEW MOLINIST THEODICY AGAINST THE PROBLEM OF THE CONTINGENTLY LOST ... 184
A Modification to Reformed Epistemology.......................................................................................... 187
A Theodicy Against the Problem of the Contingently Lost .................................................................. 197
Three Attractive Features of This Theodicy ......................................................................................... 214
THE APPLICABILITY OF THIS THEODICY TO THE BROADER PROBLEM OF EVIL ................ 217
Molinism and Soteriological Optimization Strengthen the Free Will Defense .................................... 218
Molinism and Soteriological Optimization as a Response to Gratuitous Evil ...................................... 228
Molinism and Soteriological Optimization Strengthen the Theodicies of Stump and Hick ................. 232
iv

Chapter Summary ................................................................................................................................. 240
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 242
Retracing the Theodical Journey........................................................................................................... 243
Concluding Reflections ......................................................................................................................... 249
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................................... 253

v

INTRODUCTION

Overview of the Issue
Standing before the Sanhedrin and facing a hostile audience, the Apostle Peter refuses to
back down from proclaiming the message that he knows to be true: The only road to God and
salvation goes directly through Jesus Christ. Pressed to provide an explanation for his
involvement in God’s healing of a crippled man, Peter does not fail to capitalize on the
evangelistic opportunity to assert that, besides Jesus, “there is no other name under heaven that
has been given among men by which we must be saved” (Acts 4:12).1 Indeed, Jesus Himself
insists that He is “the way, and the truth, and the life” and the only way to the Father (Jn 14:6);
moreover, He is clear that many people will enter through what He calls the “wide gate” that
leads to destruction rather than accessing God through faith in Him (Mt 7:13-14).
In view of the pluralistic mindset that is so prevalent today, the biblical teaching that
salvation is offered only through faith in Christ is met by many with scorn and indignation. It is
often seen as too narrow and unworthy of the Christian God, whom Scripture depicts as
omnibenevolent and perfectly holy. We are now more aware than ever of the vast diversity of
religions in the world, and it is clear that many people do not even hear the Christian gospel
during their lifetimes. Indeed, it may seem that the opportunity one has to respond to the gospel
is largely contingent upon whether one has the good fortune of being born into the right
circumstances. Although Christianity has more adherents than any other world religion, the
majority of people alive today have not accepted Christ as their Savior and a significant portion
of the world’s people have not been reached with the Christian message. There are thousands of
world religions, and approximately two-thirds of the world’s seven billion people are not

1. All quotations of the Bible will be from the NASB unless otherwise indicated.
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Christians; moreover, it is estimated that around one-fourth of all people alive today have never
heard the gospel and remain unevangelized.2 While some are born in twenty-first century
America where freedom of religion is permitted and Christianity is widely preached and
accepted, others are not so fortunate. Some are born in a time and place where the gospel does
not reach during their lifetimes. Others are born into a culture where the gospel is at least known,
but it is not tolerated. For example, a person born into a devout Muslim family in Saudi Arabia,
an Islamic state that allows only the public practice of Islam and has a population that is almost
entirely Muslim, will be heavily encouraged to adopt Islam. It is easy to imagine that many who
are born into such a culture might have accepted Christianity if only they were placed into
different circumstances.
It is therefore not difficult to recognize the significant challenge that is raised against
Christianity’s claim that Jesus is the only path to an eternity of blessedness in the presence of
God and to the avoidance of eternal punishment in everlasting separation from God. If salvation
is exclusively through Christ, how could an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God
allow so many people to be lost who have never even so much as heard the Christian gospel?
Even if God does somehow provide all people with an opportunity to be saved, is He not
unloving to those lost persons who are provided with minimal revelation of God but would have
chosen to be saved if placed into better circumstances? This problem, which is one of the most
pressing questions related to the so-called “soteriological problem of evil,” primarily calls God’s

2. David B. Barrett and Todd M. Johnson, World Christian Trends, AD 30-AD 2200: Interpreting the Annual
Christian Megacensus, ed. Christopher R. Guidry and Peter F. Crossing (Pasadena, CA: William Carey Library,
2001), 24. While a bit old, this statistic cannot be far from accurate today. The statistics in this source are still cited
widely in the literature. The following source from 2011 estimates that somewhere close to a third of the world
population may be unevangelized: Patrick Johnstone, Future of the Global Church: History, Trends, and
Possibilities (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2011), 161. It is safe to estimate that somewhere in the range
of a quarter to a third of the world has not heard the Christian gospel. More statistics will be given in the next
chapter, indicating the percentage of the world that is estimated to have been unevangelized at various points over
the course of church history.
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omnibenevolence into question. This difficulty might be dubbed the “problem of the
contingently lost,” and the central concern behind it is as follows: How could an
omnibenevolent, omnipotent, omniscient God allow certain people to be lost when they would
have freely accepted God’s grace and been saved if only God had placed them into different
circumstances?
Research Purpose and Hypothesis
The purpose of this dissertation is to flesh out and defend a theodicy3 against the problem
of the contingently lost. This theodicy may be summarized as follows. God has sovereignly
arranged the world in such a way that nobody is lost due to lack of information (e.g., not hearing
the gospel) or due to the sin and corrupting influences of those around them (i.e., being in the
wrong circumstances to accept the gospel when they hear it). It is possible that every lost person
is lost as a consequence of his or her own sin and not epistemological or circumstantial
limitations, and this theodicy aims to show how this may be the case even if one must hear the

3. It is useful to clarify what I mean by a “theodicy” and how it differs from a “defense.” When it comes to the
problem of evil, a defense (as I use the term) only requires giving some possibly true statement (even one that may
be false) that shows that God and evil are not inconsistent. So a defense is very modest in this sense and merely aims
to show the logical consistency of God and evil. A theodicy (as I use the term) gives an account that tries to
reconcile God and evil in a way that is plausible and consistent with Scripture. I am calling what I am doing in this
project a soteriological theodicy. The problem of the contingently lost claims that God’s attributes entail that God
would not allow anyone to be contingently lost and yet there are some who are contingently lost. As would be
required in a defense, I will aim to show that God’s attributes do not necessarily entail that He would never allow
anyone to be contingently lost. But I want to go beyond merely showing that it is possibly true that God would allow
some to be contingently lost. I want to weave together a plausible account that suggests what God may well be
doing. I want to show that it is not just possible but reasonable and consistent with Scripture (even if not explicitly
taught in Scripture) to think that an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good and loving God would allow some
people to be contingently lost in certain ways. There is no doubt that plausibility is to some degree in the eye of the
beholder, and readers will have to evaluate the plausibility of my proposal for themselves. Nevertheless, my aim is
to relieve the tension that is caused by the problem of the contingently lost as much as possible by offering more
than a mere possibility. I will strive to offer an account that, if true, logically undercuts the problem of the
contingently lost and also is likely to leave one feeling comfortable that the solution that was offered is neither
unbiblical nor implausible. A description of how a theodicy differs from a defense that is in line with what I have
described above may be found at: J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a
Christian Worldview, 2nd ed. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2017), 538. See also: Michael J. Murray and
Michael C. Rea, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 170.
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gospel and respond to it in this life to be saved (i.e., even if Christian exclusivism is true). The
theodicy proposes that there may only be two types of contingently lost persons. It makes room
for these two types because there is biblical support for them. The first type is one who would
not accept the gospel under any sufficiently non-pressured circumstances; that is, the person
would have to be shown in a way that is (for that person) unduly overt that the gospel ought to be
accepted before that person would repent and accept God’s grace. The second type is anyone
who willfully rejects God’s grace after previously accepting it (i.e., apostatizes). In both of these
cases, such persons are contingently lost because they would have been saved under other
circumstances. I will propose, however, that these may be the only two types of contingently lost
persons that God allows and that God’s omnibenevolence is not undermined even if He allows
these two types. In this way I will seek to defend God’s omnibenevolence despite allowing that
some may be contingently lost.
Before laying out the above core hypothesis in the dissertation, some foundational topics
will have to be addressed. First, the soteriological problem of evil (POE), which is mentioned
above, must be carefully explained. As part of doing this, I will evaluate a couple of challenges
that are sometimes alleged to show an incompatibility between the Christian God’s attributes and
the fact that many people will be eternally lost, and I will briefly offer a solution to these. After
clearing away these initial objections, I will contend that a key remaining objection—the one
described above concerning the contingently lost—seems to be the most pressing difficulty. That
will set the stage for focusing on the problem of the contingently lost for the remainder of the
dissertation and offering a theologically consistent and philosophically plausible theodicy that
shows why this problem does not bring God’s attributes into conflict with the Bible’s teaching
on soteriology. In the chapter that examines the soteriological POE, I will also point out how
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concern over the unevangelized has fueled rejection of Christianity in the form of religious
pluralism. Anxiety over the unevangelized has also led many Christians to adopt Christian
inclusivism and abandon the idea that one must hear the gospel and respond to it to be saved. I
will explain that my theodicy accepts the truth of Christian exclusivism because there is strong
evidence that this view is biblical and because it is useful to show that one can offer a reasonable
theodicy against the problem of the contingently lost even if one does not appeal to inclusivism.
Second, I will introduce Molinism and provide a defense of this doctrine’s philosophical
and theological viability. This is necessary because my proposed solution to the problem of the
contingently lost depends upon the validity of Molinism. The doctrine of Molinism, which
originated with the sixteenth-century Jesuit Luis de Molina, holds that God’s omniscience—even
logically prior to His decree to create the world—includes not only knowledge of all possible
worlds, but also knowledge of all feasible worlds.4 God’s “middle knowledge” involves God
knowing logically prior to His creative decree what all creatures with libertarian freedom5 would
do in any circumstances into which God might place them. I will take time to explain Molinism,
briefly discuss the history behind the rise of this view, and offer biblical and philosophical
support to show that it is defensible. As part of my biblical defense of Molinism, I will also note
how Molinism makes it possible to capture key insights from both Calvinism and Arminianism.
It allows one to hold that God is sovereign over human affairs and even elects individuals to
salvation in a real sense; meanwhile, it also allows one to hold that Christ died for all people to

4. A feasible world is one that can be actualized by God. Some logically possible worlds are not feasible. An
example of a logically possible world that is not feasible is the following: a world W that is identical to the actual
world (and let us assume that both W and the actual world contain free creatures) up until the exact moment that I
am typing this sentence but instead of finishing my typing of this sentence I freely choose to punch myself in the
face. W is not a feasible world because I simply would not freely make that choice in these circumstances.
5. An agent has libertarian freedom if, when given a choice between multiple options, the agent is not
determined to opt for any of the particular options. There are no circumstances in place that determine which option
the agent will choose. Regardless of what option the agent selects, she could have chosen a different option.
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have the opportunity to be saved and that all humans are entirely free in the libertarian sense to
accept or reject God so that “whosoever believes” will be saved.
Third, I will explore some Molinist solutions to the problem of the contingently lost that
have been put forth, and I will contend that these solutions suffer from various theological and/or
philosophical difficulties such that it is desirable to provide a better solution. This will pave the
way for me to reveal an alternative proposal that leverages the power of Molinism to address the
problem of the contingently lost without falling prey to any significant theological or
philosophical difficulties. There are numerous possible ways that Molinism could be employed
in developing a soteriological theodicy. Of those that have been proposed, the one that is most
prominent and most promising is William Lane Craig’s proposal. My own theodicy draws
heavily upon key concepts in Craig’s theodicy but also departs from it at significant junctures.
For this reason, I will focus particularly on explaining Craig’s theodicy and identifying its merits
and its difficulties. I will disagree with Craig’s theodicy primarily because there are multiple
ways in which Scripture seems to contradict his crucial proposal that nobody is contingently lost.
I will also highlight the fact that his appeal to Christian inclusivism is difficult to support on
biblical grounds. In addition, when I eventually unpack my own theodicy, I will show how God
plausibly has various goals for the world besides soteriological optimality that may place
limitations on the balance of saved versus lost that is feasible for God to bring about—a
possibility that Craig does not explore. That is, I will suggest that God may optimize the
soteriological balance within the bounds of certain restrictions that are important to God—
restrictions that, if removed, may have allowed for an even more favorable balance of saved
versus lost.
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At this point, the necessary groundwork will have been laid so that I can put forth and
defend my Molinist theodicy against the problem of the contingently lost. The theodicy will
propose a process by which the Holy Spirit might break down a person’s sinful resistance to
accepting the gospel, utilizing a slightly modified version of Reformed epistemology as well as
Molinism.6 This process will allow that all people have an opportunity to be saved and that
nobody is contingently lost aside from those who require unduly overt revelation in order to
accept the gospel and anyone who commits apostasy. I will suggest that God creates the best
soteriological balance that is possible given counterfactual truths concerning what all possible
humans would freely do in all possible circumstances into which God might place them and
given two parameters (a certain degree of divine hiddenness and God allowing Satan to tempt us)
that may limit the soteriological balance.7 Although God desires as many people as possible to be
saved and as few as possible to be lost, He also desires that those who are saved make that
decision without excessive pressure and that they are sufficiently tempted by sin (though God
Himself does not tempt anyone to sin). In this way, God ensures that those who are saved must
make a significant moral decision in choosing to love God rather than remaining a slave to sin.
For this reason, though it may result in a less optimal balance of saved versus lost than would
otherwise be feasible for God to bring about over the course of human history, God keeps
enough of an epistemic distance from us so that our decision to love Him and enter into a saving

6. I will suggest two modifications to Reformed epistemology. First, I will specify that only one’s own sin is
ultimately decisive in one’s failure to accept the gospel. Second, I will stress that arguments, evidences, and certain
life experiences may be a crucial part of the Holy Spirit overcoming the sin barrier that prevents a person from
recognizing in a properly basic way that the gospel is true. This epistemology will play a key role in the proposed
process by which God ensures that all those who would freely and without undue pressure accept the gospel will
come to accept it.
7. Counterfactual conditionals are conditional statements in the subjunctive mood. They state what would be the
case if a hypothetical antecedent were true. The following offers a good explanation of the concept of counterfactual
conditionals: Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 46.
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relationship with Him will be free from excessive pressure. God also allows Satan to tempt us
with his lies so that our affections might be drawn away from God if we allow them to be. I will
show that these two parameters—God’s hiddenness and His allowing Satan to tempt us—are
consistent with God’s goodness and love because they ensure an environment that allows
humans to make a free and morally significant choice to love God, and this is presumably a great
good. The soteriological outcome God brings about on this view is purposeful, loving, and
consistent with His omnibenevolence. It takes divine sovereignty and providence seriously while
preserving human freedom. It also accounts for the reality of spiritual warfare and the biblical
teaching that God desires the salvation of all people. In addition, it is consistent with the biblical
evidence that exclusivism is true and that some are contingently lost.
Finally, after unpacking my proposed theodicy against the problem of the contingently lost
and completing my defense of it, I will briefly show how my theodicy—although it is intended to
deal with an aspect of the soteriological POE—also offers benefits in responding to the broader
POE as it relates to the amount of suffering and evil and the apparent gratuitousness of suffering
and evil in our present earthly existence. If Molinism is true and God’s sovereign activity in
directing the world is aimed largely at achieving the best soteriological outcomes (both of which
are key ingredients in my theodicy), it will be shown how this can reduce the perplexity that
often arises from the seemingly excessive amount of evil that occurs in this world and the fact
that so much of it seems pointless so far as we can tell. In addition, I will suggest how the truth
of my proposed soteriological theodicy (or one like it) would help to bolster two prominent
responses to the broader POE that make an appeal to soteriological outcomes—those of Eleonore
Stump and John Hick.
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Research Significance
This proposal is significant for soteriology as well as Christian apologetics. With regard to
soteriology, it is useful to provide a coherent perspective that: (1) accounts for God’s classical
attributes; (2) upholds Christian exclusivism; and (3) does not require a denial of the biblical
evidence that some will be lost who would have been saved in different circumstances. I believe
my project offers insights for Christian theology by putting forth a biblically consistent and
philosophically reasonable soteriological proposal that accomplishes all of the above.
From a practical, apologetic standpoint, offering a defensible theodicy against the
soteriological POE—and specifically against the problem of the contingently lost—can be a
valuable tool for removing barriers that may prevent some non-Christians from accepting the
Christian faith. Religious pluralism is a powerful enemy of Christian evangelism, and the
soteriological POE might be the most significant impetus that drives people to religious
pluralism—a position exemplified perhaps most notably by John Hick in which all religions are
considered equally valid paths to ultimate reality and a generic form of “salvation.” Offering a
plausible theodicy against the problem of the contingently lost helps to defuse much of the
concern that many have about accepting Christianity as the only entirely true religion. This
soteriological theodicy also strengthens the response that one can give to the broader POE in
terms of the amount and apparent gratuitousness of evil. Since the POE is the most significant
challenge to theism in the eyes of many, this has much apologetic value. Furthermore, offering a
good answer to this problem will also strengthen the faith of those who are already Christians
and will make them better-equipped witnesses for Christ. It will allow believers and nonbelievers alike to see that the doctrine of Christian exclusivism is not incompatible with the
omnibenevolent Christian God. By removing the concerns raised by the problem of the
9

contingently lost, perhaps this project might be a small part of God’s eternal plan of ensuring that
as many people as possible are brought into a saving relationship with Christ.
Research Scope
The primary goal of this dissertation is to argue that Molinism is a viable doctrine
concerning God’s omniscience and that Reformed epistemology is also viable and then to offer a
philosophically and theologically sound soteriological theodicy concerning the problem of the
contingently lost that makes use of these two perspectives. Although much has been written
concerning the soteriological POE and how one might respond to its multifaceted concerns, I
will focus primarily on the question of how an omnibenevolent God who is said to desire the
salvation of all people could allow some to be lost who would have been saved in different
circumstances—the problem of the contingently lost. My proposal is intended to improve upon
Craig’s Molinist theodicy in key ways.
It is important to make clear what is meant by “contingently lost.” The focus of this
dissertation is on the eternal fate those who are of a sufficient age and cognitive capacity to
engage in sin and to understand the concepts of sin and repentance and accepting divine grace. It
is beyond the scope of this project to examine the fate of the following sorts of unevangelized
persons: the unborn who die in the womb; those dying as small children who lack an awareness
of sin and have no ability to understand the concepts of repentance and grace; and the severely
mentally handicapped who never develop the ability to understand sin and the need for grace.
While these groups may rightly be considered unevangelized, Scripture never directly addresses
what God will do with such people. There is certainly no clear biblical teaching that such
individuals cannot be saved or will not be saved. If anything, there are hints to the contrary—at
least with regard to those who die as infants. King David, for example, believed that he would
10

once again be reunited with his infant son who died (2 Sam 12:23).8 In any case, at the very least
there is no basis for thinking that such persons are lost simply because they lack the cognitive
ability to understand moral accountability, repentance, and grace. The concern of this
dissertation is with the contingently lost; since Scripture lacks any clear indication that the
above-mentioned categories of unevangelized persons are lost at all, their fate does not fall
within the problem of the contingently lost. Scripture does, however, indicate that those who
have the cognitive capacity to sin and understand moral guilt and the need for God’s grace will
be held responsible for their evil and for suppressing the truth about God. In the book of
Romans, the Apostle Paul teaches that, ever since the beginning of creation, God has made plain
to all such people through what He has made His “invisible attributes, His eternal power and
divine nature” (Rom 1:20). Guilt for violating God’s moral law applies to all people who have
the minimal capacities needed for recognizing it. Even those who have never received God’s
moral law via special revelation are guilty when they violate this moral law because the law is
written on their hearts (Rom 2:12-16). So the focus of my theodicy is only on those who are
“contingently lost,” and I will consider the contingently lost to be only those who: (1) have the
capacity to recognize the basic truths about God and the moral law that God has made plain via
general revelation in nature and conscience; (2) ultimately die in an unsaved state and are lost;
and (3) would have been saved under other freedom-permitting circumstances—excluding
circumstances in which they never attain a cognitive capacity that allows them to understand the
basic truths mentioned in (1) concerning moral guilt and the reality of God.

8. In addition, some Christian theologians have argued persuasively that children are born in a state of original
grace until they reach a cognitive ability in which they have sufficient understanding to be responsible for their
personal sins. Jack Cottrell makes this case, focusing especially on Romans 5:12-19 and arguing that this passage
teaches that whatever spiritual condition all of humanity would have inherited from birth as a result of Adam’s sin is
cancelled by what Christ did on the cross; nevertheless, he still rightly holds that faith in Christ is needed to remove
our guilt for our own personal sins. See: Jack Cottrell, The Faith Once for All: Bible Doctrine for Today (Joplin,
MO: College Press, 2002), 179-190.
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The most important research questions that I will address include: (1) Is it possible to offer
a biblically-faithful proposal for how all people may have an opportunity to be saved? (2) Does
the Bible indicate that some people are contingently lost? (3) Is it possible that any person who
never hears the gospel or is in disadvantageous circumstances for accepting the gospel could
nevertheless be solely responsible for not accepting God’s grace even if Christian exclusivism is
true? (4) What good reasons might an omnibenevolent God have for allowing some people to be
contingently lost? (5) What is Molinism, and what are biblical and philosophical reasons to think
it is true? (6) What is Reformed epistemology, and what are biblical and philosophical reasons to
think that it is true? (7) What is Craig’s Molinist theodicy to answer the problem of the
contingently lost, and is this theory plausible? (8) How can Reformed epistemology and
Molinism be leveraged to propose a better Molinist theodicy against the problem of the
contingently lost? (9) Why would God be as hidden as He is and allow Satan to tempt humans if
God wants as many as possible to be saved? (10) How might the truth of Molinism and
appealing to God’s possible soteriological aims for this world help to explain why God might
allow the amount of suffering and evil and the apparent gratuitousness of so much evil that is
observed in this present earthly existence?
I will only briefly address other questions related to the soteriological POE, since I believe
(in agreement with Craig) that the problem of the contingently lost is the most significant and
challenging one. Of course, in the first chapter I will need to justify carefully why I believe this.
Many of the topics that arise in this dissertation are complex, and theologians and philosophers
have long struggled to resolve the questions surrounding them. For example, this project touches
upon God’s omniscience, omnipotence, and sovereignty. It also runs squarely into the centuriesold controversy concerning determinism and human free will. The need to focus on the primary
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points of this dissertation will prevent me from investigating in great depth certain matters that,
while relevant and important, are more peripheral to the core of the dissertation. For example,
my position affirms that humans possess libertarian free will, and this seems to require that
humans have souls. Entire books have been written on the subjects of libertarian free will and the
existence of the soul; thus, the support that I will give to such issues must be limited.
Finally, it is important to recognize that my proposal is put forth merely as a possible and
plausible solution to the problem of the contingently lost. I do not claim that my proposal is
necessarily true or that it can be “proven” to be true. Nevertheless, so long as my proposal
provides a theologically and philosophically defensible justification of God, then it is a good
theodicy.
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CHAPTER 1
THE SOTERIOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF EVIL
Salvation is Found Only in Jesus
In the hours before His betrayal, Jesus assures His disciples that His return is as certain as
His upcoming departure, and He encourages them by pointing toward the hope that awaits them
of being with Him in His “Father’s house.” His disciple Thomas then asks Him to explain the
way to get to this place. In response, Jesus boldly declares, “I am the way, and the truth, and the
life; no one comes to the Father but through Me” (Jn 14:6). The Greek text places focus on the
“I” in “I am” (ἐγώ εἰμι) by the emphatic use of the personal pronoun. Jesus is emphasizing that
He Himself is the one and only path to God.
Jesus is certainly not alone in professing that He is the only provision God has given to
humans by which we might enjoy eternal life with God and escape the condemnation that our
sins deserve. Indeed, the unanimous testimony of the New Testament writers is that there is no
salvation apart from Christ and his atoning death. The uniqueness of Christ’s sacrifice and its
necessity for salvation have been recognized since the beginning of the church.
Peter pointedly affirms the soteriological centrality of Jesus, declaring that “there is
salvation in no one else; for there is no other name under heaven that has been given among men
by which we must be saved” (Acts 4:12). Paul likewise insists that “there is one God, and one
mediator also between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave Himself as a ransom for
all, the testimony given at the proper time” (1 Tim 2:5-6). The Apostle John’s teaching further
adds to Scripture’s unwavering consistency on this point. John raises the question: “Who is the
one who overcomes the world?” His answer is that it is only “he who believes that Jesus is the
Son of God” (1 Jn 5:5). John asserts that “God has given us eternal life, and this life is in His
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Son. He who has the Son has the life; he who does not have the Son of God does not have the
life” (1 Jn 5:11-12). John preached the universal applicability and soteriological necessity of
what Jesus accomplished on the cross, pronouncing that Jesus “is the propitiation for our sins;
and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world” (1 Jn 2:2).
The biblical testimony on this point is decisive. Nobody can be saved apart from Jesus and
what He accomplished in dying for our sins.9 This simple truth, however, ushers in a number of
difficult questions.
Definition of the Soteriological Problem of Evil
Although Jesus offers the hope that he is the gate (Jn 10:9) by which one accesses
salvation, His unsettling affirmation that those who accept this salvation “enter through the
narrow gate” do not paint an optimistic picture for the majority of mankind. Not only is salvation
obtained through Christ alone, but the teaching of Jesus Himself seems to be that a significant
portion of humanity will enter through the “wide gate” that “leads to destruction” while only a
relative “few” will find salvation (Mt 7:13-14).
Perhaps Jesus’ statement that many will be lost should not be surprising given the biblical
teaching that salvation is only through Christ and given what we know about the world’s
religious diversity and the historical spread of the Christian faith. The fact that there is a vast
assortment of religions in the world is far more widely known than ever before. As noted
previously, only about one in three people alive today call themselves Christian (even though
more people adhere to Christianity than any other world religion), and there are almost as many
unevangelized persons in the world as there are Christians. Indeed, down through the history of

9. We will examine the controversy concerning Christian inclusivism and exclusivism, which has to do with
whether or not one must hear the gospel of Christ and respond to it in order to be saved; however, the fact that Jesus
is at least ontologically necessary for salvation is an uncontroversial doctrine that lies at the core of Christianity.
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the Christian church, it has always been the case that most people alive at any given time did not
know Christ, and there has always been a large percentage of the world population that is
unevangelized. At the start of the second century (roughly seventy years after the death of
Christ), it is approximated that well under one percent of the world was Christian and 94% of the
estimated 180 million people alive at that time were unevangelized. By the start of the eleventh
century, about 17% of the world was Christian and 79% of the roughly 264 million people alive
at that time were unevangelized. Although close to one-third of the world’s 1.6 billion people
were likely Christians by the turn of the twentieth century, over half of the world still remained
unevangelized. The world population has exploded in the more than 100 years since that time,
yet Christians have steadily comprised only about one-third of that population. Although the
percentage of the world that is unevangelized has been cut in half since the year 1900, it remains
that over 4.5 billion people that are alive today are not Christians and around 1.7 billion of those
people are unevangelized.10
These statistics help to demonstrate why the biblical teaching that Jesus is the only path to
salvation raises challenging problems for Christians and provokes skepticism among some who
are outside of the Christian faith. Why does God create anyone who fails to believe and is lost to
hell? Why does God not ensure that all people hear the gospel? Why are some people placed into
circumstances that are much more conducive to accepting Christ and His salvation than others?
These are prominent issues within the so-called “soteriological problem of evil.”
The soteriological POE is a particular aspect of the broader POE. The broader POE is a
challenge to theism—and thus to Christian theism—which contends that the existence of God
(i.e., the God of classical theism, a being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent) is

10. Barrett and Johnson, World Christian Trends, 24.
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inconsistent with—or at least made unlikely by—the existence of evil in some way. The
“deductive” or “logical” version of the POE is the claim that there is a logical incompatibility
between the existence of God and the existence of evil such that evil disproves theism. By
contrast, the “inductive” or “probabilistic” version of the POE holds that the existence of God is
unlikely given the features of evil that are observed in the world (e.g., its intensity, its
pervasiveness, and its apparent gratuitousness in many cases). Philosophers have widely
abandoned the deductive version in light of Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, though the
inductive version still garners much support. Within this broader POE, the soteriological POE
specifically focuses on the challenge of reconciling the above-mentioned attributes of God with
the biblical teaching concerning soteriology. It alleges an incompatibility between the following
propositions:
P1. God possesses the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence.
P2. Some persons do not accept the forgiveness that is available via receiving Christ and are
thus damned.11
In assessing the soteriological POE,12 William Lane Craig rightly points out that the above
two propositions “are not explicitly contradictory, since one is not the negation of the other, nor

11. Craig rightly points out that these two allegedly inconsistent premises are at the heart of the soteriological
POE. See: William Lane Craig, “‘No Other Name’: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of
Salvation Through Christ,” Faith and Philosophy 6 (April 1989): 180.
12. One important challenge that is outside the scope of this paper is that God should not send anyone at all to
an eternity in hell. This challenge is not directly part of the soteriological POE (at least insofar as the soteriological
POE is considered to be an inconsistency that arises between P1 and P2) because this challenge concerns God’s
justice rather than His omnibenevolence or love. The concern raised by the objector is that God’s attribute of justice
is incompatible with Him determining that anyone should receive an eternal punishment for committing a finite
amount of sins. The claim is that the crime does not fit the punishment. If, however, it is just to send anyone to an
eternal hell, then the question arises as to whether the provision indicated in Scripture that God has lovingly
provided to humans for avoiding their just punishment is loving enough to be worthy of an omnibenevolent God.
This concern is the essence of the soteriological POE (at least as it is defined here), and it will be my focus. In brief,
though, it is worth noting three common responses to the objection that it is unjust for God to send anyone to an
eternal hell. David Clotfelter examines each of them. First, he notes that even if a person can commit only a finite
number of sins in this life, the lost may continue to sin while in hell so that their sins are ongoing just as their
punishment is ongoing. If one’s sins are ongoing, it seems just that the punishment is as well. Second, he notes the
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are they logically contradictory, since a contradiction cannot be derived from them using first
order logic.” Therefore, the objector’s only hope of showing that P1 and P2 are inconsistent is to
show that they are “inconsistent in the broadly logical sense, that is, that there is no possible
world in which both are true.”13 Since there is no explicit contradiction, the only way to
demonstrate the inconsistency of P1 and P2 is to add propositions to this set of propositions such
that an inconsistency is revealed. This chapter will handle two such arguments that are designed
to uncover an alleged inconsistency. After putting to rest these preliminary objections, I will
reveal that there is still a residual problem—one that will be addressed in the remaining chapters.
We begin with the objection that God ought to ensure that all people are freely saved.
First Preliminary Objection: Should Not God Ensure Universal Salvation?
In defending the broader POE, J. L. Mackie has argued for two premises that, if true, would
show that the existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of an omnibenevolent,
omnipotent, omniscient God. First, Mackie claims that “there are no limits to what an
omnipotent being can do” (i.e., an omnipotent God can literally do anything). Second, he asserts
that “a being who is wholly good eliminates evil as far as he can” (i.e., an omnibenevolent God
would necessarily want to prevent evil entirely if He could).14 If God would want to prevent evil
and would be able to prevent it, then evil would not exist if God exists. Since evil clearly exists,

response given by W. G. T. Shedd that the guilt of the lost is eternal and is never removed; thus, it merits eternal
punishment. Clotfelter finds positive and negative aspects to both of these types of responses. Third, Clotfelter
examines his preferred response (that of Jonathan Edwards), which holds that an offense against an infinite Being
(God) demands an infinite punishment. God is infinite in perfection and goodness and beauty. We are utterly
dependent upon God and owe Him our complete obedience and allegiance. So offending a God of infinite dignity
and greatness demands a punishment of infinite duration. See: David Clotfelter, Sinners in the Hands of a Good
God: Reconciling Divine Judgment and Mercy (Chicago: Moody Publishers, 2004), 88-94.
13. Craig, “No Other Name,” 180.
14. J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 150.
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Mackie’s contention is that God must not exist. In a similar way, the proponent of the
soteriological POE can argue for the incompatibility of propositions P1 and P2 listed above by
adding to them the following two premises:
P3. God is able to actualize a possible world in which all persons freely [in the libertarian
sense] receive Christ.
P4. God prefers a world in which no persons fail to receive Christ and are damned to a
world in which some do.15
If God’s omnipotence and omniscience in P1 entail the truth of P3 and God’s
omnibenevolence in P1 entails the truth of P4, then God must be both able and willing to ensure
that all people freely choose to be saved. That, however, means that P2 must be false, since P2
recognizes that some will be damned. So, if that is the case, P3 and P4 may seem to bring out a
contradiction between P1 and P2.
This argument, however, is undermined by multiple problems. Craig offers an effective
response by casting doubt upon both P3 and P4. Regarding P3, Craig points out that it may not be
“feasible for God to actualize any possible world.”16 Just as Mackie erred in thinking that God’s
omnipotence entails that He can actualize all possible worlds (including ones in which all
humans freely choose to do only good and no evil), the proponent of the soteriological POE errs
in thinking that an omnipotent God can necessarily actualize a world in which all of humanity
freely accepts the salvation offered by Christ.17 Just because it is logically possible to conceive of

15. These two premises are adapted from Craig. See: Craig, “No Other Name,” 180. Of course, in order for God
to choose to actualize a certain world of free creatures from among all possible worlds of free creatures so as to
achieve a desired end, God’s “middle knowledge” is presumed. This concept will be fully developed in the next
chapter; in short, if God possesses middle knowledge, then He knows logically prior to creation what any free
creature would freely choose to do in any possible circumstance into which God could place him.
16. Ibid.
17. Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974), 34-44. Plantinga makes this
point well. Plantinga’s response to Mackie’s aforementioned claim that God should be able to create a world in
which all creatures freely choose not to do evil (since it is broadly logically possible that there be a world of free
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a world in which all persons have libertarian freedom of the will and freely choose to be saved,
that does not mean it is feasible for God to actualize such a world. The actions of creatures
possessing libertarian freedom, given the very definition of what it means to have such freedom,
cannot be causally determined by God; thus, given counterfactual truths concerning the choices
that all free creatures whom God could create would make, God may not be able to actualize the
world described in P3. For one thing, Craig suggests that some persons might possess what Craig
calls “transcircumstantial damnation.” This is “a contingent property possessed by an individual
essence if the exemplification of that essence would, if offered salvation, freely reject God’s
grace and be lost no matter what freedom-permitting circumstances God should create him in.”18
Note that if one is transcircumstantially damned, then he is also “transworldly damned”; that is,
this individual would freely choose to reject God and be lost in any world that God could
actualize.19 Even an omnipotent God is unable to create a world in which a transcircumstantially

creatures in which all of the creatures freely choose to do only what is right throughout their lives) is to argue that
God’s omnipotence does not entail that He can necessarily create such a world. Plantinga makes it clear that
omnipotence does not entail being able to actualize just any possible world. God is free to actualize a world with
free creatures or free to refrain from doing so, but if He does actualize a world of free creatures then it is up to the
free creatures to choose what actions they will perform in the various circumstances in which they find themselves.
Plantinga thus rejects Mackie’s claim, which Plantinga terms “Leibniz’ Lapse,” that an omnipotent God “could have
created any possible world He pleased” (see p. 44). Plantinga names this lapse after Leibniz because Leibniz, like
Mackie, thought that God could create any possible world—though Leibniz thought that our world is the best of all
possible worlds and Mackie, of course, denies this. In the same way, the defender of P3 falls into Leibniz’ Lapse by
assuming that God can actualize a possible world in which all persons have libertarian freedom and freely choose to
receive Christ. Just because such a world is conceivable and is broadly logically possible, that does not mean that
such a world is feasible for God to create; that is, given counterfactual truths concerning the choices that all free
creatures whom God could create would make, God may not be able to bring about such a world. That is the sort of
point that Craig is rightly making here in suggesting that God may not be able to actualize a world in which all
people freely choose to be saved.
18. William Lane Craig, “Middle Knowledge and Christian Exclusivism,” Sophia 34, no. 1 (April 1995): 128.
For an explanation of the concept of an “essence,” see Plantinga’s God, Freedom, and Evil, pp. 49-53. Basically, an
essence is the “complete set of world-indexed properties” that are uniquely possessed by an individual. One’s
essence is “the set of properties essential to him.” For example, although others may share some of the worldindexed properties possessed by Napoleon’s essence (e.g., being born in France in 1769 in the actual world or
having six fingers in a particular world), no other essence shares all of the world-indexed properties that Napoleon
possesses.
19. Craig adapts this idea of transworld damnation from Plantinga’s concept of “transworld depravity,” a
condition that a person P has in which P would err with regard to at least one morally significant action in every
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damned person is freely saved. It may be argued, however, that God could simply choose not to
create a world that contains any such persons. God could choose to create only persons who
would freely choose to be saved in some possible world. Nevertheless, Craig contends that “even
if it were the case that for any individual He might create, God could actualize a world in which
that person is freely saved, it does not follow that there are worlds which are feasible for God in
which all individuals are saved.”20 This is because the circumstances in which numerous
different individuals freely choose to be saved may not be “compossible”; that is, they may not
be able to exist together in the same world. Moreover, even if they are compossible, the
combination of these various circumstances in the same world might not yield the same results
that occur when the circumstances are actualized apart from each other in isolation. In other
words, even if it is true that “in circumstances C1, individual S1 would do action a and that in
circumstances C2 individual S2 would do b and that C1 and C2 are compossible,” Craig points out
that one would commit the counterfactual fallacy of “strengthening the antecedent”21 if one
claims that it follows that “in C1 * C2, S1 would do a or that in C1 * C2, S2 would do b.”22 So the

world in which God could create P with libertarian freedom. If P suffers from transworld depravity, then in every
world W in which “is significantly free in W” and “never does what is wrong in W” are included in P’s essence,
God could not actualize W. So if all creaturely essences suffer from this condition, then there is no world that is
feasible for God to create that is composed entirely of free creatures who never sin. Even though worlds of free
creatures who never sin are logically possible, Plantinga points out that the fact that it is at least possible that all
creaturely essences suffer from transworld depravity means that there may be no way that God could bring about
such worlds. See: Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 51-53. In a similar way, Craig’s concept of transworld
damnation may be understood as follows: If a person Q suffers from this condition, then in every world W in which
“has libertarian freedom in W” and “freely chooses to be saved in W” are included in Q’s essence, God could not
actualize that world.
20. Craig, “No Other Name,” 182.
21. Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 48. Recall that counterfactual conditionals are conditional
statements in the subjunctive mood. They state what would be the case if a hypothetical antecedent were true. The
authors rightly explain that the counterfactual fallacy of strengthening the antecedent states that one cannot conclude
that Q would be true if (P & R) is true just because Q would be true if P were true. Such reasoning does not hold for
counterfactuals.
22. Craig, “No Other Name,” 182. Note that C1 * C2 indicates that both C1 and C2 occur in a world.
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fact that P3 may well not be feasible for God is enough to show that adding P3 and P4 to P1 and P2
does not bring out a clear contradiction between P1 and P2.
Beyond the above problem with P3, however, Craig also shows that P4 is dubious. He
proposes, contrary to P4, that it may be the case that “God prefers certain worlds in which some
persons fail to receive Christ and are damned [as opposed] to certain worlds in which all receive
Christ and are saved.”23 Craig points out that even if God could create worlds in which everyone
is freely saved, such worlds might have certain “overriding deficiencies that make them less
preferable” than the actual world in which some freely reject Christ and are lost. For example, it
is possible that “the only worlds in which everybody hears and freely believes the gospel are
worlds with only a handful of people in them, say, three or four. If God created any more people,
then at least one of them would not believe and so would be lost.”24 If so, it seems reasonable
that God may prefer well-populated worlds in which some are lost to minimally-populated
worlds in which all are saved. Though it seems plausible that God would ideally prefer to create
a world in which everyone is freely saved, the possibility exists that counterfactual truths
concerning creaturely freedom25 may be such that all of those worlds would be deficient in some
way that is unacceptable to God. It is, therefore, not at all clear that it is incumbent upon an

23. Craig, “No Other Name,” 183.
24. William Lane Craig, Hard Questions, Real Answers (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2003), 158.
25. The concept of a counterfactual of creaturely freedom will be explored later. Counterfactual conditionals
express what would be the case if a different antecedent state of affairs were to be actual. For example, “If it were
raining today, then my lawn would be wet.” It is not raining today, but if it were then my lawn would be wet. A
counterfactual of creaturely freedom is a counterfactual concerning what a free creature would do. A good definition
of a counterfactual of creaturely freedom is that it is a counterfactual “of the form If S were in C, S would freely do
A, where S is a created agent, A is some action, and C is a set of fully specified circumstances including the whole
history of the world up until the time of S’s free action.” See: William Lane Craig, “Middle Knowledge, TruthMakers, and the ‘Grounding Objection,’” Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001): 338.
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omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God to prefer a world in which all are freely saved
over a world in which some freely choose to be lost.
It is also worth noting that, for the same reason, there is no way that we can be confident
that God ought to prefer creating no world at all to creating a world in which some people are
damned. As Craig puts it, those “who would willingly reject God and forfeit salvation should not
be allowed to have a sort of ‘veto power’ over which worlds God is free to create.”26 God may
prefer to actualize a world in which many freely choose to be lost because it is only in such a
world that many people freely choose to enjoy the unfathomable benefit of an eternity with Him.
So P4 appears to be neither necessarily true nor required by Christian theism. Thus, given the
difficulties with both P3 and P4, we may conclude that the above argument reveals no clear
contradiction between P1 and P2.
Second Preliminary Objection: Should Not God Provide Universal Access to Salvation?
Despite the failure of the previous argument, the advocate of the soteriological POE may
still appeal to an even more vexing challenge for Christians. As evidenced by the statistics given
previously, a massive number of people throughout history have never even heard of Jesus.
Accordingly, instead of P3 and P4, the defender of the soteriological POE might conjoin the
following three premises to P1 and P2 in order to demonstrate a contradiction between them:
P5. Some people never hear the gospel.
P6. Anyone who never hears the gospel has no opportunity to accept God’s forgiveness
through Christ.
P7. God, if He exists, would be willing and able to ensure that everyone has an opportunity
to be saved.27

26. Craig, Hard Questions, Real Answers, 161.
27. See Table 1.1 on p. 62 for a summary of all the premises that are introduced in this chapter.
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Now if P5 and P6 are true, then it follows that some people have no opportunity to accept
God’s forgiveness through Christ. Given that P2 entails that one who does not accept God’s
forgiveness through Christ is damned, it follows that some people have no opportunity to avoid
being damned. Yet, if God’s attributes in P1 entail that P7 is true, then God should not allow it to
be the case that some people have no opportunity to avoid being damned. Thus, one may allege
that there is an inconsistency between P1 and P2.
To overcome this charge of inconsistency, one must make a plausible case that at least one
of the added premises is neither a necessary truth nor a premise that is required by orthodox
biblical theology. Since the truth of P5 is uncontroversial,28 the question becomes whether P6 and
P7 are either necessarily true or required by orthodox biblical theism. I will argue that P6 is the
flawed premise. I will aim to show that it is at least possible that all people do have an
opportunity to accept God’s forgiveness through Christ and be saved and that there is biblical
evidence that all people have at least an opportunity to be saved. If I can make this case
successfully, then P6 is neither necessarily true nor required by orthodox biblical theism.
I will not dispute P7 and will consider it to be in agreement with biblical teaching. It should
be noted that Calvinist Christians generally deny the truth of P7 because Calvinism holds that
God only wills and ensures the salvation of the elect. Indeed, a person’s “opportunity” to choose
to accept the salvation God offers has no place in Reformed doctrine because it holds that human
corruption entails that no human has any role in making a free choice to accept God’s grace and
be saved. God alone determines who is elect apart from any choices made by the individual and

28. Some argue that all people hear the gospel and have the chance to respond to it while in a postmortem
condition, but this speculation is not well supported in the Bible. Biblical arguments will be given later against there
being postmortem opportunities to accept Christ for those who failed to accept God’s offer of salvation in this
lifetime. An assumption of P5 is that hearing the gospel after death is irrelevant. I will not dispute this assumption.
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wholly apart from any qualities or abilities possessed by the individual (unconditional election).
Moreover, Calvinism views the atoning sacrifice of Jesus as salvifically efficacious only for the
elect (limited atonement). Nobody who is elect can resist God’s grace (irresistible grace), and
nobody who is determined by God to be reprobate can ever accept it.29 Nevertheless, contra these
Reformed views, I will accept that the biblical data does support the truth of P7. As I will later
argue, the strong case that can be made that the Bible upholds unlimited atonement and declares
God’s desire for all people to choose to be saved provides good reason to think that God is
willing to supply every person with an opportunity to be saved. Furthermore, by showing that P6
is not necessarily true and arguing that the unevangelized do have an opportunity to be saved, I
will make the case that God is also able to provide everyone with an opportunity to be saved
even if Christian exclusivism is true.
Practical Relevance: Concern for the Unevangelized Fuels Religious Pluralism
Before proceeding with a critique of P6, it is worth highlighting the practical significance of
this premise. Anxiety over the issue of whether those who are unevangelized lack the
opportunity to be saved is a crucial factor that has driven some people to adopt religious
pluralism. Religious pluralism rejects the truth of Christianity—and all claims to exclusive
religious truth—and holds that there are many valid paths to “salvation” or some sort of ultimate
religious outcome.
The pull toward religious pluralism over some form of religious exclusivism began
growing in the West in the Enlightenment, but it has especially taken off in the last century.
Although Christianity emerged within a milieu that included Judaism as well as the philosophies

29. These points are consistent with the standard Calvinist position, though not all Calvinists accept all of them.
For a concise overview of Calvinist doctrine (as it is typically understood) from a Reformed author, see: Duane
Edward Spencer, Tulip: The Five Points of Calvinism in the Light of Scripture (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1979).
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and pagan religions of the Greco-Roman world, by the fourth century Christianity was the
dominant religion of the Roman Empire. It remained dominant in the West for centuries, but a
shift began during the Enlightenment. Charles Taylor notes how the eighteenth century saw for
the first time in the West a “viable alternative to Christianity in exclusive humanism” (i.e., the
belief that ultimate meaning is found only in humanity and not in a transcendent reality).30 The
diversification of new positions in the nineteenth century resulting from the various critiques of
orthodox Christianity, Deism, and the emerging humanism led to what Taylor calls a “nova
effect” that has spawned “an ever-widening variety of moral/spiritual options” among the social
elite. In the twentieth century, however, the “fractured culture of the nova” has expanded from
the elites to “whole societies” and produced a “generalised culture of ‘authenticity,’ or
expressive individualism, in which people are encouraged to find their own way.”31 We now live
in what Taylor calls a “spiritual super-nova” in which there are many religious options.32 After
World War II there was greater wealth in the West and more people lived in the suburbs and on
their own. A culture of “authenticity” and being one’s “true self” emerged.33 The 1960s, in
particular, ushered in an “age of authenticity” in the West in which this individualism became
widespread and entrenched.34
Although these developments contributed to a twentieth century milieu in which it became
more acceptable to many people living in Western society to consider religious options other

30. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007),
423.
31. Ibid., 299.
32. Ibid., 300.
33. Ibid., 474-475.
34. Ibid., 473.
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than Christianity, one key development over the course of the last century has been especially
influential in driving Westerners toward a greater openness to a variety of religious options. That
development is the fact that technology, immigration, and the ability to travel quickly over vast
distances has led to greater awareness among Westerners of the religious diversity that exists in
the world so that the world has become a smaller place than it has ever been before. Telephones,
the internet, television, and air travel have greatly increased the contact that Westerners have
with adherents of the various world religions. Increased immigration into the West has been a
particularly significant factor. Harold Netland cites the significance of the 1965 Immigration and
Nationality Act in the United States as a major contributor to greater awareness of religious
diversity in America. This has led to a huge influx of non-European immigrants to the United
States so that it is no longer uncommon to have neighbors, coworkers, and classmates who
practice Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, and other non-Christian religions.35 Other Western
countries have also seen increased immigration from Eastern and Middle Eastern peoples. The
weakening of Christian dominance in the West together with increased awareness of religious
diversity and greater interaction with good and decent people who practice other faiths has given
rise to a growing discomfort that there is only one true religion. In this much more diverse
Western milieu, the Christian teaching that salvation is found only through Jesus Christ and that
non-Christians will suffer eternal separation from God has driven more and more people to
religious pluralism. The idea that many people living in the East may perish—people who are
just like our kind Eastern neighbors and coworkers—without ever so much as hearing the gospel
(and, presumably, lacking an opportunity at salvation) leads many to suspect that Christianity
cannot possibly be the only true religion.

35. Harold Netland, Encountering Religious Pluralism: The Challenge to Christian Faith & Mission (Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 9.
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There may be no more prominent defender of religious pluralism in contemporary
scholarship than the late philosopher and theologian John Hick. It is thus instructive to examine
the shift that occurred in his view and how concern for the eternal fate of adherents of nonChristian faiths drove him to religious pluralism. Hick once believed that salvation is found in
Christ alone and that Christianity alone is true; however, he later abandoned orthodox
Christianity and adopted the view that the supreme “Reality,” which he terms the “Real,” is
unknowable. (Hick avoids using the term “God” in favor of more religiously neutral terminology
like the “Real.”) Moreover, he suggests that all world religions that promote a transformation
from “self-centeredness” to “Reality-centeredness” are effective in achieving the ultimate
religious goal—what Hick generically calls “salvation/liberation.”36 Hick came to regard all
“Reality-centered” religions as equally effective “ways of salvation.”37 This salvation, of course,
must not be understood in Christian terms. Indeed, since Hick’s view is that we can know
nothing about the Real, we clearly cannot know whether there are actual “sins” against the Real
that require forgiveness.38 In order to allow that numerous mutually exclusive religions are
equally valid paths to God, Hick felt compelled to reject the exclusivistic aspects of all religions.
What, then, is the catalyst that led Hick to abandon Christianity in favor of this pluralistic
perspective? The key difficulty for Hick is that he began to regard the core Christian doctrine
that salvation is found only in Christ as inconsistent with Christianity’s conception of an allloving God. Hick saw this doctrine as “a grave problem, for the eternal destiny of the large

36. John Hick, “A Pluralist View,” in Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World, ed. Dennis L. Okholm
and Timothy R. Phillips (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1996), 44.
37. John Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate: Christology in a Pluralistic Age, 2nd ed. (Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), 136.
38. Of course, one of the difficulties with Hick’s view is that the unknowability of the Real seems to make the
very concept of “Reality-centeredness” an arbitrary concept that cannot be defined.
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majority of the human race is at stake. The unacceptable aspect of the old exclusivist view that
non-Christians are eternally lost, or eternally tormented in hell, is its dire implication concerning
the nature of God.”39 In particular, Hick’s unease with Christianity primarily boils down to the
question raised by P6 concerning the opportunity for the unevangelized to be saved. Hick
explains:
For understood literally the Son of God, God the Son, God-incarnate language implies that
God can be adequately known and responded to only through Jesus; and the whole
religious life of mankind, beyond the stream of Judaic-Christian faith is thus by implication
excluded as lying outside the sphere of salvation. This implication did little positive harm
so long as Christendom was a largely autonomous civilization with only relatively marginal
interaction with the rest of mankind. But with the clash between the Christian and Muslim
worlds, and then on an ever-broadening front with European colonization through the earth,
the literal understanding of the mythological language of Christian discipleship has had a
divisive effect upon the relations between that minority of human beings who live within
the borders of the Christian tradition and that majority who live outside it and within other
streams of religious life.
Transposed into theological terms, the problem which has come to the surface in the
encounter of Christianity with the other world religions is this: If Jesus was literally God
incarnate, and if it is by his death alone that men can be saved, and by their response to him
alone that they can appropriate that salvation, then the only doorway to eternal life is
Christian faith. It would follow from this that the large majority of the human race so far
have not been saved. But is it credible that the loving God and Father of all men has
decreed that only those born within one particular thread of human history shall be saved?40
As exemplified in this passage from Hick and as noted by Taylor and Netland, many have
recognized how the widened cultural interaction resulting from the “colonial expansion of
Europe during the last five centuries”41 has shaken Christianity in the West as awareness has
grown of “the existence of other nations, religions, and races outside of our own tiny enclave.”42

39. Hick, “Pluralist View,” 45.
40. John Hick, “Jesus and the World Religions,” in The Myth of God Incarnate, ed. John Hick (Philadelphia,
PA: The Westminster Press, 1977), 179-80. Craig also cites this quote in his article “No Other Name,” pp. 175-176.
41. Nicholas Ibeawuchi Mbogu, Christology and Religious Pluralism: A Review of John Hick’s Theocentric
Model of Christology and the Emergence of African Inculturation Christologies (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 2006), 54.
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Hick’s claim is that, in light of what we now know about the enormous religious diversity of
mankind and the fact that most people who have ever lived have not been Christians, it is not
“credible” that the omnibenevolent God described in the Bible would determine that eternal life
hinges upon whether one happens to be born in a time and place where one has the opportunity
to hear about Jesus and accept Him as Savior. Hick recognizes that the Bible does teach that
salvation is only through Christ, but he assumes that this means that salvation is not accessible to
large portions of humanity. It is largely this fact that drives him away from Christianity and
towards the pluralism that he finds more palatable.
Inclusivism versus Exclusivism: A Spectrum of Views among Christians
Yet is it true that, as P6 states, anyone who never hears the gospel has no opportunity to
accept God’s forgiveness through Christ? Christians—including evangelical Christians—have
adopted a full spectrum of views in response to this troubling question, from a strong form of
Christian inclusivism to an unbending Christian exclusivism. Indeed, Daniel Strange contends
that “there seems to be no consensus on what represents an ‘historic orthodox’ evangelical
position” on this issue.43 Let us explore the range of positions.
D. A. Carson offers a useful definition of Christian inclusivism that adheres to a typical
understanding of the term, describing it as the view that “all who are saved are saved on account
of the person and work of Jesus Christ, but that conscious faith in Jesus Christ is not absolutely
necessary: some may be saved by him who never heard of him, for they may respond positively

42. Mbogu, Christology and Religious Pluralism, 56.
43. Daniel Strange, The Possibility of Salvation Among the Unevangelized: An Analysis of Inclusivism in Recent
Evangelical Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2002), 21.
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to the light they have received.”44 Carson likewise offers a standard definition of Christian
exclusivism. Christian exclusivism agrees with inclusivism that nobody is saved apart from the
person and work of Jesus, but it requires that “only those who place their faith in the Christ of the
Bible are saved.”45 So, in contrast to religious pluralists, both inclusivists and exclusivists accept
the core Christian doctrine that the atoning work of Jesus is the one and only means by which
anyone can be saved. The dividing line between inclusivists and exclusivists is simply the
question of whether one must actually have explicit faith in Jesus as the object of one’s faith.46
Within inclusivism there is a range of positions. Carson helpfully distinguishes between
what he calls “hard” inclusivism and “soft” inclusivism. Soft inclusivists are very close to being
exclusivists, but they at least allow the “bare possibility” that inclusivism is true. Soft inclusivists
do not find that there is strong biblical evidence to affirm the truth of inclusivism, but they still
allow that the biblical data does not necessarily preclude the possibility that the unevangelized
may be saved by responding to the general revelation that they have. Hard inclusivists, by
contrast, firmly hold that inclusivism is, in fact, biblically warranted and true. Hard inclusivists
thus adopt a soteriologal position that places “more emphasis on believing than on believing
Christ.”47 As noted hard inclusivist John Sanders describes his position, Scripture decisively

44. D. A. Carson, The Gagging of God: Christianity Confronts Pluralism (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan,
1996), 278.
45. Ibid.
46. Some have defined exclusivism and inclusivism differently. For example, see Netland, Encountering
Religious Pluralism, 48-52. The definitions I provide for these terms, however, are common. In any case, regardless
of the terminology, what is important is understanding the concepts that I am describing.
47. Carson, The Gagging of God, 279. Others have used different terms to describe the same concepts that
Carson conveys. For example, Paul Helm uses the term “opaque exclusivism” and Terrence Tiessen uses the term
“agnosticism” to describe the same position that Carson calls “soft inclusivism.” See: Terrance L. Tiessen, Who Can
Be Saved?: Reassessing Salvation in Christ and World Religions (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004), 3840. See also: Paul Helm, “Are They Few That Be Saved?,” in Universalism and the Doctrine of Hell, ed. Nigel M.
de S. Cameron (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1992), 278-279.
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teaches that “the appropriation of salvific grace is mediated through general revelation and God’s
providential workings in human history.” In this way, “the work of Jesus is ontologically
necessary for salvation (no one would be saved without it) but not epistemologically necessary
(one need not be aware of the work in order to benefit from it).”48 Besides the distinction
between hard and soft inclusivism, Craig and Moreland recognize another point of difference
among inclusivists: inclusivism ranges from “narrow” to “broad.”49 Narrow inclusivists believe
that few people will be saved apart from explicit faith in Jesus. Broad inclusivists are optimistic
that many will be saved in this way. One may adopt either a narrow or broad approach to
inclusivism regardless of whether one is a soft or hard inclusivist.50
Along with the aforementioned Sanders, the late Clark Pinnock was perhaps the most
outspoken evangelical theologian who advocated hard inclusivism in recent times. Indeed, more
and more evangelical Protestants seem to be moving from the traditional exclusivist position and
toward inclusivism.51 Moreover, an even greater number of Roman Catholics have adopted hard
inclusivism in light of the decision reached at Vatican II (1962 - 1965) concerning the
unevangelized. The Roman Catholic Church, heavily influenced by the inclusivist ideas of Karl
Rahner and continuing to move away from its long-held position that only those within the
Roman Catholic Church are saved, declared at Vatican II: “Those who, through no fault of their

48. John Sanders, No Other Name: An Investigation into the Destiny of the Unevangelized (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 1992), 215.
49. Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 630.
50. Ibid., 633. For example, Craig and Moreland advocate hard inclusivism since they claim that the Bible
provides positive evidence for inclusivism; yet they only advocate a very narrow inclusivism, as they believe certain
passages give no hope that many people will be saved via general revelation. By comparison, Sanders and Pinnock
are hard and broad inclusivists. It is also possible to be soft and broad as well as soft and narrow.
51. Ronald Nash, Is Jesus the Only Savior? (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1994), 106-107. The late Ronald
Nash, an evangelical and a very ardent exclusivist, estimated in 1994 that the majority of evangelical leaders and at
least a third of evangelical laypeople were inclusivists.
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own, do not know the Gospel of Christ or his Church, but who nevertheless seek God with a
sincere heart, and, moved by grace, try in their actions to do his will as they know it through the
dictates of their conscience—those too may achieve eternal salvation” (Lumen Gentium 16).52
Now it is evident that if inclusivism—a view which clearly enjoys a significant number of
adherents in both Protestant and Catholic circles—is true, then P6 is false; even the
unevangelized would have the opportunity to respond to general revelation and be saved. Even if
it were the case that very few of the unevangelized actually do choose to respond to general
revelation and be saved (narrow inclusivism), the fact would remain that all people have an
opportunity to be saved. Unfortunately, however, there does not seem to be strong biblical
evidence for inclusivism. For that reason, in my judgment inclusivism should not be assumed.53 I
will proceed to argue that P6 is plausibly false even if exclusivism is accepted. Since P6 is
automatically false if inclusivism is true, attempting to offer a refutation of inclusivism is not
necessary and will not be carried out here; rather, I will seek to show that P6 should be rejected
even if one assumes the truth of the more challenging position that Christian exclusivism is true.

52. Austin Flannery, ed., Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, vol. 1 of The
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Gagging of God, 285-314; Nash, Is Jesus the Only Savior?, chapters 8-9; R. Douglas Geivett and W. Gary Phillips,
“A Particularist View: An Evidentialist Approach,” in Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World, ed. Dennis L.
Okholm and Timothy R. Phillips (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1996), 239-243; Christopher R.
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After briefly examining some of the biblical data that supports exclusivism, I will contend
that there are three biblical reasons for thinking that God has provided an opportunity for
salvation to all people. I will then lay out an exclusivist position that, despite being exclusivist,
still allows that all people have the opportunity to be saved. If this view is sustainable, it shows
that one need not be driven to inclusivism out of an unwillingness to accept P6.
Exclusivism: The Centrality of the Gospel in Scripture
Before proceeding with an assessment of P6 under the assumption of exclusivism, it is
useful to examine a sampling of the many biblical passages that underscore the elevated place of
the gospel in the New Testament teaching concerning soteriology. The aim in doing this—for the
reason given above—is not to offer here in this brief space a decisive refutation of inclusivism,
as I will not in this section interact with any texts that are alleged to support inclusivism; rather,
the aim is merely to highlight some of the texts that emphasize the centrality that the Scripture
gives to the gospel in soteriology so that the value of defending an exclusivist position is clear.
In agreement with the exclusivist position, Scripture does indicate that a key component of
saving faith is that faith is to be directed toward the correct object: Jesus Christ. Jesus Himself
highlights the importance of placing faith specifically in Him, saying that whoever “believes in
[Me] is not judged; he who does not believe has been judged already, because he has not
believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God” (Jn 3:18). Jesus also gives the command
to take the specific message of the gospel to all the people of the world and make disciples out of
them (Mt 28:19-20).
Paul describes the gospel as “the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes, to
the Jew first and also to the Greek. For in it the righteousness of God is revealed from faith to
faith; as it is written, ‘But the righteous man shall live by faith’” (Rom 1:16-17). Paul thus shows
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his high regard for the gospel by intimately tying saving faith to accepting the gospel and
considering it “the power of God for salvation.” Paul goes on in his letter to the Romans to
emphasize the centrality of responding to the gospel, saying that the “word of faith” (Rom 10:8)
he has been preaching is that “if you confess with your mouth Jesus as Lord, and believe in your
heart that God raised Him from the dead, you will be saved; for with the heart a person believes,
resulting in righteousness, and with the mouth he confesses, resulting in salvation” (Rom 10:910). So Paul describes saving faith as faith that is directed at Jesus Christ. He says that “whoever
believes in [Jesus] will not be disappointed” (Rom 10:11) and “whoever will call on the name of
the Lord will be saved” (Rom 10:13). Paul then emphasizes the importance of carrying out the
commission Jesus gave in Matthew 28 by reminding his readers that one cannot respond to the
gospel and be saved until one hears the gospel. Quoting Isaiah, Paul says: “How then will they
call on Him in whom they have not believed? How will they believe in Him whom they have not
heard? And how will they hear without a preacher? How will they preach unless they are sent?
Just as it is written, ‘How beautiful are the feet of those who bring good news of good things!’”
(Rom 10:14-15). He concludes that “faith comes from hearing, and hearing by the word of
Christ” (Rom 10:17).54 Paul’s message seems clear: One must call on the name of the Lord to be
saved, and one cannot call on the Lord if one has not heard of the Lord. Now Paul’s argument
here does not exclude that one can hear the gospel from a source other than a human preacher in
order to be saved, although he is undeniably emphasizing the importance of carrying out the call
to evangelism. What it does do, however, is help us to see why the traditional Christian view has

54. Despite Paul’s subsequent reference in Romans 10:18 to Psalm 19:4, a passage which clearly describes how
some knowledge of God is revealed to all people through God’s general revelation, it would violate the context of
Romans 10 to assume that this reference somehow advocates the idea that one can be saved by responding to general
revelation apart from hearing the gospel. As Ronald Nash says in Is Jesus the Only Savior?, such an interpretation
“would bring Paul’s entire argument in that chapter to an abrupt halt” (p. 121).
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been that there is no assurance of salvation apart from somehow hearing the gospel and
responding to it.
There are numerous examples of biblical texts that connect saving faith with hearing and
accepting the gospel. The answer that is consistently given in the book of Acts to the question of
what one must do to be saved involves an explicit response to the gospel (e.g., Acts 2:38-39;
11:14; 16:31). There is an information content in faith to which we are called to be “obedient”
(Acts 6:7), for which we are to “contend” (Jude 3), and from which we must not “go astray” (1
Tim 6:21). Paul obviously cared very much about the specific content of the faith communicated
in the one true gospel (Gal 1:6-9). Saving faith also is accompanied by the specific knowledge
that one needs to repent of sins committed against God (Lk 13:3-5; Acts 2:38; 2 Cor 7:10). While
I have not made an attempt to refute inclusivism, the above ought to at least indicate that there is
a strong biblical basis for thinking that it is important—and may well be essential—for one to
hear the gospel and respond to it in order to be saved. It is thus advantageous if one can refute P6
despite assuming the truth of exclusivism.
Three Biblical Indicators Pointing Toward Universally Accessible Salvation
Let us now begin to critique P6—which claims that anyone who never hears the gospel has
no opportunity to accept God’s forgiveness through Christ—under the assumption of
exclusivism. Recall that rejecting P6 will undercut the major objection we are examining, which
centers upon the Christian God failing to provide universal access to salvation and aims to show
that P1 and P2 are inconsistent. I will make the case that three biblical truths, especially when
taken together, serve as strong indicators that God at least offers the opportunity for salvation to
all. First, God wants all to be saved. Second, Jesus died for the sins of all people (i.e., there is
unlimited atonement). Third, there is a desired response to general revelation implied by the facts
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that general revelation leaves everybody without excuse (Rom 1) and renders guilty those who
ignore it (Rom 2). After examining each of the three biblical indicators that point toward God
providing universal access to salvation, I will suggest a particular way that all people might have
an opportunity for salvation even if Christian exclusivism is true and even though many do not
hear the gospel. Let us begin with the first biblical indicator that God has provided all people
with the opportunity to be saved.
First Biblical Indicator: God’s Universal Salvific Will
The first biblical basis for thinking that God makes salvation universally accessible is that
God wants all to be saved. Although, as previously argued, God may not be able to actualize a
well-populated world of free persons in which all of them freely choose to be saved, Scripture
declares that it is nevertheless God’s desire that all would choose to be saved. Paul declares that
God “desires all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim 2:4). Peter
likewise proclaims, “The Lord is not slow about His promise, as some count slowness, but is
patient toward you, not wishing for any to perish but for all to come to repentance” (2 Pt 3:9).
God rhetorically asks, “Do I have any pleasure in the death of the wicked?” God insists that He
prefers instead that the wicked would “turn from his ways and live” (Ezek 18:23).
Yet, if God truly does want all people to be saved, one would expect that He would provide
all people with that opportunity. Inclusivist John Sanders contends that if God “has not provided
an opportunity for all people to benefit from the redeeming work of the Son,” then it would not
seem that God does “truly love all people enough genuinely to desire that they be saved.”55
Sanders’ point is valid. Clearly all people are lost sinners in need of God’s salvation (Rom 3:23).
In what sense could God, who sent his Son “to seek and to save that which was lost” (Lk 19:10),

55. Sanders, No Other Name, 60.
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genuinely desire the salvation of every person if some people are not even afforded the
opportunity for salvation?
Some do, however, dispute that God desires the salvation of all people. Christians with a
Reformed soteriology who hold that God sovereignly decrees to elect only some even though it
is within His power to save all must wrestle with the aforementioned passages that indicate
God’s universal salvific will. Some Calvinists, such as David Engelsma, strongly reject that God
does desire the salvation of all. Engelsma declares that the “Reformed doctrine of reprobation” is
the “explicit denial that God loves all men, and conditionally offers them salvation. Reprobation
asserts that God eternally hates some men; has immutably decreed their damnation; and has
determined to withhold from them Christ, grace, faith, and salvation.”56 Yet it is difficult to see
how one could deny God’s desire for all people to be saved in light of the biblical passages cited
above. Calvinists, in order to reconcile the fact that not every person is saved with a view of
God’s sovereignty that entails that His desires are never thwarted, often assert that these passages
only indicate that God desires the salvation of all sorts of people rather than literally all people.
Following the view of Augustine and Calvin, Ronald Nash contends that these passages
indicating God’s desire to save “all people” simply mean that God wants to save “all humans
without distinction.” In this way, Nash says that God desires the salvation of people from all
nationalities and backgrounds, but not every individual person.57 Many Reformed theologians
attempt to show that these passages only teach that God desires the salvation of all of the elect.58
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of the Unevangelized, ed. John Sanders (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1995), 124.
58. R. K. McGregor Wright, No Place for Sovereignty: What’s Wrong with Freewill Theism (Downers Grove,
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How, then, should these passages be interpreted? It is clear that the Greek word for “all” or
“everybody” (πᾶς) that is used in 1 Timothy 2:4 (God “desires all men to be saved and to come
to the knowledge of the truth”) and 2 Peter 3:9 (God wants “all to come to repentance”) is
sometimes not intended to carry the idea of universal scope. This is evident from the context of
such passages as Acts 21:28, in which the Jews accuse Paul of preaching about Jesus to “all” or
“everyone” (πᾶς). The Jews clearly do not mean that Paul has literally preached to every single
person in the world. Yet when Paul uses πᾶς to declare that “all” have sinned in Romans 3:23,
Calvinists and non-Calvinists can agree—given the context of Romans 3:1-20 and the testimony
of other Scriptures—that Paul is using this term with universal scope to affirm that all people are
sinners in need of God’s grace. So context must be our guide in determining the scope of this
Greek word in each place that it is used.
When context is considered, the biblical texts cited in support of God’s desire to save all
people are best interpreted as referring to each and every person that God creates. Consider the
context of 1 Timothy 2:4. Here, the connection with the prayers and petitions that Paul urges his
audience to make “on behalf of all men” (the term for “all” is again πᾶς) in verse one of the
chapter is key. There is no contextual basis for limiting the scope of “all men” in verse one to
anything less than literally all people. Some have claimed that the “specification of a subgroup”
in verse two (“kings and all who are in authority”) gives credibility to the interpretation that the
“all” in verse one (as well as verse four) means “all kinds of people.”59 However, the problem
with this view is that it does not fit with the flow of Paul’s thought. As I. Howard Marshall
points out, Paul actually maintains his focus on all people when he gives special attention to
praying for those who are in authority in verse two. This is because, as Paul specifically says in

59. George William Knight, The Pastoral Epistles: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 1992), 115.
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verse two, these rulers are able to facilitate an environment in which mankind might live
peaceful and godly lives. In this way, the call to prayer for rulers in verse two is not specifically
for the salvation of the rulers as a subgroup; rather, this prayer is in support of Paul’s command
to pray for all people in verse one.60 Paul continues his focus on all people in verses three and
four by indicating that the idea of all men living a godly life pleases God, a state of affairs
congruent with God’s desire for all men to be saved. Paul continues the universal focus in verses
five and six, emphasizing Christ’s role as the sole mediator between mankind and God and
stating that Christ “gave Himself as a ransom for all.”61 Thus, the context for the universal focus
of “all” that is seen in these six verses is established in verse one and remains unbroken.
The other texts cited in support of God’s universal salvific will also hold up well when
their contexts are scrutinized. For example, 2 Peter 3:9 is set within the context of the Apostle
Peter emphasizing God’s patience in holding off on His certain judgment of the world. Peter says
that God’s delay of judgment should not be misinterpreted as “slowness”; rather, the Lord’s
return is delayed because He is “patient with you” and is “not wishing for any to perish but for
all to come to repentance.” Some Reformed commentators have interpreted the “you” (which is
the second person plural personal pronoun) in this verse as referring only to those who are
already saved, since Peter addresses the letter to “those who have received a faith of the same
kind as ours” (2 Pt 1:1). The references to “any” and “all” in this passage are then interpreted as
only referring to those who are saved. The problem, however, is that it makes no sense “to say
that God wants his saved ones to repent so they can be saved.” Thus, there is no good reason to
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think that the context implies that a restriction should be placed on the “any” (those whom God
does not want to perish) or on the “all” (those whom God wants to repent).62
The strength of the arguments in favor of God’s universal salvific will is also evidenced by
the fact that they are even accepted by some Reformed theologians. John Piper, for example,
embraces the biblical data affirming God’s universal salvific will. Piper, however, claims that
this truth is compatible with the Calvinist doctrine that God unconditionally chooses to elect only
certain people to salvation even though it is fully within God’s power to save everyone.63 If he is
able to show this is true and square Reformed soteriology with God’s universal salvific will, then
my contention that God’s universal salvific will implies that God provides all people with an
opportunity to be saved would be falsified. Piper’s argument, however, is unconvincing.
Piper’s argument involves God having two wills with regard to salvation. God sincerely
wills for all to be saved, but this will is overruled by His will to demonstrate His “glory in wrath
and mercy (Rom 9:22-23) and the humbling of man so that he enjoys giving all credit to God for
his salvation (1 Cor 1:29).”64 Given the Reformed position that God is solely responsible for
determining who is elect and that one’s election or reprobation is not based upon the qualities of
that individual (election is unconditional), Piper allows that universalism would be the case if
God chose to elect everyone. Since universalism is not the case and God chooses that some will
not be elect, the explanation that Piper gives for this, as seen in the previous quotation, is that
God’s will to show His holy wrath by not providing the gift of faith to the reprobate trumps His
sincere will for all to be saved. As much as God would like to opt for universalism, Piper thinks
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that God’s greater will is to demonstrate His righteous judgment of sin by condemning some
individuals so that His glory is revealed to the elect and the reprobate. Nevertheless, in contrast
to Engelsma, Piper holds that God does truly love the reprobate and sincerely wills their
salvation.
Piper attempts to reinforce his point by offering an analogy that compares God’s decision
to condemn those He loves to a decision that George Washington once made to execute for
treason an officer for which Washington had sincere love and compassion. Washington’s will to
have compassion on the criminal was trumped by his will to carry out the “superior judgments”
of “wisdom, duty, patriotism, and moral indignation.”65 Jerry Walls and Joseph Dongell,
however, point out a significant problem with Piper’s view, which is ironically made more
obvious by his analogy. The problem is that, according to the Reformed perspective, it is within
God’s power to save any sinner. Although Washington lacked the power to ensure that the guilty
officer could have avoided his fate, Calvinism requires that God has the power to “act on any
sinner in such a way that the sinner will not persist in sin and unbelief.”66 If Washington had the
ability to ensure that no one has to be condemned for his or her transgressions, then it would be
problematic to claim that Washington truly had compassion and love for the officer he executed.
While it is true that God’s justice does not obligate Him to save anyone, God’s love and
compassion (or at least love and compassion that rise to the level of omnibenevolence) do seem
to be inadequate if He chooses not to save everyone when it is within His power to do so. As I
have argued previously, given the (non-Calvinist) position that humans have the libertarian
freedom to choose God’s salvation or reject it of their own accord, it is possible that even an
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omnipotent God cannot ensure universal salvation in a well-populated world of free creatures.
This accounts well for God truly having a universal salvific will despite the fact that there is not
universal salvation. However, since Calvinism denies that libertarian human free will is involved
in any human’s acceptance of God’s gracious offer of salvation and places election entirely
within God’s hands so that God could have saved all had He chosen to do so, it becomes
inconsistent for Calvinists also to affirm that God truly desires the salvation of all people.
Indeed, Engelsma derides any attempt made by fellow Calvinists to reconcile God’s universal
salvific will with unconditional election, flatly declaring this position “a fraud.”67
Regarding the idea that God gains glory by determining that the reprobate will be lost so
that His wrath is carried out against them when God could just as easily have saved them, Walls
and David Baggett argue that on this view “there is no intelligible sense in which God loves
those who are lost, nor is there any recognizable sense in which he is good to them.” They
contend that a God who would act in this way is not good in any way that is recognizable by
humans, and they find it unacceptable that the goodness of God should be unrecognizable to us if
it is to be meaningful at all for us to regard God as “good.” Moreover, besides the fact that it
seems impossible on this view to affirm God’s goodness and love for the lost, Baggett and Walls
also rightly find that the idea of God solely determining whether each human will accept Christ
and His offer of salvation fails to do justice to any reasonable view of our love for God. If God’s
love and grace are irresistible for the elect and the reprobate lack the freedom to accept God’s
love and grace, then God’s election seems to cache out to a sort of “divine love potion.” This is
problematic because genuine love seemingly must be a “two-way relationship” that is freely

67. Engelsma, Hyper-Calvinism and the Call of the Gospel, 41. In the next chapter we will see how Molinism
does justice to God’s sovereignty in election while affirming that humans have libertarian freedom.
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entered into by both parties.68 Given a reasonable understanding of “goodness” and “love,” it
does not seem plausible that God is either good or loving on the view Piper proposes. While
some biblical teachings may be hard (but not impossible) to square with our moral sense, Baggett
and Walls seem to be correct in finding it impossible to square with our moral sensibilities the
idea that God’s perfect goodness and love would remain intact and that He would genuinely gain
glory for Himself if Piper’s view were to be true.69
In addition, Piper’s appeal to Romans 9 (which is often viewed as a proof text for
Reformed soteriology) in the quotation above to argue that God gains “glory in wrath and
mercy” does not justify his view that God has an overriding will to damn some. Jack Cottrell
offers an insightful interpretation of Romans 9 in which he makes a strong case that Paul is not
aiming to teach unconditional election to salvation or reprobation. Cottrell contends that Paul
distinguishes between God’s unconditional election to service (i.e., God unconditionally chooses
to use individuals and entire nations to serve in various roles that fulfill His sovereign plans) and
God’s conditional election to salvation (i.e., salvation is always conditional upon humans
accepting the grace God offers). While it takes us too far afield to exegete in detail Romans 9-11
(which Cottrell rightly sees as a unit), it is worth briefly summarizing Cottrell’s view. Cottrell
recognizes that Romans 9:1-6 is a prologue to this three-chapter unit. This prologue introduces
the contrast between national Israel (those who are ethnically Jewish) and spiritual Israel (those
who accept God’s grace and are saved), indicating that not all who are in the former are in the
latter. Romans 9 aims to show that God is sovereign and can choose to elect people and nations
unconditionally to serve particular roles in the divine plan wholly apart from whether those

68. David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 71.
69. Ibid., 72-73.
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individuals will ultimately be saved. Paul is highlighting that God is not unfair in allowing some
individuals within national Israel to be lost—the reality that Paul mournfully introduces in the
prologue. Cottrell contends that the election described in Romans 9:7-18 has to do with
unconditional election to service and not election to salvation; it is 9:19-10:21 that discusses
salvation, and salvation is conditional. Finally, 11:1-32 stresses that those who are ethnically
Jewish can be saved.70 In addition to this interpretation being plausible, it is also attractive given:
the moral challenges faced by double predestination; the clear biblical teachings we have noted
concerning God’s sincere universal salvific will; and the difficulty of reconciling God’s universal
salvific will with double predestination. God is sovereign and has good reasons for creating the
lost, but it seems biblically and morally important to affirm that the lost freely choose to reject
God’s offer of salvation and that God genuinely desires their salvation (even though it is
plausibly not feasible to actualize a world in which all are freely saved).
In the final analysis, it seems reasonable to agree with Piper over Engelsma that Scripture
affirms God’s universal salvific will, but it seems most reasonable to agree with Engelsma over
Piper that God’s universal salvific will is inconsistent with God withholding salvation from some

70. For the details of Cottrell’s exegesis, see “Part Four: The Faithfulness of God in His Dealings with the Jews
— 9:1-11:36” in Jack Cottrell, Romans (Joplin, Mo: College Press, 2005). Concerning Romans 9:7-18, which
Cottrell argues has to do with unconditional election to service and not election to salvation, it is worth making a
couple of additional points. Paul’s comments concerning Jacob and Esau make no statement about the salvation of
Jacob and Esau or about the salvation of anyone else. Paul is commenting on God’s sovereign choice that Jacob’s
descendants would be God’s chosen people and not Esau’s and that this was chosen by God before the brothers were
born. With regard to Pharaoh, Paul’s focus is again not on the divine election or reprobation of Pharaoh. His focus is
on God’s sovereign choice to raise up Pharaoh and place him into power so that God’s name would be known
throughout the earth. God showed favor to Pharaoh by giving him power but chose to harden Pharaoh to achieve
divine purposes. The focus here is not on soteriology. Moreover, the passage does not even say anything about
whether Pharaoh had libertarian freedom when God hardened him in this way. The Scriptures are clear that Pharaoh
stubbornly hardened his own heart (Ex 7:14; 8:15, 32; 9:34). There is also a very real sense in which God actively
hardened Pharaoh’s heart (Ex 9:32; 10:1, 20, 27; 11:10), but this is compatible with Pharaoh freely hardening his
own heart. God knew that Pharaoh would stubbornly (and freely) harden his own heart if God continually brought
the plagues on Egypt; thus, by bringing the plagues God ensured that Pharaoh’s heart would be hardened and that
God’s objectives would be achieved through Pharaoh.
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when He could have saved all. If God withholds salvation from some when He just as easily
could have saved them, this would contradict the biblical teaching that God truly desires all to be
saved. If God genuinely has a universal salvific will and humans have a role in freely choosing to
accept or reject the grace that God offers as He works to draw us to Him, then this seems to
imply that God would provide at least an opportunity for salvation to every person. The divine
will for all to be saved seems to serve as one strong indicator that in some way God would at
least made salvation accessible to all.
Second Biblical Indicator: Unlimited Atonement
A second biblical basis for thinking that God makes the opportunity for salvation
universally accessible is that the benefits of Christ’s atoning death are offered to all people. If the
previous contention that Scripture affirms God’s universal salvific will is successful, then it
seems to follow that the grace and forgiveness that God offers via Christ’s atoning sacrifice
would be made available for anyone. It would make little sense for God to desire that all people
would choose to be saved if the only gate God provides for salvation is not intended for some
people. As it turns out, the Bible does support the doctrine of unlimited atonement. Let us now
survey some of the key evidence for this doctrine.
It is useful to begin by returning to Paul’s comments in First Timothy. I have argued that
the context of the first four verses of chapter two supports interpreting “all” in the universal
sense. We also saw that Paul continues his line of thinking in the subsequent verses. After urging
his audience to pray for all people and confirming God’s desire for all to be saved, Paul states in
verses five and six that Christ, the only mediator between mankind and God, “gave Himself as a
ransom for all.” If my argument concerning the interpretation of the first four verses is correct,
then it makes no sense to abandon the universal sense of “all” in verse six. This is especially true
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in light of Paul’s later statement in the same epistle that God “is the Savior of all men, especially
of believers” (1 Tim 4:10). Here, Paul specifically differentiates “believers” from “all men.” This
passage provides an especially impressive case for unlimited atonement because, as Millard
Erickson says, it shows that “the Savior has done something for all persons, though it is less in
degree than what he has done for those who believe.”71 While Christ is Savior for all people in
some sense (plausibly in the sense that anyone can accept the salvation He offers), it is only
believers who will be saved.
Although no Scripture explicitly teaches that Christ died only for the elect and not for
others, the above evidence from First Timothy only scratches the surface of the numerous
passages that do indicate that Christ died for all people. John says: “My little children, I am
writing these things to you so that you may not sin. And if anyone sins, we have an Advocate
with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and He Himself is the propitiation for our sins; and
not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world” (1 Jn 2:1-2). Jesus thus stands as the
propitiation for the sins of all people, though it is true that not all will accept this gift. Peter says:
“But false prophets also arose among the people, just as there will also be false teachers among
you, who will secretly introduce destructive heresies, even denying the Master who bought them,
bringing swift destruction upon themselves” (2 Pt 2:1-2). Here Peter states that the false teachers
bring destruction on themselves by denying Jesus, the “Master who bought them.” Even though
they reject Christ and are lost, Christ nevertheless paid for their sins. In one of the most
celebrated Old Testament prophecies, Isaiah says concerning Christ that “all of us like sheep
have gone astray, each of us has turned to his own way; but the Lord has caused the iniquity of
us all to fall on Him” (Is 53:6). Paul is in agreement with Isaiah that even though “all have

71. Millard Erickson, Christian Theology, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1984), 834.
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sinned and fall short of the glory of God” (Rom 3:23), “Christ died for the ungodly” (Rom 5:6).
Since every person has gone astray and is ungodly, Christ’s death must be able to cover the sins
of all men. Finally, when Paul says that “the grace of God has appeared, bringing salvation to all
men,” he clearly is not advocating a doctrine of universal salvation; rather, Paul is simply
agreeing with Jesus’ famous statement that “whoever believes in Him shall not perish, but have
eternal life” (Jn 3:16). Christ offers salvation to all men, and only those who believe in Him
accept that offer and are saved.72
Those who advocate limited atonement attempt to reject the above-mentioned Scriptures by
appealing to other passages that they believe imply that Christ died only for the elect. For
example, it is said that Jesus “will save His people from their sins” (Mt 1:21). Paul says that
Christ “loved the Church and gave Himself up for her” (Eph 5:25). In evaluating such passages,
Scripture must be used to interpret Scripture. Robert Lightner nicely clarifies why such
purportedly limiting passages should not govern our understanding of those passages that affirm
unlimited atonement. Lightner says:
The task of harmonizing those various Scriptures poses a far greater problem for those who
hold to a limited atonement than it does to those who hold to an unlimited position. Those
who hold to an unlimited atonement recognize that some Scriptures emphasize the fact that
Christ died for the elect, for the church, and for individual believers. However, they point
out that when those verses single out a specific group they do not do so to the exclusion of
any who are outside that group since dozens of other passages include them. The ‘limited’
passages are just emphasizing one aspect of a larger truth. In contrast, those who hold to a
limited atonement have a far more difficult time explaining away the ‘unlimited’
passages.73

72. Erickson, Christian Theology, 829-832. Many of the passages I referenced are identified by Erickson in
these pages. I have only provided a brief survey of key texts, but Erickson provides a more detailed assessment.
73. Robert P. Lightner, “For Whom Did Christ Die?,” in Walvoord: A Tribute, ed. Donald K. Campbell
(Chicago: Moody Press, 1982), 166.
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We have now seen that Scripture supports God’s universal salvific will and indicates that
Christ died for all of mankind. These two facts point powerfully to the likelihood that God would
provide all people with sufficient grace such that each and every human being has the
opportunity to be saved. After all, the concept of unlimited atonement would prove quite hollow
if the billions of people who do not hear the gospel have no opportunity to be saved. As Stuart
Hackett puts it:
If every human being in all times and ages has been objectively provided for through the
unique redemption in Jesus, and if this provision is in fact intended by God for every such
human being, then it must be possible for every human individual to become personally
eligible to receive that provision—regardless of his historical, cultural, or personal
circumstances and situation.74
Third Biblical Indicator: General Revelation
The third and final biblical basis that I will highlight in support of the universal opportunity
for salvation is the fact that God wants mankind to recognize and properly respond to general
revelation. In accord with exclusivism, I will not presume that this desired response itself
constitutes saving faith. Nevertheless, the fact that there is a desired response to general
revelation implies that God seems to be working to draw all people in general to Himself.
Paul is clear that no person is “without excuse” when it comes to basic knowledge that God
has revealed about Himself. Ever since the “the creation of the world,” Paul says that God’s
“invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being
understood through what has been made” (Rom 1:20). Through God’s creation, He has made
these things about Himself “evident” to people at large (Rom 1:19).75 Nevertheless, despite this

74. Stuart Hackett, The Reconstruction of the Christian Revelation Claim (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1984),
244.
75. David also famously proclaims that “the heavens are telling of the glory of God, and their expanse is
declaring the work of His hands” (Ps 19:1). Like Paul, David declares that the knowledge of God that is revealed via
creation “has gone out through all the earth” (Ps 19:4).
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knowledge of God, the tendency of mankind has been to reject what God has revealed and turn
to idolatry, acting wickedly and worshipping God’s creations rather than God Himself (Rom
1:21-32). Paul also emphasizes that “there is no partiality with God” (Rom 2:11) because “all
who sin under the Law will be judged by the Law” and even those who have not received God’s
special revelation (“all who have sinned without the Law”) will also “perish without the Law”
(Rom 2:12). In this way, Paul reaffirms that everybody is without excuse—even the “Gentiles
who do not have the Law” will be judged because they, too, have the law that is “written in their
hearts” (Rom 2:14-15). God’s revelation that is found in nature (Rom 1) and in our own
consciences (Rom 2) brings some measure of knowledge about God and His moral requirements
to the unevangelized, and the rejection of this knowledge makes them guilty of sin. Paul again
makes the point as strongly as he can that all people are sinners and unrighteous before God,
quoting a variety of Old Testament Scriptures (Rom 3:10-18). Although the bad news is that
nobody will be made right with God “by the works of the Law” (Rom 3:20), Paul finally reveals
the good news that “now apart from the Law the righteousness of God has been manifested,
being witnessed by the Law and the Prophets, even the righteousness of God through faith in
Jesus Christ for all those who believe” (Rom 3:21-22).
While it is clear that God’s revelation via nature and conscience leaves the unevangelized
guilty of sin when they inevitably violate this law, how do the unevangelized take advantage of
Paul’s good news that righteousness is found through faith in Christ? This conundrum has led
inclusivists to conclude that the unevangelized must be able to attain salvation by responding to
general revelation. After all, what other revelation do they have? Inclusivist Clark Pinnock finds
it unacceptable that rejecting general revelation brings God’s condemnation while accepting it is
insufficient for salvation. Pinnock maintains that such a state of affairs:
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implies that God reveals himself to all people, not to help them, but to make their
condemnation more severe. It is easy to see why Barth took the logical step of denying that
general revelation exists. What kind of God is it who would reveal himself in order to
worsen the condition of sinners and make their plight more hopeless? 76
Pinnock is surely correct that God’s sole purpose in revealing Himself to all people through
nature and conscience is not to ensure their condemnation. We have seen that: God truly desires
for all to be saved; Christ died for the sins of all people; and rejecting what God reveals about
Himself and His moral law via general revelation brings God’s judgment even on the
unevangelized. The strong implication of these biblical truths is that God desires some sort of a
positive response from all humans to general revelation in which they are drawn to God. If God
wants all to be saved and if God has made a pathway through Christ for all to be saved and
reveals important truths about Himself and sin to people at large through general revelation, then
it seems likely that God did not merely provide general revelation to condemn people. Let us
then consider whether there is a biblically-consistent way that exclusivism can be true and yet all
people may have an opportunity to be saved. I will examine a possible way that this could work,
and this possibility also shows how general revelation may have a positive purpose and not
merely a condemnatory one.
How Might the Unevangelized Have an Opportunity to be Saved on Exclusivism?
Recall that P6 states that anyone who never hears the gospel has no opportunity to accept
God’s forgiveness through Christ. The proponent of this premise assumes that the unevangelized,
because they never do hear the gospel, never had the opportunity to hear the gospel and accept
Christ. This, however, need not be the case even if exclusivism is true. Although my own
preferred view concerning how God might provide an opportunity for salvation to all people—

76. Clark Pinnock, “An Inclusivist View,” in Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World, ed. Dennis L.
Okholm and Timothy R. Phillips (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1996), 117.
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including those who never hear the gospel—on the assumption of the truth of exclusivism will
not be fleshed out until the fourth chapter when I offer my own theodicy, it is useful for now to
examine one possible way of showing how this can be done. I explain in the fourth chapter why I
opt for a more nuanced perspective than this approach—one that agrees that God uses general
revelation to prepare the hearts of unbelievers, including the unevangelized, but does not require
that one must respond in a certain way to general revelation in order to be brought the gospel.
But the view offered at present is a widely-held view among Christian exclusivists and serves
our purposes for now by at least showing why P6 is not necessarily true even on exclusivism.
A view held by a number of exclusivists is that God will send the gospel to those
unevangelized persons who respond appropriately to the general revelation that they do have.
This view at least goes back to the middle ages and Thomas Aquinas,77 and it has continued to be
defended by such scholars as Norman Geisler, Robert Lightner, Christopher Little, and
Robertson McQuilken.78 The advantage of this view is that it makes sense of how the three
aforementioned biblical indicators actually do point toward God giving all people an opportunity
to be saved, since any unevangelized person has the opportunity to respond in faith to the general
revelation that he has; moreover, this view upholds the strong biblical evidence for exclusivism
because it requires that one must respond to the gospel (and not merely general revelation) to be
saved. We will now see that this view also seems to be at least consistent with Scripture.79

77. Sanders, No Other Name, 156-162. Sanders provides a useful discussion of how Aquinas supported this
view, and he identifies various proponents of the view from the Middle Ages through the Reformation.
78. A helpful list of many contemporary advocates of this view is given in: Sanders, No Other Name, 163.
79. Other theories have been proposed that also seek to reconcile the universal opportunity for salvation with
exclusivism. Some postulate that God gives the unevangelized a postmortem opportunity to accept Christ; others
speculate that God somehow affords the unevangelized the opportunity to make a decision for Christ in the very last
moment of their life prior to death. The biblical support for the first theory is weak (relying heavily on the
controversial passage 1 Peter 3:18-22), and this theory trivializes the relevance of this life. So far as I can see, there
is no evidence for the second theory. Neither theory will be defended here.
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A key biblical principle that is consistent with this view is that God does not turn away
from those who respond to Him in faith. The writer of Hebrews declares that “he who comes to
God must believe that He is and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him” (Heb 11:6). If one
who has never heard the gospel realizes, as Paul says one should, that there must be an incredibly
wise and powerful Being responsible for our existence and that one is obligated to honor the
moral law that is written in one’s heart, and this person pursues righteousness and asks God to
reveal His truth to her, then God will surely not turn a deaf ear to such a person. David describes
God’s response to those who cry out to God by saying, “The Lord is righteous in all His ways
and kind in all His deeds. The Lord is near to all who call upon Him, to all who call upon Him in
truth. He will fulfill the desire of those who fear Him; He will also hear their cry and will save
them” (Ps 145:17-19). Jesus says those who ask, seek, and knock will not be denied by the Lord.
When a son asks his father for food, the father does not give the son a rock or a snake (Mt 7:710). Jesus concludes that if sinful humans “know how to give good gifts to [their] children, how
much more will your Father who is in heaven give what is good to those who ask Him” (Mt
7:11). As Paul teaches in the first two chapters of Romans, the Holy Spirit uses general
revelation to reveal certain truths, and a key role of the Holy Spirit is to “convict the world
concerning sin and righteousness and judgment” (Jn 16:8). So, in light of the biblical principle
that God does not turn away from those who respond to Him in faith, it seems plausible that God
would ensure that those who respond in faith to what revelation they have will receive the special
revelation they need for saving faith.
Scripture also seems to include examples of God intervening at times to ensure that special
revelation is given to those who lack it when they are responding in faith to the revelation that
they do have. The book of Acts records the story of Cornelius, a Gentile centurion in the Roman
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army who was aware of the Jewish Scriptures but had not been reached with the gospel.
Cornelius is described as “a devout man and one who feared God with all his household, and
gave many alms to the Jewish people and prayed to God continually” (Acts 10:2). Although
Cornelius earnestly sought God, he was not a saved believer. Yet God provided Cornelius with
an angelic vision in which he is told that his “prayers and alms have ascended as a memorial
before God” and Cornelius is given instructions for contacting the Apostle Peter. At this point, it
is evident that Cornelius had not yet been saved because the angel told Cornelius that Peter will
arrive and “will speak words to you by which you will be saved, you and all your household”
(Acts 11:14). Peter was also given a vision to convince him that he is to go with the men sent by
Cornelius and preach the gospel. In this way, God used visions and angelic messengers to
orchestrate an interaction in which a devout man who responded in faith to God was delivered
the gospel message so that he could accept it and be saved. As exemplified in the Cornelius
account, Christopher Little rightly argues that there are many “modalities” that God can use to
deliver the gospel. God is not limited to spreading the gospel solely through human messengers
and the distribution of God’s written Word. There is no reason that God cannot make use of
visions, angels, and dreams today. God may even choose to use miraculous events, as seen when
God called Paul on the Damascus road (Acts 9) and then transmitted the gospel to Paul “not
according to man” but “through a revelation of Jesus Christ” (Gal 1:11-12).80
Scripture reveals other examples of God directing the gospel to seekers in various ways. In
the account of Philip witnessing to the Ethiopian eunuch, the eunuch was a God-fearing person
who “had come to Jerusalem to worship” (Acts 8:27) and was pondering the meaning of Isaiah’s
prophecy about Jesus as he returned home (Acts 8:32-34). God did not allow the eunuch to leave

80. Little, The Revelation of God Among the Unevangelized, 116-130.
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without hearing the message. Via an angelic message, God directed Philip to the eunuch (Acts
8:26) and Philip spoke the gospel to him, culminating in his decision to accept Christ and be
baptized (Acts 8:35-39). Similarly, in Paul’s second missionary journey recorded in the book of
Acts, God intervened in directing Paul so that he would preach the gospel in Macedonia. Paul
and his companions tried to enter Bithynia, but “the Spirit of Jesus did not permit them” to do so
(Acts 16:7). Instead, they continued west to Troas where Paul received a vision of a man from
Macedonia who pleaded with Paul to “come over to Macedonia and help us” (Acts 16:9). Paul
thus preached the gospel in Macedonia instead of following his original plans. This vision may
or may not have involved Paul seeing an actual man from Macedonian who was seeking God’s
truth, but at the very least this account shows that God is involved in directing the gospel to
certain individuals and part of the basis for His directing the gospel to those individuals seems to
be their openness to responding to the gospel.81
Although there is a biblical basis for thinking that God has a history of bringing the gospel
to those who respond in faith to the revelation that they have, one might claim that we would see
much more evidence of this if God does this in every case still today. Should there not be
widespread stories of people who have come to Christian faith as a consequence of seeing
visions or receiving an angelic message? In response to this concern, several points should be
noted. First, there are numerous modern accounts of God using such unconventional means to
bring the gospel to people.82 Such anecdotal evidence should not be surprising if the proposed

81. God is no doubt continually intervening to direct the spread of the gospel in countless ways that may be
quite subtle. For example, I myself was once part of a short-term mission team that was scheduled to go to
Zimbabwe before certain last-minute events forced us to change our plans and go to Haiti instead.
82. See the following for accounts of God using visions, dreams, or other unconventional means to deliver the
gospel to people: Pauline Selby, Persian Springs: Four Iranians See Jesus (London: Elam Ministries, 2001); David
H. Greenlee, From the Straight Path to the Narrow Way: Journeys of Faith (Waynesboro, Ga.: Authentic Media,
2005); Rick Brown, “Brother Jacob and Master Isaac: How One Insider Movement Began,” International Journal of
Frontier Missions 24, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 41-42; Augustus Hopkins Strong, Outlines of Systematic Theology
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view is true. Second, although it is impossible to know the precise frequency with which such
occurrences take place, there is no reason to think they should be extremely widespread. As we
have seen, the testimony of Scripture is that most people do not seek God. The general tendency
of mankind is to reject God’s general revelation, turning away from the light that they have
(Rom 1-3). Third, it could be that God rarely provides a supernatural revelation by way of
visions or angels. We have seen that God, in his providence, can simply ensure that human
messengers carry the gospel to those who are seeking Him. Mission work is bringing the gospel
to new places all the time, and God is undoubtedly involved in providentially directing the places
it reaches—even in subtle ways. In addition, as the world population has exploded in the last
century, mankind’s technological capabilities have also leaped forward. The world population is
approximately four times larger today than at the turn of the twentieth century,83 and it is
interesting that this population jump has corresponded with the emergence of electronic
communication. Norman Geisler points out how recent technologies such as radio, television,
and the Internet help to facilitate the spread of the gospel.84 The Internet, in particular,
continually makes the world a smaller place, and God certainly uses it to bring His truth to those
who are seeking it. There is simply no way to prove that God is not delivering the gospel to those
who have been made ready to respond to it.
We have thus seen that the universal opportunity for salvation is at least possible on
Christian exclusivism. This perspective is consistent with the character of God and His genuine
desire for all to be saved; furthermore, it legitimizes the concept of unlimited atonement while
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remaining faithful to the biblical evidence for exclusivism. We may thus conclude that P6 should
be rejected on the grounds that it is not necessarily true and is not required by orthodox biblical
theism. Consequently, the version of the soteriological POE that attempts to reveal a
contradiction between God’s attributes and the biblical teaching on soteriology on the
presumption that some people lack an opportunity to be saved fails and should be rejected.
The Remaining Objection: God’s Omnibenevolence and the Contingently Lost
At this point two key arguments in favor of the soteriological POE have been handled.
First, we have seen that, due to counterfactual truths about free creaturely choices, it may be the
case that it is not feasible for God to create a well-populated world of free persons in which
everyone freely chooses to be saved. Thus, the objection that God should have created a world in
which all people freely choose to be saved lacks force. Second, it has been shown that Christian
exclusivism is compatible with universally accessible salvation and that Scripture seems to
indicate in multiple ways that God would provide an opportunity for all to be saved. Thus, the
objection that God has not given all people an opportunity at salvation is unconvincing. Neither
of these arguments provides any convincing reason to believe that there is a conflict between P1
(God’s possession of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence) and P2 (some persons
not accepting forgiveness through Christ and being lost), and such a conflict must be identified if
the soteriological POE is to succeed. Nevertheless, one important difficulty remains. Craig
describes the nature of this residual problem well, and it is worth quoting him at length:
If God is all-knowing, then presumably he knew the conditions under which people would
freely place their faith in Christ for salvation and those under which they would not. But
then a very difficult question arises: why does God not bring the gospel to people who he
knows would accept it if they heard it, even though they reject the general revelation that
they do have? Imagine, for example, a Native American—let us call him Walking Bear—
who lived prior to the arrival of Christian missionaries. Suppose Walking Bear sees from
the order and beauty of nature around him that a Creator of the universe exists and that he
senses in his heart the demands of God’s moral law implanted there. Unfortunately, like
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those described by Paul in Romans 1, Walking Bear chooses to spurn the Creator and to
ignore the demands of the moral law, plunging himself into spiritism and immorality. Thus
suppressing the knowledge of God and flouting his moral law, Walking Bear stands under
God’s just condemnation and is destined for hell. But suppose that if only Walking Bear
were to hear the gospel, if only the Christian missionaries had come earlier, then he would
have believed in the gospel and been saved. His damnation thus appears to be the result of
bad luck; through no fault of his own he was born at the wrong place or time in history; his
salvation or damnation thus seems to be the result of historical and geographical accident.
Granted that his condemnation is not unjust (since he has freely spurned God’s sufficient
grace for salvation), nonetheless is it not unloving of God to condemn him? Would not an
all-loving God have given him the same advantage that is enjoyed by that lucky individual
who lives at a place and time such that he hears the gospel?85
This difficulty can be formalized as follows. We have seen that the soteriological POE
claims that there is an inconsistency between the statements: P1 God possesses the attributes of
omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence; and P2 Some persons do not accept the
forgiveness that is available via receiving Christ and are thus damned.86 The following additional
premises may be added to P1 and P2 in order to reveal the alleged contradiction:
P8. God will necessarily not allow persons to exist who are lost in their actual
circumstances but who would have been saved if placed into different circumstances.87
P9. Some persons who freely reject the grace that God offers them in their actual
circumstances and are lost would have freely accepted God’s grace and been saved in
different circumstances.
The truth of P8 is considered to be entailed by God’s omnipotence, omnibenevolence, and
omniscience in P1. It may be that God’s omniscience includes having knowledge logically prior
to creating the world of the possible circumstances under which each person that He would

85. William Lane Craig, “Politically Incorrect Salvation,” in Christian Apologetics in the Postmodern World,
eds. Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Ockholm (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 89-90.
86. See Table 1.1 on p. 62 for a summary of all the premises that are introduced in chapter one.
87. If one denies that God could have middle knowledge so that He cannot know for sure whether any of the
lost would have been saved if placed into different circumstances, P8 could instead be stated: “God will necessarily
not allow persons to exist who are lost in their actual circumstances but who would have had a significantly better
opportunity to be saved if placed into different circumstances.” For example, as explained below, one could argue
that an omnibenevolent and omnipotent God should at least give those who are unevangelized the chance to hear
and respond to the gospel.

58

create would accept His grace through faith in Christ. (This is the view that God has middle
knowledge, a view that I will accept and defend in the next chapter.) If God has this knowledge,
then it may be claimed that His omnipotence requires that He is able to bring it about that any
person who God knows would freely choose to be saved in some set of circumstances is placed
into such circumstances and is thus saved. Moreover, it is assumed that God’s omnibenevolence
requires that He would want to do this so that nobody is, as Craig puts it, lost due to “historical
and geographical accident.” Since God is maximally loving and beneficent and desires that all
people choose to be saved, the assumption is that God would necessarily want to ensure that
nobody is lost who would freely choose to be saved in some possible circumstances.
Nevertheless, even if God does not have middle knowledge so that He cannot know for sure
whether any of the lost would have been saved if placed into different circumstances, one could
still argue for the truth of P8. If God lacks middle knowledge, He still has overwhelming reason
to believe that many of the unevangelized are contingently lost (e.g., it is overwhelmingly likely
that at least some of the billions of people who never hear the gospel would have responded to it
if they heard it). While I will argue in the next chapter that God does have middle knowledge,
one could still argue that an omnibenevolent and omnipotent God who lacks middle knowledge
should at least give everyone the chance to hear the gospel.
The truth of P9 is considered to be entailed by P2. Given that P2 states that those who never
place faith in Christ are lost, one may contend that P9 is unavoidable. Again, one crucial change
in circumstances that could plausibly lead to at least one person who is actually lost instead
choosing to be saved is that those who are unevangelized could have been presented with the
gospel. It is clear that many people who never turned to God on the basis of general revelation
eventually accept God’s salvation when they are fortunate enough to hear the gospel. Many such
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people thoroughly rejected God until coming into contact with the gospel and becoming
convicted to respond to it. One may thus regard it as overwhelmingly likely that at least one
person—if not many—out of the billions of people who go through life without ever hearing the
gospel and are lost would have responded to it and been saved if they had heard it. Failure to
hear the gospel is only one example of how one’s circumstances might not be congruent with one
choosing to be saved. As Pinnock points out, many people who might be considered
“evangelized” because they have heard the gospel at least once in their life “have been exposed
to the message of Jesus only in inadequate ways.” Can we say that a Jew who only heard the
details of the gospel explained by a guard at Auschwitz who was torturing him “really heard”
it?88 Moreover, consider a Muslim who was born into a devout Muslim family in present-day
Saudi Arabia, an Islamic state that allows only the public practice of Islam and has a population
that is almost entirely Muslim. Is it not highly likely that at least one such person would have
become a Christian if born into a devout Christian family in America? So P9 may be thought to
be strongly implied by P2 given the plausibility of there being some person who is lost but would
have been saved if his or her circumstances had been altered in some way.
If P8 and P9 are both true, however, then we have an obvious contradiction. God’s attributes
would then be incompatible with the purported reality that some of the lost are contingently lost.
Thus, if the above argument is to be refuted, one must show that either P8 or P9 (or both) should
be rejected. One must show that at least one of these two premises is neither necessarily true nor

88. Clark Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy: The Finality of Jesus Christ in a World of Religions (Grand
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1992), 174. Pinnock, an inclusivist, is making this point in the context of arguing that God
must provide the unevangelized with a postmortem opportunity to accept Christ. It is curious for an inclusivist to
adopt postmortem evangelism since inclusivists already allow that the unevangelized have an opportunity to be
saved. The fact that Pinnock feels the need to conjoin this biblically unsupported doctrine to inclusivism points to
the force of the problem at hand: Many feel that God’s omnibenevolence requires more than providing the mere
opportunity for salvation to all. Pinnock believes the disadvantage of the unevangelized of not having more
favorable circumstances (e.g., hearing the gospel) is unacceptable.
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required by Christian doctrine. A successful theodicy that is put forth to undercut one of these
premises must be philosophically defensible, and it must also be theologically defensible (i.e.,
consistent with all of the biblical data).
The remainder of this dissertation will develop a theodicy in response to the above
objection (i.e., that an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, omniscient God would not allow anyone to
be contingently lost). Since my ultimate proposed solution relies upon the truth of Molinism, the
next chapter will describe this perspective on God’s omniscience and offer a defense of its
theological and philosophical credibility. That will pave the way for exploring how others
(especially William Lane Craig) have applied Molinism to resolve this soteriological problem
and for laying out an alternative Molinist theodicy that I believe overcomes some weaknesses in
these approaches.
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Table 1.1. Summary of Premises Introduced in Chapter One
Premises that the Soteriological Problem of Evil Attempts to Show are in Conflict
P1. God possesses the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence.
P2. Some persons do not accept the forgiveness that is available via receiving Christ and are thus
damned.89
First Preliminary Objection: Should Not God Ensure Universal Salvation?
P3. “God is able to actualize a possible world in which all persons freely [in the libertarian sense]
receive Christ.”
P4. “God prefers a world in which no persons fail to receive Christ and are damned to a world in
which some do.”90
Second Preliminary Objection: Should Not God Provide Universal Access to Salvation?
P5. Some people never hear the gospel.
P6. Anyone who never hears the gospel has no opportunity to accept God’s forgiveness through
Christ.
P7. God, if He exists, would be willing and able to ensure that everyone has an opportunity to be
saved.
The Remaining Objection: God’s Omnibenevolence and the Contingently Lost
P8. God will necessarily not allow persons to exist who are lost in their actual circumstances but
who would have been saved if placed into different circumstances.91
P9. Some persons who freely reject the grace that God offers them in their actual circumstances
and are lost would have freely accepted God’s grace and been saved in different
circumstances.

89. P1 and P2 are the two basic premises that proponents of the soteriological POE claim are in conflict. See
Craig, “‘No Other Name’: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation Through Christ,” 180.
Since there is no explicit contradiction between them, we have considered various arguments that conjoin additional
premises to these two basic premises in order to make the contradiction explicit. P3 and P4 were added to P1 and P2
in the formulation of the first objection that we considered and rejected. P5, P6, and P7 were added to P1 and P2 in the
formulation of the second objection that we considered and rejected. P8 and P9 were added to P1 and P2 in the
formulation of the final objection that is described in this first chapter. The remainder of this dissertation is aimed at
responding to this final objection.
90. As cited previously, P3 and P4 are drawn from Craig, “No Other Name,” 180.
91. As previously explained, if one denies that God has middle knowledge so that He cannot know for sure
whether any of the lost would have been saved if placed into different circumstances, then P8 could instead be stated
as follows: “God will necessarily not allow persons to exist who are lost in their actual circumstances but who would
have had a significantly better opportunity to be saved if placed into different circumstances.”
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CHAPTER 2
AN EXPLANATION AND DEFENSE OF MOLINISM
In the classic movie It’s a Wonderful Life, George Bailey wishes that he had never been
born. In order to convince George of the positive impact that his life has had on others, an angel
named Clarence shows George what would have taken place if he had never been born. George
discovers that his town would have become run-down and many people that he cares about
would have had much harder lives—or no life at all. His mother would be a widow running a
boarding house. His uncle Billy would be placed in an insane asylum. His brother Harry would
have died, and all of the soldiers that Harry saved in the actual world would have instead died at
war. These things that Clarence shows George are examples of counterfactual conditionals.92
Counterfactual conditionals express what would be the case if a different antecedent state of
affairs (in this case, eliminating the birth of George) were to be actual. The consequences that
Clarence shows George never actually happen because George was, in fact, born; however, if—
contrary to what is in fact the case (hence the term counterfactual)—George had not been born,
then what Clarence reveals to George would have occurred.
Although such a concept makes for an interesting movie, does God actually have this kind
of knowledge about what would be the case if non-actual circumstances were actualized? Could
God know the truth value of counterfactual conditionals concerning the actions of free creatures
such that His omniscience includes knowing what any free creature—both free creatures who
come into existence and those who never exist—would do in any situation into which that
creature might be placed? Numerous theologians throughout the history of the Christian church

92. There are a number of movies besides It’s a Wonderful Life that illustrate the concept of counterfactual
conditionals. Consider for example: A Christmas Carol, Groundhog Day, Sliding Doors, Frequency, and Next.
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have held that God has counterfactual knowledge of human free choices; however, one sixteenthcentury theologian named Luis de Molina made the case that God not only possesses
counterfactual knowledge concerning the actions of free creatures, but that God possesses this
knowledge logically prior to His decree to actualize the world. He held that God knows all
worlds of free creatures that could be actualized and that God, in His sovereignty, could bring
into existence just the world of free creatures that He wants. Armed with this idea, Molina
attempted to reconcile human freedom with God’s sovereign control over the world.
A Brief History of Molinism
Before explaining the details of Molinism and unpacking its central tenet, the doctrine of
middle knowledge, it is useful to understand how Molinism arose. Luis de Molina (1535 – 1600),
a Spanish Jesuit theologian and philosopher, lived during the turmoil of the Catholic CounterReformation and sought to tackle a thorny theological conundrum of great prominence in his
day: How can God’s sovereignty, providence, and grace be reconciled with human libertarian
freedom? Leading Protestant Reformers, such as Martin Luther and John Calvin, were
emphasizing God’s sovereignty and providence at the expense of rejecting human libertarian
freedom, and Molina was well aware of their views. Luther held that “God’s foreknowledge and
omnipotence are diametrically opposed to our free choice, for either God can be mistaken in
foreknowing and also err in action (which is impossible) or we must be acted upon in accordance
with his foreknowledge and activity.”93 That is, Luther considered human free will to be
incompatible with God sovereignly ruling over His creatures with all power and knowledge

93. Martin Luther, “On the Bondage of the Will” in Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation, eds. Ernest
Gordon Rupp, Philip S. Watson, and Desiderius Erasmus (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1969),
243-244.
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because if God cannot be wrong in what He foreknows then we cannot act in any other way than
the way God foreknew that we would act. Luther thought this meant that we are not capable of
taking alternative courses of action other than those that we do in fact take and thus are not free
in the libertarian sense; he thought that whatever God foreknows must happen necessarily.94 In
much the same way (though emphasizing more that it is God’s sovereign control over human
affairs rather than God’s foreknowledge of our actions that leaves no room for human
freedom),95 Calvin also rejected the idea that humans possess libertarian freedom. Calvin insisted
that “by [God’s] providence, not heaven and earth and inanimate creatures only, but also the
counsels and wills of men are so governed as to move exactly in the course which [God] has
destined.”96 While Molina agreed with Luther and Calvin that God is sovereign over all things
94. Luther, “On the Bondage of the Will,” 240-241. It is certainly biblical that God foreknows all things and
cannot err in His foreknowledge. Necessarily, whatever God foreknows will happen. But that does not mean that
whatever God foreknows happens necessarily. This was a significant mistake on the part of Luther. If humans have
free will, then God’s foreknowledge is based upon what He knows people will freely do. It is our free choices that
partly determine what God foreknows. (The other part is God’s sovereign creative choice to bring about the free
creatures in the circumstances in which they will freely act as they do.) If God’s foreknowledge depends upon our
free choices, that does not mean that God is at the mercy of our free will or that He loses His sovereignty. We will
see that this is because Molinism shows how God can be sovereign over all things despite humans having libertarian
freedom. The two are not at odds. It is also notable that Luther at one point (see Luther, “On the Bondage of the
Will,” 143) suggests that “in matters pertaining to salvation or damnation, a man has no free choice, but is a captive,
subject and slave either of the will of God or the will of Satan”; however, with regard to other matters (i.e., “his
faculties and possessions”), Luther says mankind has a sort of “free choice.” Yet even with the latter, he says this is
“controlled by the free choice of God alone.” It is not clear what sort of freedom Luther is aiming for here even with
regard to actions that are not related to salvation. As William Lane Craig rightly points out, it would be inconsistent
for Luther to leave room for human libertarian freedom in any aspect of life given Luther’s (flawed) argument that
our freedom is incompatible with divine foreknowledge. God foreknows all that we will do and not merely choices
related to salvation. See: William Lane Craig, “Middle Knowledge: A Calvinist-Arminian Rapprochement?,” in The
Grace of God, the Will of Man, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1989), 142-143.
95. Craig argues effectively that Calvin’s view that man cannot have the ability to act differently than he acts is
because of God’s sovereignty over human affairs in contrast to Luther’s focus on the necessity of our actions
resulting from divine foreknowledge. See: Craig, “Middle Knowledge: A Calvinist-Arminian Rapprochement?,”
143-144.
96. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson
Publishers, 2008), 120 (I.xvi.8). With regard to sin, Calvin agreed with Luther that mankind sins necessarily; indeed,
all that humans do is according to the sovereign decree of God and happens necessarily. Yet he denied that humans
are compelled to sin and affirmed that we do so voluntarily. See: Calvin, Institutes, 181 (II.iii.5). Both Luther and
Calvin also insisted that the human will is not coerced by God when it comes to the changing of one’s thoroughly
depraved will so that one accepts the gospel. Robert Picirilli rightly points out that this seems blatantly inconsistent.
Since prior to regeneration all humans are unable to will to accept God and turn from sin, it seems that “God must
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and even agreed with them concerning God’s unconditional election to salvation (though, as we
will see, unconditional election is not entailed by Molina’s proposed doctrine of middle
knowledge), Molina sharply disagreed with them concerning their rejection of our libertarian
free will and their undermining of God’s genuine universal salvific will. Molina held that God
gives us His prevenient grace to overcome what would otherwise be our inability to respond to
God’s grace so that we all have libertarian freedom—and this applies even to matters of
salvation so that we can freely accept or reject Christ.97
Meanwhile, on the Catholic side, Domingo Bañez and the Dominicans were following in
the steps of Thomas Aquinas and arguing that God is able to predetermine the free will of
humans. Bañez did not agree with Calvin or Luther that humans lack libertarian free will;
nevertheless, he paradoxically maintained that God’s divine decree physically operates on us to
determine how we will freely act.98 Of course, God’s intervening on the will in this way does not
seem to square with our libertarian free will as he claimed. Molina did not find the view of
Bañez—who proved to be the primary Catholic opponent of Molina’s efforts to reconcile divine
sovereignty and human libertarian freedom—and the Dominicans to be acceptable either.

change us against our wills” if anyone is to come to God. See: Robert E. Picirilli, Free Will Revisited: A Respectful
Response to Luther, Calvin, and Edwards (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2017), 100.
97. Kirk MacGregor provides a useful discussion of Molina’s view of grace. See: Kirk R. MacGregor, Luis de
Molina: The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2015), 72.
This recent work from MacGregor is the first biography of Molina, revealing much of the history of his life, the
influences on him that led to his development of the doctrine of middle knowledge, and the controversy that
emerged within Catholicism over Molinism. It also examines the legacy that Molina has left today, as many
throughout all branches of Christianity have found Molinism to be a fruitful and biblical doctrine. In addition, since
almost all of Molina’s writings (aside from the crucial Part IV of his Concordia in which his theory of middle
knowledge is unpacked) have never been published in an English translation, MacGregor usefully describes
Molina’s views on a variety of points that extend beyond his doctrine of middle knowledge and cites where
Molina’s comments can be found in Molina’s original Latin texts. He also often cites Molina’s exact words in Latin
so that the reader knows the specific text to which he is referring.
98. Joseph Pohle and Arthur Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual: A Dogmatic Treatise (St. Louis, MO: B.
Herder, 1915), 232-234.
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While Molina, along with the Protestant Reformers and the Dominicans, desired to uphold
the sovereignty and providence of God and the need for God’s grace in calling sinners to
salvation, he also wanted to provide an adequate justification of human libertarian freedom
(including freedom with regard to the decision to accept Christ) and God’s sincere desire for all
to be saved. Finding that the views of the Dominicans and the Protestant Reformers fail to do
justice to libertarian freedom, Molina set out to formulate a more desirable option. He wanted to
bring the synergistic Jesuits closer to the monergistic Dominicans and Protestants reformers, and
he thought that his proposed doctrine of middle knowledge—which we will soon examine in
detail—was just the way to accomplish this; indeed, he thought that if middle knowledge had
been widely adopted by Christians much earlier, then Christian controversies and divisions over
divine providence and human free will could have been prevented.99 Nevertheless, despite
Molina’s high hopes, Molinism—although it was embraced by many (especially the Jesuits)
throughout Europe after Molina described his views in his 1588 Concordia100—never resolved
the monergistic-synergistic tensions among Christians. Molina was disheartened when his view
was rejected by the Inquisition in 1591. It was rejected largely due to the opposition he received
from Bañez and the Dominicans.101 Yet the vast majority of Jesuits embraced Molinism and
believed that the Dominicans misrepresented Molina. After a few years of intense disagreement
between Dominicans and Jesuits over Molinism, Molina published his Apologia Concordiae in

99. MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 158.
100. The full title of Molina’s work in Latin is Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina
Praescientia, Providentia, Praedestinatione et Reprobatione, and it is commonly referred to as the Concordia. In
English, the title can be translated as: The Concordance of Free Will with the Gifts of Grace, Divine Foreknowledge,
Providence, Predestination, and Reprobation. The title reflects Molina’s desire to show how human libertarian
freedom is compatible with God’s grace, foreknowledge, providence, and election of individuals to salvation. It is in
Part IV of the Concordia that Molina especially unpacks his key idea of middle knowledge.
101. MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 172-173.
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1594 to defend the ideas he laid out in his Concordia and refute the objections of Bañez and the
Dominicans. Yet the disagreement between the Dominicans and Jesuits raged on, leading Pope
Clement VIII to threaten excommunication on anyone who debated about this controversy.102
This did not quiet the storm, however, and Clement VIII ordered a careful investigation of
Molina’s ideas. This papal commission suspected that Molina had introduced innovative ideas
that were not consistent with historic Catholic doctrine.103 The Jesuits and Molina himself urged
the pope to reconsider the merits of Molinism, but Molina died of dysentery in 1600 under the
impression that he would likely be wrongly anathematized after his death.104 However, Pope
Paul V decided in 1607 that Molinism is acceptable to believe, though he made no determination
on whether it is true. He ordered that there is freedom within the Roman Catholic Church to
adopt the position of the Dominicans or hold to Molinism.105 So Molina was vindicated in the
end. His position did not immediately revolutionize the church as he had hoped, but he
nevertheless made an impact that continues to this day.
Molinism has experienced an explosion of renewed interest in the forty-five years since
Alvin Plantinga “unwittingly reformulated the central tenets of Molinism in his free will defense
against the logical problem of evil” in his book God, Freedom, and Evil. It was not until three
years after that, in 1977, that Robert Adams, an opponent of Molinism, recognized that
Plantinga’s ideas were consistent with Molinism, and Plantinga thus was led to discover that he
is in agreement with Molinism. Plantinga then became a prominent advocate of divine middle

102. MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 175-176.
103. Ibid., 231.
104. Ibid., 239-240.
105. Ibid., 241.
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knowledge.106 Kirk MacGregor rightly regards William Lane Craig as the “world’s leading
defender of Molinism” at present, and Molinism has gained much traction and popularity among
evangelicals in recent years. A number of Christian philosophers and theologians have adopted
Molinism, and it is starting to gain a significant following among lay people as well.107 Contrary
to the misimpression of some, Molinism is not a “Catholic doctrine.” It is not entailed by any
particular doctrines in Catholic theology or even regarded as definitely true by the Roman
Catholic Church. MacGregor is correct to point out that “Molinism has been completely
embraced by theologians representing a broad cross-section of Protestantism.” Moreover, he
rightly notes that “Protestant thinkers who reject Molinism in part or in whole have not done so
because Catholic tendencies are somehow inherent to Molinist thought.”108 Molinism, as we will
see, focuses on an aspect of God’s omniscience. As such, once one accepts that God possesses
the sort of knowledge that Molina proposes, one may apply this in a variety of ways in terms of
what God might do with this knowledge. In terms of soteriology, for example, this allows for a
variety of options, and Protestants who are more Reformed in their theology (e.g., Alvin
Plantinga) and those who are more Arminian (e.g., William Lane Craig) have incorporated
Molina’s idea that God has middle knowledge into their theology.109

106. MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 243.
107. Some important contemporary advocates of Molinism include: Alvin Plantinga, William Lane Craig,
Thomas Flint, Alfred Freddoso, Kenneth Keathley, Kirk MacGregor, Paul Copan, Eef Dekker, Jonathan Kvanvig,
and Richard Otte.
108. MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 16.
109. Plantinga, for example, holds that humans have libertarian freedom with regard to all of their actions
except for choosing to accept Christ. With regard to the latter, he holds the Reformed position that God must grant
one the gift of faith and that apart from God doing this one lacks the ability to turn from one’s sins and accept
Christ. Since Plantinga allows that humans have libertarian freedom with regard to all of their choices that do not
pertain to accepting God’s grace (which accounts for the vast majority of choices that humans make throughout their
lives), he makes use of Molina’s concept of middle knowledge to explain how God sovereignly directs a world of
creatures who carry out most of their choices with libertarian freedom. This allows him to uphold Reformed
soteriology, divine sovereignty, and human libertarian freedom and responsibility for sin. Plantinga explained this in
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Having briefly surveyed the history of the rise of Molinism, let us turn to an examination of
this view. In particular, we must understand the engine that drove Molina’s theory of reconciling
God’s sovereignty and providence with human libertarian freedom: the doctrine of middle
knowledge.
An Explanation of Molinism
In his 1588 Concordia, Molina recognized that the solution to the mystery of reconciling
divine sovereignty and human freedom is ultimately found in God’s attribute of omniscience.
Molina proposed that there are “three types of knowledge in God,”110 and these three types can
be understood in terms of three logical moments. These logical “moments” do not have any
temporal implication, as if God is ignorant of certain knowledge until He acquires other
knowledge; rather, these moments must be understood in terms of logical priority. As Craig aptly
describes it, one moment “serves to explain” the next moment and “provides the grounds or
basis” for it.111 Molina certainly did not deny that God knows all things eternally.
Molina was not the first to suggest that there are logical moments in God’s knowledge;
indeed, this concept is found in the writings of such earlier theologians as Duns Scotus and
Thomas Aquinas. In fact, Molina’s first and third moments actually correspond with the first and

a letter that he sent to my dissertation chair, Dr. Ed Martin, in February of 1989. Plantinga wrote, “Calvinism
embraces predestination,” and this doctrine “implies at most that one doesn’t become a Christian by way of free
choice, but rather as a result of divine grace. But that is compatible with our having all sorts of libertarian freedom
with respect to other matters.” Plantinga stresses that the historic creeds of Calvinism affirm “that God is not
responsible for sin,” so he thinks it is best for Calvinists to affirm that humans have libertarian freedom with regard
to matters outside of becoming a Christian so that the moral agency of humans can be justified.
110. Luis Molina, Concordia 4.52.9, in On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, tr. Alfred J.
Freddoso (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 168.
111. William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human
Freedom (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2000), 127. As an example of how temporal and chronological priority differ,
Craig also points out (p. 128) how God’s eternal foreknowledge that an event will happen is chronologically prior to
the event, even though the event is logically prior to God’s foreknowledge of it. That is, the logical basis for God
foreknowing the event is the fact that it will occur. If the event were not to happen, God would not foreknow it.
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last moments that Aquinas identified; moreover, Molina and Aquinas even agree that between
these moments lies “a decision of the divine will.”112 Yet, despite this similarity, Molina’s
proposal is unique in terms of how his second moment is able to reconcile adequately God’s
sovereignty with human libertarian freedom.
Molina refers to the first moment in God’s knowledge as “natural knowledge.” This is
God’s knowledge of all things that could possibly come to be; that is, it includes knowledge of
every possible world. Because natural knowledge includes every possibility, God possesses this
knowledge necessarily (or “naturally”). Since God’s natural knowledge of all possible worlds
does not depend upon what world God chooses to actualize, Molina notes that this natural
knowledge “could not have been any different in God.”113 In Molina’s words, God’s natural
knowledge includes:
all the things to which the divine power extended either immediately or by the mediation of
secondary causes, including not only the natures of individuals and the necessary states of
affairs composed of them but also the contingent states of affairs—through this knowledge
He knew, to be sure, not that the latter were or were not going to obtain determinately, but
rather that they were indifferently able to obtain and able not to obtain, a feature that
belongs to them necessarily.114
Skipping over the second moment for now, Molina terms the third moment in God’s
knowledge “free knowledge.” This is God’s knowledge of the actual world—what will happen in
the world that God has, in fact, freely decided to create. Molina explains that “after the free act
of His will [to create the particular world that He did], God knew absolutely and determinately,
without any condition or hypothesis, which ones from among all the contingent states of affairs

112. Craig, “A Calvinist-Arminian Rapprochement?,” 145.
113. Molina, Concordia 4.52.9, 168.
114. Ibid.
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were in fact going to obtain and, likewise, which ones were not going to obtain.”115 Clearly then,
unlike the necessary content of God’s natural knowledge, what God knows in His free
knowledge is entirely contingent; it is contingent upon God’s creative will and could have been
different from what it is if God had decided to actualize a different world.
Now, as Thomas Flint points out, what has been said about the first and third moments in
Molina’s view of God’s omniscience is not especially controversial. Few theologians throughout
church history would deny that some truths known by God are necessary while others are
contingent upon His free creative will. Yet Flint points out that “the picture sketched thus far is
incomplete. For how, one might wonder, does it provide God with complete foreknowledge or
control of events which are contingent?”116 If God is sovereign in actualizing the specific world
that He desires and the world He wishes to actualize includes creatures who possess libertarian
free will, then some mechanism is needed whereby God can get from His natural knowledge of
all possible worlds to ensuring that the specific world that He desires is actualized. How can God
be sovereign over a world of free creatures and ensure that His plans are achieved without
robbing the creatures of their genuine libertarian freedom? Molina’s solution to this conundrum
is that, logically between God’s natural and free knowledge, God possesses “middle knowledge.”
While Molina may not have wasted much creative energy in his naming of this logical
moment that falls in the “middle” between God’s natural and free knowledge, the concept of
middle knowledge itself is ingenious and explanatorily powerful. Molina explains that God’s
middle knowledge, the second logical moment in God’s omniscience, is His knowledge of what
each free creature that He might create “would do with its innate freedom were it to be placed in

115. Molina, Concordia 4.52.9, 168.
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this or in that or, indeed, in infinitely many orders of things—even though it would really be
able, if it so willed, to do the opposite.”117 So while God’s natural knowledge includes all of the
possibilities concerning what free creatures could do (e.g., if Judas is placed in circumstance C,
God knows all of the possible decisions that Judas could make), God’s middle knowledge
ensures that He knows what any possible free creature would do if placed into any possible
circumstance (e.g., God knows that if placed into circumstance C, Judas would freely choose to
betray Christ). Thus, if God decides to actualize a world in which Judas is placed into
circumstance C, then God is able to guarantee that Judas will freely choose to betray Christ.
Given God’s decision to actualize a world in which Judas is in C, God’s knowledge that Judas
will actually betray Christ in C is then part of His free knowledge.
Once one recognizes that God’s possession of middle knowledge would allow Him to
know with certainty what a free creature would freely choose to do if placed in any given
circumstance, it is not hard to see how God can use this knowledge to arrange providentially an
entire world. Given that God knows all possible worlds with His natural knowledge, He can use
His middle knowledge to determine which of those possible worlds are feasible for Him to
create. Some possible worlds are not feasible for God to actualize because the free creatures in
those worlds would not make the free choices that that they would have to make in the
circumstances in which they find themselves in those worlds in order for those worlds to be
actualized. For example, if Judas is placed in the exact circumstances in which he is placed in
this actual world on the night that he betrayed Christ, God cannot change the fact that Judas
would freely choose to betray Christ in those circumstances. That is simply what Judas would
freely choose to do in those precise circumstances. God could not actualize a world that is
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exactly like the actual world up to the very moment that Judas chooses to betray Christ but then
Judas freely chooses not to betray Christ. Such a world is not feasible for God to make because it
is simply a counterfactual truth concerning creaturely freedom that Judas would freely choose to
betray Christ in those circumstances. So God understands which worlds are feasible by using His
middle knowledge to comprehend which out of all of the possible worlds are actualizable. God
then decrees to actualize one of these feasible worlds. He thus knows exactly and entirely what
the future will be—His free knowledge. In this way, God’s middle knowledge is the means by
which Molina reconciles God’s sovereignty and providence with human freedom. It also
provides a clear answer to theological fatalists such as Martin Luther by showing that God’s
foreknowledge of the choice that a creature will make is consistent with that creature having
libertarian freedom.
Molina meticulously clarifies the nature of middle knowledge, emphasizing how it is
distinct from natural knowledge and free knowledge even though it bears similarities to both.
Middle knowledge is distinct from free knowledge “because it is prior to any free act of God’s
will and also because it was not within God’s power to know through this type of knowledge
anything other than what He in fact knew.”118 That is, God’s middle knowledge resembles
natural knowledge more than free knowledge in one sense—the sense that it does not depend on
any act of God. God’s middle knowledge is determined by what the free creatures would choose
to do in various circumstances, and the free choices of free creatures are not determined or
controlled by God. Natural knowledge is also that way because God simply knows all
possibilities, and this knowledge does not depend upon any choice or action on God’s part.119

118. Molina, Concordia 4.52.10, 168.
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Nevertheless, middle knowledge is also distinct from natural knowledge in the sense that it is not
“so innate to God that He could not have known the opposite of that which He knows through it.
For if created free choice were going to do the opposite, as indeed it can, then God would have
known that very thing through this same type of knowledge, and not what He in fact knows.”120
Thus middle knowledge is like free knowledge in the sense of not being what it is by necessity
(though middle knowledge is contingent upon the creatures’ free will whereas free knowledge is
based upon God’s will).
We have seen that Molinism arose during the period of the Catholic Counter-Reformation
at a time when theologians within Protestant and Catholic circles were focused upon working out
the tension between human free will and God’s sovereignty, providence, and grace. We have
also laid out Molina’s basic position for resolving this tension. Yet an obvious question remains:
Is there any reason to think that Molinism is true?
Evidence for Molinism
Since Alvin Plantinga brought the doctrine of Molinism back into prominence in the 1970s,
much has been written concerning its biblical and philosophical viability.121 While a full-blown
critique of all the arguments for and against Molinism cannot be done here, the aim of this
portion of our examination of Molinism is to offer a concise but thorough assessment of the most

is logically impossible. For example, it does not count against God’s omnipotence that He cannot create a square
circle, since there cannot be a square circle. A square circle is logically impossible, for by definition a shape cannot
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determine that a stochastic (i.e., utterly random) process contingently turns out in a certain way such that it could not
turn out otherwise.” See: MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 90.
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prominent issues surrounding this doctrine, succinctly making a case for its faithfulness to the
Scriptures and its philosophical coherence. We begin with the biblical evidence in favor of
Molinism.
Biblical Evidence for Molinism
Although there is no explicit proof-text for Molinism in the Bible, the sum total of the
biblical evidence in its favor is impressive. Molinism is not only consistent with the biblical data,
but it seems to be strongly indicated in Scripture by the combination of three key concepts that
seem to be biblical: (1) God has counterfactual knowledge of how humans would act in
circumstances that will never come to exist; (2) humans possess libertarian free will; and (3) God
has sovereign control of the world and the ability to achieve His precise plans. I will show in the
discussion that follows that there is good biblical reason for affirming all three of these points
and that Molinism appears to be the only way to reconcile them.
God’s Counterfactual Knowledge of Creaturely Actions
Let us begin with God’s knowledge of counterfactuals concerning creaturely actions. God’s
having counterfactual knowledge is clearly a necessary condition for His possession of middle
knowledge; however, it is not a sufficient condition because true middle knowledge requires that
God’s counterfactual knowledge must logically precede His creative decree. If it turns out that
God only has counterfactual knowledge of creaturely actions on the basis of (i.e., logically after)
His creative decree, then God would not possess true middle knowledge; this is because God’s
counterfactual knowledge would simply involve His knowing how He would actively cause a
person to act in any possible circumstance (even ones that He does not actualize). This, for
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example, is the position taken by the Dominicans,122 and it leaves no room for humans to possess
genuine libertarian freedom because they could not choose to act other than the way God decrees
that they must act. Thus, God only knows counterfactuals of creaturely freedom if He has middle
knowledge. If His counterfactual knowledge is logically subsequent to His creative decree, then
it is not knowledge of choices that are made by creatures who possess libertarian freedom.
Given that God’s knowledge of counterfactuals concerning creaturely actions is a
necessary condition for Molinism, it would be advantageous for the Molinist to find biblical
evidence that God has such knowledge. As it turns out, the Bible contains many instances in
which God indicates outcomes that would result in non-actual circumstances, and a number of
these involve human decisions. Molina focuses on two biblical examples in particular. First, in
Matthew 11:20-24 Jesus states that the wicked people of Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom would have
repented if they had seen the miracles Jesus performed in Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum.
Molina sees this statement as a clear example of Jesus expressing a counterfactual truth
concerning human decisions. He emphasizes that “because the hypothesis on which it was going
to occur was not in fact actualized, this repentance never did and never will exist in reality—and
yet it was a future contingent dependent on the free choice of human beings.”123 While William
Lane Craig has put forth the possibility that this particular statement from Jesus was merely
expressing hyperbole rather than a true counterfactual (Craig seems to propose this interpretation
largely because, as we will later discover, interpreting this particular statement as a true
counterfactual would undermine the theodicy that Craig proposes for dealing with the problem of

122. William Lane Craig, “The Middle-Knowledge View,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, eds. James
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the contingently lost), Molina’s literal interpretation is widely accepted by biblical commentators
for good reason. When we discuss Craig’s soteriological theodicy, we will examine this passage
in detail and discover why the best exegesis of the passage is to take it as a true counterfactual of
creaturely freedom (i.e., Jesus is truly expressing knowledge of what free creatures would have
done in non-actual circumstances).
Molina also cites 1 Samuel 23:4-13 as an example showing God’s knowledge of
counterfactuals. Here, David asks God whether Saul will attack the town of Keilah in order to
capture him. God affirms that Saul will attack. David then asks whether the men of Keilah will
decide to turn him over to Saul. God affirms that they will. At this point, David flees Keilah and
Saul no longer has any reason to come to Keilah and attack it. Molina points out that “God knew
these two future contingent events, which depend on human choice, and He revealed them to
David. Yet they never have existed and never will exist in eternity.”124 In other words, God was
communicating counterfactual truths concerning human decisions. Even though the events never
occur (David never stayed in Keilah so Saul never attacked the city and the men of Keilah never
turned David over to Saul), God revealed to David what Saul and the men of Keilah would have
done if David remained in Keilah.
There are many other examples indicating that God has counterfactual knowledge. For
example, God reveals to Zedekiah what his enemies would do to him under the condition that he
surrenders and under the condition that he does not surrender (Jer 38:17-18). God reveals to Saul
how he would have prospered as king and how his kingdom would have been permanently
established if he had not sinned by illegitimately offering a sacrifice to God (1 Sam 13:11-14).
The Apostle Paul says that if the “rulers of this age” had understood the wisdom of God then
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“they would not have crucified the Lord of glory” (1 Cor 2:8). Paul seems to be expressing what
the rulers who condemned Jesus would have done under non-actual circumstances. God also
knows numerous counterfactuals that do not directly involve human choices.125 Thus, the biblical
evidence that God knows counterfactual truths—even ones concerning human choices—is
strong. Indeed, the acceptance of God’s knowledge of counterfactuals is not unique to Molinism
and has been held without controversy throughout church history.126
Human Libertarian Freedom
The second key piece of biblical evidence that supports Molinism is that Scripture indicates
that humans have libertarian free will. We have seen that there is biblical evidence that God
knows counterfactuals concerning human actions, but such counterfactual knowledge is only
middle knowledge if God knows it logically prior to His creative decree. If it is the case that God
knows counterfactuals concerning human actions and humans possess libertarian free will, then
it is the case that God’s counterfactual knowledge concerning human actions is logically prior to
His creative decree. That is, God would know what any creature would do in any given
circumstance on the basis of the creature’s free choice, and it would not be the case that God
knows what a free creature would do in any given circumstance merely on the basis of God’s
decree that the creature would be divinely determined to act in that way. So, if humans possess
libertarian free will, then God’s counterfactual knowledge concerning human actions is logically
prior to His creative decree and God has true middle knowledge. Because the Bible indicates that
humans do, in fact, have libertarian freedom—the ability of an agent, when confronted with a

125. See for example: Is 38:1-5; Ex 32:9-14; Jon 3:1-10; Mt 17:27; Mt 26:24; Jn 15:22-24; Jn 21:6; 1 Cor 2:8.
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choice involving multiple options, to choose an option other than the one that the agent does in
fact choose—God appears to have legitimate middle knowledge. Note, however, that I do not
deny that one’s conscience can be seared (1 Tim 4:2) or that one can suppress the truth and be
given over to a depraved mind (Rom 1:18-32) or that one can become addicted to drugs or
certain sinful behaviors. I recognize that in these sorts of cases it may eventually become hugely
difficult (perhaps at some point nearly impossible) to resist sin and respond to the convicting
work of the Holy Spirit or to break free of one’s addictions. In such cases, one has used one’s
free will to become enslaved to sin or to drugs, and the freedom one has to resist these things
may be greatly diminished. This recognition does not detract from the fact that God has given all
of us the freedom required to be moral agents and to choose to love or reject God.
Clearly, there is disagreement among Christians as to whether it is biblical that God has
given humans libertarian freedom. We have already seen that Luther regarded divine
foreknowledge as incompatible with human libertarian freedom and Calvin thought God’s
sovereignty would be threatened if we are free. According to some Reformed Christians, humans
have freedom in the sense of being able to act in accordance with the desires that God has given
us, but we lack the ability to generate a choice from our own wills that departs from this
predetermined desire. As Reformed theologians Robert Peterson and Michael Williams put it,
“We do as we please. But we are not so absolutely free as to be able to please as we please.”127
For those who hold such a view, the catalyst behind all human actions is the will of God. While
not all Reformed Christians would deny that humans possess libertarian freedom at all, we have
noted that it is part of Reformed soteriology to deny that anyone has the libertarian freedom to
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choose to be saved; only God can give a person the gift of having the ability to place faith in
Christ and be saved. We have also seen, however, that there are important difficulties with
certain aspects of Reformed soteriology and that these difficulties point toward humans
possessing libertarian freedom with regard to the decision to accept or reject Christ.
I argued in the previous chapter that: Christ died so that all people have the opportunity to
accept God’s grace and be saved; God truly desires for all people to be saved; and God has
provided sufficient grace to all so that no person is without excuse for rejecting His offer of
grace. However, if God does genuinely offer salvation to all people and desires for all people to
be saved, then it is evident that humans do not always act in accordance with God’s will since all
people clearly are not saved. As we have seen, this is why the Reformed theologian David
Engelsma realizes that he must bite the bullet and assert that God does not genuinely desire for
all people to be saved.128 If my arguments from the previous chapter succeed, then God’s
sovereignty must have a permissive component in which He allows creatures the freedom either
to set their wills against God or to allow God’s promptings of their heart to soften their wills;
God must allow humans to make their own choices that are not determined by God—even the
choice to reject every opportunity that God gives them to respond to God’s drawing them toward
Himself and salvation. Yet, if this is true, then humans possess libertarian freedom. The fact that
some people are lost despite God’s provision of sufficient grace to all people and His genuine
desire for their salvation cries out for an explanation, and that explanation is found in the
rebellious will of creatures who freely spurn God’s grace and reject Him in favor of sin.
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Aside from the importance of libertarian freedom in one’s choice concerning the
acceptance or rejection of the gospel, libertarian freedom seems essential to the moral agency
that Scripture ascribes to humans. The Bible teaches that we choose whether or not to do good or
do evil, and we thus bear responsibility when we make moral choices. It is dubious that creatures
who are incapable of choosing to act differently than they do in fact act bear moral responsibility
for their actions. On Compatibilism, an agent is causally determined to act as she does (i.e.,
antecedent conditions beyond her control make it impossible for her to choose otherwise), yet
she is free in the sense that she would have acted differently if she had chosen to do so (even
though she could not have so chosen). Even atheists who hold to determinism often admit that
this compatibilistic concept of freedom does not legitimize the praiseworthiness or
blameworthiness of an agent. David Baggett and Jerry Walls explore the interactions between
three naturalists regarding moral responsibility: Bruce Waller, Daniel Dennett, and Tom Clark.
While there are differences among them, all three agree that libertarian freedom is required if
moral responsibility is understood in the robust sense of the agent deserving praise or blame.129
They recognize that lauding or condemning a moral choice is not reasonable if that person was
determined to act as she did. Baggett and Walls rightly disagree with their determinism but agree
with them that on determinism there could be no moral responsibility. A genuine moral agent
must be the source of her moral decisions and must have the ability to take alternative action.
Notably, a number of Calvinists recognize that libertarian freedom is necessary in order to
escape the moral difficulty that God is the author of sin and eternally decrees that the reprobate

129. David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning (Oxford:
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have the freedom that warrants that. Dennett also thinks we are not morally responsible if “moral responsibility” is
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will have no ability to avoid their fate. Within Calvinism, there are some who hold to
supralapsarianism and others who adopt infralapsarianism. According to supralapsarianism, God
desires to damn certain persons and elect others. On that basis, He decrees that the Fall of Adam
must happen in order to ensure that humans fall under the condemnation of sin so that He can
save only the elect and damn the reprobate. Supralapsarian Calvinism thus places logical priority
on God’s will to damn and save certain people, and the Fall is the logically subsequent means by
which God achieves this double predestination. By contrast, infralapsarian Calvinists hold that
God’s determination to save some and leave others to be damned is logically subsequent to
Adam’s sin.130 Infralapsarians make this distinction in order to claim that the reprobate are only
lost due to sin and not simply because God wills for them to be reprobate. The problem is that
infralapsarianism alone fails to remove God as the author of sin. God still eternally wills the
damnation of the reprobate and the election of the saved, and it is hard to see how human
culpability could enter the picture if it were the case that our sins are the result of God’s
sovereign plan and happen by necessity. In order to avoid this, certain infralapsarians such as the
late R. C. Sproul attack the real difficulty: libertarian freedom and human responsibility must
enter into the equation somehow.
Sproul argues that Adam possessed libertarian freedom—the “ability to sin and the ability
not to sin.”131 Sproul then adopts the controversial view that Adam functions as the federal head
of the human race. Thus, when Adam chose to sin, all people essentially make the libertarian
choice to sin with Adam.132 In this way, even though all of Adam’s descendants lack libertarian
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freedom, Sproul still appeals to libertarian freedom in order to justify sin and God’s decision to
permit, rather than cause, the reprobate to be damned. While many aspects of Sproul’s view are
problematic (e.g., his Reformed starting points against which I have argued, his heavy emphasis
on just one act of libertarian freedom, and the dubious concept of federal headship), the central
point for our purposes is this: The fact that he considers it important to work libertarian freedom
into his Reformed position in order to justify God morally is a testament to the theological and
moral importance of libertarian freedom in Scripture.133 Moreover, the importance of libertarian
freedom is seen in the fact that those Calvinists who reject libertarian freedom and do not see a
way to avoid the conclusion that this seems to entail that God decrees sin are often compelled to
appeal to mystery in order to brush aside this problem; Robert Peterson and Michael Williams,
for example, make this appeal to “mystery” when faced with the enormous challenge of how “a
supremely good and holy God can sovereignly ordain the sinful acts of human beings.” They
wrongly deny that we have libertarian freedom and rightly affirm the complete sovereignty of
God. They thus are forced to admit that “sin ought not to be. It does not fit with any conception
of a good and just God. Yet it is, and he is.”134 They simply rest content to regard this as a
profound mystery. But surely this is more than a mystery—it is a deep incoherence; moreover, it
is an incoherence that can be avoided when one recognizes the strong indications in Scripture
that humans have the ability to choose not to sin.
Since human libertarian freedom appears to be a necessary ingredient in order to give a
morally justifiable account of sin and reprobation, it is not surprising that many biblical texts
highlight the human ability to choose sin or reject it. When we sin, Scripture seems to teach that
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we have the capability to do otherwise. For example, while condemning the Jewish leaders for
continually rejecting and persecuting the prophets God has sent to them, Jesus states: “Jerusalem,
Jerusalem, who kills the prophets and stones those who are sent to her! How often I wanted to
gather your children together, the way a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were
unwilling” (Mt 23:37). The painful grief Jesus shows in this passage emphasizes how it was
never His will for the people of Jerusalem to reject God; rather, Jesus states that His desire for
them was not actualized due to their own unwillingness. God has eternally known what choices
the people of Jerusalem would ultimately make, and He permits their decisions and accounts for
them in His sovereign plan for human history; however, He still mourns their rebelliousness and
prefers that they would freely accept the prophets and turn to Him. Similarly, when Cain is angry
because of God’s unhappiness with his offering, God reminds Cain that Cain himself has the
power to sin or to do the right thing. God tells Cain, “If you do well, will not your countenance
be lifted up? And if you do not do well, sin is crouching at the door; and its desire is for you, but
you must master it” (Gen 4:7). Scripture is clear that God “does not tempt anyone. But each one
is tempted when he is carried away and enticed by his own lust” (Jas 1:13-14). Moreover, when
one is tempted, God “will provide the way of escape also, so that you will be able to endure it” (1
Cor 10:13). Even if one takes the latter verse, given its context, to be directed at believers only,
the verse at least indicates that when believers sin they always have the ability to have avoided
that sin. Thus, this verse indicates that there are at least millions of people in the world (at least
all believers) who have libertarian freedom with regard to their moral actions. Yet, given verses
such as those noted above about Jerusalem and Cain, one should not think the Bible teaches that
it is only believers who have the ability to avoid sin regardless of whether 1 Corinthians 10:13
applies only to believers.
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Ultimately, Scripture indicates that at the final judgment God will praise those who acted in
love toward others (Mt 25:34-40) and will eternally punish the lost for their culpability in acting
wrongly (Mt 25:46). If we sin and bear moral responsibility so that we are worthy of punishment,
then (as Baggett and Walls rightly argue) we must have libertarian freedom. Moral agency
requires that we could have done otherwise, and the Bible portrays us as moral agents who have
the ability (at least prior to being completely consumed by sin or addiction) to make different
choices than the ones that we make.
Libertarian freedom is thus a biblical concept; therefore, together with the fact of God’s
having counterfactual knowledge concerning human actions, a strong biblical basis exists for
concluding that God knows counterfactuals concerning human actions logically prior to His
creative decree. This means that God truly knows counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and He
has middle knowledge. It seems that we can eliminate the possibility that God knows
counterfactuals concerning creaturely choices on the basis of God determining all of our choices.
God’s Sovereignty, Providence, and Election of Individuals
There is, however, also a third key piece of biblical evidence that supports Molinism: God
is fully sovereign over all things despite our libertarian freedom. While Arminians are correct to
emphasize human libertarian freedom and responsibility, Calvinists are correct in affirming a
strong view of God’s sovereignty. Molinism provides a bridge that supports libertarian freedom
as well as God’s sovereignty, providence, and even election.
The fact that God is sovereign and providentially directs human history in accordance with
His unshakable will is a thoroughly biblical concept. Scripture tells us that God’s plans cannot be
thwarted. For example, through Isaiah, God reveals that no person or power will prevent Him
from achieving what He has decreed shall occur from eternity: “I am God, and there is no one
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like Me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times things which have not
been done, saying, ‘My purpose will be established, and I will accomplish all My good
pleasure’” (Is 46:9-10). Similarly, and without denying human freedom, the psalmist declares
God’s ability to achieve His plans, saying: “The Lord nullifies the counsel of the nations; He
frustrates the plans of the peoples. The counsel of the Lord stands forever, the plans of His heart
from generation to generation” (Ps 33:10-11). Jesus affirms that not even a sparrow falls to the
ground apart from the will of the Father (Mt 10:29). Indeed, Solomon goes so far as to regard
events that appear to be random as falling within God’s sovereign control, saying: “The lot is
cast into the lap, but its every decision is from the Lord” (Prv 16:33).
Most significantly, Scripture specifically claims that God accomplishes his purposes
through free human decisions—even sinful ones. Molina emphasized the power of Molinism to
make sense of how Scripture teaches both the sovereignty of God and the moral responsibility of
humans for their sins. Molina stressed that his view allows that “all things without exception are
individually subject to God’s providence and will.” Evil acts are permitted by God and are part
of His sovereign plan, but they are brought about by evil humans who have libertarian freedom
and not by God. Molinism avoids God being the author of sin and yet accounts for the biblical
teaching that God is sovereign over even the evil that humans bring about.135 Consider the
following biblical example: Saul opts to take his own life rather than be captured in battle (1 Chr
10:4), yet the chronicler regards Saul’s death as God’s doing. The chronicler explains: “Saul died
because he was unfaithful to the Lord; he did not keep the word of the Lord and even consulted a
medium for guidance, and did not inquire of the Lord. So the Lord put him to death and turned
the kingdom over to David son of Jesse” (1 Chr 10:13-14). William Lane Craig thinks that in this
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passage we see “in microcosm the mystery of divine sovereignty and human freedom. On the
one hand, Saul took his own life; on the other, God killed Saul.”136 Craig sees Molinism as the
key to unraveling this mystery. He explains:
God knew what Saul would freely do in those circumstances, and though he did not desire
Saul to commit suicide, he permitted him to do so freely, knowing that by this means David
would take the throne, which is what God wanted. (This is obviously grossly simplified;
Saul’s suicide has an ever-widening ripple effect down through subsequent history, which
God also takes into account.) Thus, Saul freely took his own life, but the chronicler,
looking at it from the perspective of God’s plan, says the Lord slew Saul.137
Another prime example of God achieving His plans via human free choices is seen in the
account of Joseph’s brothers selling Joseph into slavery. In their jealous hatred of Joseph, the
brothers made a plot to kill him before ultimately selling him into slavery. After enduring slavery
and imprisonment for many years, Joseph became second in command of Egypt and was
reunited with his brothers when they went to Egypt for food to survive the famine that God
brought about. Despite the fact that Joseph came to be in Egypt as a result of his brothers’ sinful
actions, Joseph reassured his brothers that everything happened according to God’s plan. Joseph
said, “God sent me before you to preserve for you a remnant in the earth, and to keep you alive
by a great deliverance” (Gen 45:7). Even though it was the brothers who sold Joseph off to
Egypt, Joseph nevertheless regarded this as God’s decision. When his brothers later begged him
to forgive them, Joseph responded, “Do not be afraid, for am I in God’s place? As for you, you
meant evil against me, but God meant it for good in order to bring about this present result, to
preserve many people alive” (Gen 50:19-20). How then can one make sense of the fact that the
brothers’ sinful actions were intended by God to accomplish His purposes? Clearly, God does
not tempt anyone to sin or cause anyone to do evil (Jas 1:13). It is unbiblical to think that God

136. Molina, Concordia 4.53.3.17, 252.
137. Craig, “God’s Middle Knowledge,” 168.
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caused the brothers to carry out the sinful actions that brought Joseph to Egypt; however,
Molinism shows how God can achieve His purposes via the free choices of humans. Although
God would prefer that the brothers would not make the sinful choice that they did, He knew they
would make that choice if placed into those particular circumstances. God simply brought about
the circumstances, knowing how He would use their free actions to ultimately accomplish His
good and loving purposes.
The death of Jesus also provides another remarkable case of God achieving His
predetermined plan via sinful human actions. Peter, in his Pentecost speech, emphasizes to the
people of Jerusalem the dual truths that they were responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus and
that this event was part of God’s intentional plan. Concerning Jesus, Peter emphasizes that “this
Man, delivered over by the predetermined plan and foreknowledge of God, you nailed to a cross
by the hands of godless men and put Him to death” (Acts 2:23). Although it was God’s plan, the
people are responsible for this sin. Peter again declares in a subsequent speech to the people of
Jerusalem that “the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the God of our fathers, has glorified His
servant Jesus, the one whom you delivered and disowned in the presence of Pilate, when he had
decided to release Him” (Acts 3:13). Yet Peter follows up this statement concerning the
responsibility of the people by again insisting that this happened so that “the things which God
announced beforehand by the mouth of all the prophets, that His Christ would suffer, He has thus
fulfilled” (Acts 3:18). Similarly, after Peter and John were released from prison by the Jewish
authorities, the early believers lifted up a prayer to God, saying, “For truly in this city there were
gathered together against Your holy servant Jesus, whom You anointed, both Herod and Pontius
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Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever Your hand and Your
purpose predestined to occur” (Acts 4:27-28).138
These biblical statements concerning the death of Jesus reveal the incredible extent of
God’s sovereignty over human history. That God is able to bring about the sacrificial death of
Jesus in just the time and place that He has eternally planned without violating the free will of
the human agents responsible for Jesus’ death is nothing short of amazing. Apart from the truth
of Molinism, it is inexplicable how this could be accomplished. As Craig puts it, if we allow that
God possesses middle knowledge, then:
via his middle knowledge, God knew exactly which persons, if members of the Sanhedrin,
would freely vote for Jesus’ condemnation; which persons, if in Jerusalem, would freely
demand Christ’s death, favoring the release of Barabbas; what Herod, if king, would freely
do in reaction to Jesus and to Pilate’s plea to judge him on his own; and what Pilate
himself, if holding the prefecture of Palestine in A.D. 27, would freely do under pressure
from the Jewish leaders and the crowd. Knowing all the possible circumstances, persons
and permutations of these circumstances and persons, God decreed to create just those
circumstances and just those people who would freely do what God willed to happen.139
Indeed, even opponents of Molinism often recognize the fact that reconciling this type of
meticulous sovereignty with human libertarian freedom cannot be done apart from Molinism.
For example, William Hasker, in a response to the Molinist Thomas Flint, admits: “If you are
committed to a ‘strong’ view of providence, according to which, down to the smallest detail,
‘things are as they are because God knowingly decided to create such a world,’ and yet you also
wish to maintain a libertarian concept of free will—if this is what you want, then Molinism is the
only game in town.”140 Of course, as a proponent of open theism, Hasker argues that God must

138. For other biblical statements indicating both the human responsibility for Jesus’ death and God’s
foreordination of the event, see Acts 13:27 and Luke 22:22.
139. Craig, “The Middle-Knowledge View,” 134.
140. William Hasker, “Response to Thomas Flint,” Philosophical Studies 60 (1990): 117-118. Flint cites this
quote on page 75 of his book Divine Providence and proceeds to explain why Hasker is correct that Molinism is the
only way to reconcile libertarian freedom with a strong view of God’s sovereignty.
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take risks without knowing what the future holds; Hasker thus opts to deny this “strong view of
God’s providence.” As we have seen, however, the biblical data indicates that God is sovereign
over a vast range of “large” and even “small” things—and, by implication, over all things.
We thus have strong biblical grounds for finding Molinism attractive. Molinism is
supported by the biblical evidence that God has knowledge of counterfactuals concerning human
actions and that humans possess the libertarian freedom to act other than the way they do act.
The fact that God does not determine our actions and yet knows what we would freely choose in
non-actual circumstances strongly indicates that God has middle knowledge. Furthermore,
Molinism appears to be the only mechanism by which God can be fully sovereign over a world
of free creatures. It is also worth noting that Molinism, if true, has the benefit of resolving much
of the tension between Calvinism and Arminianism.141 The Molinist can affirm with the
Arminian that humans have libertarian freedom such that they are not determined to act as they
do;142 that unlimited atonement is true; that God genuinely desires for all to be saved; and that all
people are given sufficient grace such that they can respond to God’s calling and be saved if they
so choose. Yet the Molinist can also agree with the Calvinist that God is fully sovereign over all
things, including electing individuals to salvation. Unlike the Arminian position that God’s
election is merely corporate, Molinism allows for God to elect individuals to salvation.143 Since,

141. Craig, “Middle Knowledge: A Calvinist-Arminian Rapprochement?,” 141-164. Craig argues effectively
that Molinism captures the insights of Calvinism and Arminianism, shrinking the gap between them.
142. Of course, as I have noted previously, some Calvinists (such as Plantinga) also affirm that humans have
libertarian freedom. Plantinga only denies that humans have libertarian freedom with regard to accepting Christ.
143. Some have argued that Jacobus Arminius was actually a Molinist, but there is a limit to the comparison
that should be made between the views of Arminius and Molina. Eef Dekker shows that Arminius was influenced by
Molina to accept that God possesses counterfactual knowledge of human free choices. See: Eef Dekker, “Was
Arminius a Molinist?,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 27, no. 2 (Sum 1996): 337-352. However, Kirk MacGregor
points out that Arminius only believed that God has knowledge of human free choices logically subsequent to His
creative decree to create the world. Once God determined to create a world of certain people, Arminius thought, God
then knows on that basis how those people will freely choose. It is then the people whom God knows will choose to
be saved that are corporately considered the “elect.” This is not true Molinism. See Kirk R. MacGregor, A Molinist-
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according to Molinism, God knows the various circumstances under which a person would freely
choose to be saved, God can elect that person to salvation by creating him or her in such a
circumstance. In this way, Molinism allows that “it is up to God whether we find ourselves in a
world in which we are predestined, but that it is up to us whether we are predestined in the world
in which we find ourselves.”144 (Of course, if anyone would freely choose to be saved in any
world in which that person has libertarian freedom or if anyone would freely choose to be lost in
any world in which that person has libertarian freedom, then for such persons it would not be up
to God whether they find themselves in a world in which they are predestined to be saved or
predestined to be lost. It would be up to God that they exist, but it would be solely up to them
that they are predestined for salvation or damnation in any world in which they exist with free
will because God could not actualize any world in which such a person is free and a different
soteriological outcome would occur for that person. There is no way to know, however, whether
such persons exist or could exist.) If God has middle knowledge, there are a variety of ways that
He could choose to use it in electing individuals to salvation; indeed, although the doctrine of
middle knowledge in no way requires this view, Molina actually held that God uses His middle
knowledge to elect unconditionally individuals to salvation. We will examine this later.
With all of these advantages, Molinism stands on solid biblical ground. Craig goes so far as
to say that “middle knowledge, if coherent, is one of the most fruitful theological ideas ever
conceived. For it would serve to explain not only God’s knowledge of the future, but divine

Anabaptist Systematic Theology (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007), 69-73. MacGregor also points
out that many Reformed Christians “reject Molinism out of hand on the faulty assumption that [Molinism and
Arminianism] are basically the same thing.” They wrongly see Molinism as merely a “slightly more philosophically
sophisticated version” of Arminianism. In reality, “Molinism agrees or disagrees with Calvinism at various points
and agrees or disagrees with Arminianism at various points.” See: MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 18-19.
144. Craig, “Middle Knowledge: A Calvinist-Arminian Rapprochement?,” 157.
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providence and predestination as well.”145 But is Molinism coherent? Does it hold up to
philosophical scrutiny? It is to that subject that we now turn.
Philosophical Defense of Molinism
Even though Molinism seems to be the only way to resolve the difficult biblical puzzle of
explaining the combination of human libertarian freedom, God’s counterfactual knowledge of
our actions, and God’s detailed sovereignty over all things, the question remains as to whether it
is a philosophically defensible concept. In order to defend Molinism, one need not offer a
“proof” that it is true; rather, a defense of the coherence of Molinism is all that is necessary. If
Molinism seems to be coherent and at least possibly true, then there can be no objection to its
acceptance and to leveraging its significant explanatory power. While a variety of philosophical
arguments have been lodged against the claim that God has middle knowledge, these attacks
really only target a couple of key areas. The first—and most important—area of attack is to deny
that any counterfactual of creaturely freedom (CCF) can be true. The second is to deny that God
can know CCFs logically prior to His decision to create the actual world.146 A CCF is a
counterfactual “of the form If S were in C, S would freely do A, where S is a created agent, A is
some action, and C is a set of fully specified circumstances including the whole history of the
world up until the time of S’s free action.”147 Let us begin with the first major type of objection.

145. Craig, The Only Wise God, 127.
146. Ibid., 138-139. In exploring the anti-Molinist literature, I am in agreement with Craig’s assessment that
these are the two basic areas of philosophical objection to Molinism. The second objection, as we will see, can be
broken into two separate issues: (1) Can God know counterfactuals of creaturely freedom? (2) If so, can God know
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom logically prior to His decision to create the existing world? Ken Perszyk, in
surveying the current scholarly landscape concerning Molinism, agrees with Craig that the main anti-Molinist
objections are the claims that: (1) “there are or can be no true counterfactuals of freedom; all are false or neither true
nor false” (or at least “there are or can be no true counterfactuals of freedom prior to God’s creative decisions”); and
(2) “God cannot know counterfactuals of freedom prior to his decrees even if they are true prior to them.” See: Ken
Perszyk, “Introduction,” in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. Ken Perszyk (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), 7.
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The Truth of Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom
Some philosophers argue that there is no valid basis for the truth of any CCF—either by
contending that CCFs are all false or by making the case that they have no truth value at all. The
most significant reason why such philosophers—most notably Robert Adams and William
Hasker—reject the truth of CCFs is what is known as the “grounding objection.” Ken Perszyk,
who has done much work on the viability of Molinism, is correct in his assessment that the
grounding objection is “the most common objection to the coherence of Molinism in recent
times.”148 Besides the grounding objection, the other key argument against there being true CCFs
is one that was put forward in the 1980s—and is still defended today in an updated form—by
William Hasker and is known as the “bring about” argument. These two prominent objections,
therefore, will be our focus in this section.149
Let us begin with the grounding objection. The grounding objection originated with Adams
in his 1977 article “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil.” In this article, he argues that it
is not possible for God to have middle knowledge because CCFs cannot be true apart from a
metaphysical basis, or “grounds,” for their truth. Since CCFs are conditionals stating what a free
creature would freely do if placed in some non-actual circumstance,150 Adams makes the case

147. Craig, “Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the ‘Grounding Objection,’” 338.
148. Ken Perszyk, “Recent Work on Molinism,” Philosophy Compass 8, no. 8 (Aug 2013): 758.
149. Perszyk offers a nice summary of the landscape of philosophical objections to the truth of CCFs in the
contemporary debate and how Molinists have dealt with them. See: Perszyk, “Recent Work on Molinism,” 757-760.
Besides the grounding type of argument and the “bring about” argument (both of which we will examine briefly), he
mentions two others: “might” arguments and “tie” arguments. These arguments are not of much prominence in the
literature and are widely considered to have been answered. The “might” type of argument is explained by Perszyk
on p. 757, and he summarizes the Molinist response. Thomas Flint similarly gives a helpful description of how this
type of argument has been handled for over two decades. See: Thomas P. Flint, “Whence and Whither the Molinist
Debate: A Reply to Hasker,” in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. Ken Perszyk (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), 38-39. The “tie” type of argument is explained by Perszyk on p. 758, and he points out how Alvin
Plantinga has provided a forceful answer to it. Neither the “might” nor the “tie” arguments will be discussed here.
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that there is nothing in reality to ground the truth of such a conditional. He contends that “the
intentions or character of the agents” cannot ground the truth of CCFs because the free agents
involved “may act out of character” or their intentions or desires may change.151 He also argues
that the free will of the agent would be undermined if the truth of the CCF is grounded in
“logical or causal necessitation,” so he eliminates that possibility and concludes that he does “not
see how these counterfactuals can be true.”152 Hasker similarly raises the challenge: “Who or
what is it (if anything) that brings it about that these propositions are true?”153 He argues that
there can be no true CCFs because neither God nor the agent involved in the CCF causally brings
about the truth of the CCF. Hasker holds that “truths about ‘what would be the case . . . if’ must
be grounded in truths about what is in fact the case.” He thinks the truth of counterfactuals must
be grounded in something about “the natures, causal powers, inherent tendencies, and the like, of
the natural entities described in them.”154
Craig rightly points out that the grounding objection is an application of a theory of truth
known as “truth-maker theory.” This theory holds that true propositions have a “truth-maker”—a
basis upon which there is sufficient grounds for the proposition being true.155 It is important to
150. Note once again that a “circumstance” here refers to what is often called a maximal world segment—a
complete description of the entire history of the world up until the exact moment that the agent who is part of the
CCF freely acts.
151. Robert Merrihew Adams, “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” in The Problem of Evil, ed.
Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 114. This is a
reprinting of Adams’s original 1977 article that appears on pp. 109-117 of American Philosophical Quarterly 14
(April 1, 1977).
152. Robert Merrihew Adams, “An Anti-Molinist Argument,” in Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 5, ed. J.
Tomberlin (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1991), 345. Adams regards as false CCFs having to do with “possible but
non-actual creatures” and all CCFs that “have false consequents.” He thinks that if CCFs “with true consequents
about actual creatures are true at all, their truth arises too late in the order of explanation to play the part in divine
providence that it is supposed to play according to Molina’s theory.”
153. William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 39.
154. Ibid., 30.
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note that truth-makers, according to the standard theory, are not required to be concrete objects
that cause the proposition in question to be true; rather, truth-makers are merely states of affairs
that provide a logical basis for the truth of the proposition. Truth-maker theorists generally
understand truth-makers in this way for good reason. As Craig points out, statements such as the
following cannot have truth-makers that are currently existing concrete objects: negative
statements that express the non-existence of something (e.g., “Dinosaurs are extinct today”);
universal statements (e.g., “All ravens are black”); and statements about people who have died
(e.g., “Napoleon lost the Battle of Waterloo”) or are not yet born (e.g., “The U. S. President in
[the year 2200] will be a woman”).156 Even in the case where there is an agent involved in
causing the state of affairs that brings a proposition into correspondence with reality, truth-maker
theorists regard the state of affairs, and not the agent, as the truth-maker. William Vallicella
explains:
All are agreed that truth-making is not a causal relation, even though there is a sense in
which an agent who brings about a state of affairs ‘makes true’ the corresponding
proposition. Thus by painting the gate red, there is a sense in which I make true the
proposition expressed by ‘The gate is red.’ But what is really going on here is that I cause a
concrete state of affairs to exist, and then it [the state of affairs that the fence is red]
noncausally makes true the corresponding proposition.157
Thus, proponents of the grounding objection, such as Adams and Hasker, are not even
consistent with standard truth-maker theory because they demand that there must be some
concrete thing in reality that causes a proposition to be true. Of course, given the nature of a
CCF, there will not be a concrete object that causes the CCF to be true. This departure from

155. Craig, “Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the ‘Grounding Objection,’” 339-340.
156. Ibid., 341-343.
157. William F. Vallicella, A Paradigm Theory of Existence: Onto-Theology Vindicated (Norwell, MA: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2002), 165-166.
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truth-maker theory ought to be an initial reason to have doubts about whether the grounding
objection reveals that CCFs cannot be true.
Beyond Adams and Hasker not keeping with truth-maker theory by making it a requisite
condition for the truth of CCFs that some sort of concrete object causes the CCF to be true, one
may further ask why CCFs must have any truth-maker at all (even a noncausal one). As Craig
points out, even very few truth-maker theorists accept the idea that all true propositions must
have truth-makers (a view known as “truth-maker maximalism”).158 Craig adds:
I have yet to encounter an argument for the conclusion that counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom cannot be among those types of truths lacking a truth-maker. Indeed, when one
reflects on the fact that such statements are counterfactual in nature, then such statements
might seem to be prime candidates for belonging to that diverse class of statements which
are true without having any truth–makers.159
Yet, in any case, a number of prominent Molinists do allow that CCFs may have noncausal
truth-makers. Alvin Plantinga imagines, for example, the CCF that “if Curley had been offered a
bribe of $35,000, he would have (freely) accepted it.” Plantinga claims that “what grounds the
truth of the counterfactual, we may say, is just that in fact Curley is such that if he had been
offered a $35,000 bribe, he would have freely taken it.”160 That is, Plantinga allows that if CCFs
must be grounded, what grounds a CCF is simply the fact that if the state of affairs described in
the antecedent of the CCF were to be actual, then the specified agent would freely perform the
action specified in the consequent of the CCF. Curley himself thus does not make the CCF about
him true; indeed the CCF would be true even if Curley never exists. Similarly, Alfred Freddoso
has argued that the grounds for CCFs being true are analogous to the grounds for past-tense or

158. Craig, “Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the ‘Grounding Objection,’” 343-344.
159. Ibid., 344. See also Craig, “The Middle-Knowledge View,” 142.
160. Alvin Plantinga, “Reply to Robert M. Adams,” in Alvin Plantinga, eds. James Tomberlin and Peter Van
Inwagen (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1985), 374.
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future-tense statements being true. Freddoso argues that “there are now adequate metaphysical
grounds for the truth of a past-tense proposition,” such as “Socrates drank hemlock,” just in case
“there were at some past time adequate metaphysical grounds for the truth of its present-tense
counterpart.” In the same way, future-tense propositions currently have adequate metaphysical
grounds if such grounds will exist in the future. Likewise, CCFs currently have adequate
metaphysical grounds if such grounds would exist under the circumstances specified in the
CCF.161 So, like Plantinga, Freddoso believes a CCF is grounded by the simple fact that its
consequent would be true if its antecedent condition were to be actualized. Craig162 and Thomas
Flint163 also find such reasoning to be plausible, should one think that CCFs need to have a truthmaker at all.
Let us now turn to an examination of Hasker’s “bring about” argument. This argument
originated with his 1986 article “A Refutation of Middle Knowledge”164 and his 1989 book God,
Time, and Knowledge. Hasker helpfully makes note of the various iterations of his argument that
have been published leading up to the more recent version of the argument that he defends in a
chapter of the 2013 anthology Molinism: The Contemporary Debate.165 I will provide the current
161. Alfred J. Freddoso, “Introduction,” in On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, tr. Alfred J.
Freddoso (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 72.
162. Craig, “Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the ‘Grounding Objection,’” 346. Craig agrees that “what
makes it true that ‘If I were rich, I would buy a Mercedes,’ is the fact that if I were rich I would buy a Mercedes.” If
the counterfactual state of affairs described in the CCF were made actual (if I were rich), it is simply true that I
would buy a Mercedes. No concrete object causes this to be true. While Craig allows for such a noncausal grounding
of CCFs, he strongly rejects the very notion of causal grounds for the truth of CCFs. He argues that such grounds
would be incompatible with libertarian freedom. See William Lane Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human
Freedom: The Coherence of Theism: Omniscience (Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1991), 261-262.
163. Flint, Divine Providence, 137. Flint thinks Freddoso’s argument gives “powerful reasons” to reject the
grounding objection.
164. William Hasker, “A Refutation of Middle Knowledge,” Nous 20 (1986): 545-57.
165. William Hasker, “The (Non‐)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals,” in Molinism: The Contemporary
Debate, ed. Ken Perszyk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 30-34. Perszyk also provides a useful history of
the iterations of this argument. See: Perszyk, “Recent Work on Molinism,” 759-760.
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version of Hasker’s “bring about” argument before identifying why it fails to show that there can
be no true CCFs.
The most recent version of Hasker’s argument is somewhat complex and has two parts.
The first part tries to show that if we assume for the sake of argument both that humans have
libertarian freedom (which Hasker himself accepts) and that there are true CCFs (which Hasker
does not accept), then this leads to the conclusion that there must be something that a free agent
could do (i.e., nothing logically or causally prevents the free agent from doing it) such that, were
she to do it, it would result in CCFs that are true in the actual world being false and CCFs that
are false in the actual world being true. This is because libertarian freedom requires that when an
agent A is in circumstance c, A could do action z or refrain from doing z. With this conclusion in
place, he moves to the second part of his argument and aims to show that the idea of true CCFs
leads to a second conclusion—one that conflicts with the conclusion he reached in the first part
of his argument. In the second part of his argument, he contends that any true CCFs would have
to be intimately connected with the history of the world (and the world’s history can no longer be
changed) such that there is no possible world in which we could do anything other than act in
accordance with CCFs that are in fact true; thus, this second part of his argument contends that
we could not do anything such that, if we were to do it, it would alter the truth value of the CCFs.
So, he claims that the conclusion of the first part of his argument contradicts the conclusion of
the second part of his arguments, and yet both conclusions seemingly must be true if there are
true CCFs. Thus, he thinks that he has offered a reductio ad absurdum argument that shows that
it is incoherent for there to be true CCFs, so Molinism is false. With this broad overview of what
Hasker is trying to accomplish in place, let us examine the details of his argument.
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He first defines what he means by an agent’s “bringing about” (BA) that a proposition is
true: “A brings it about that Y iff: For some X, A causes it to be the case that X, and (X & H) ⇒
Y, and ~ (H ⇒ Y), where ‘H’ represents the history of the world prior to its coming to be the
case that X.” 166 This means that for A to bring about Y, there must be some X that A has it in his
power to do such that, by A doing X, that action X (together with H, which is the history of the
world up to the moment of A doing X) it is necessarily the case (i.e., it entails) that Y;
furthermore, in order for A to bring about Y it must not be the case that H would entail Y wholly
apart from A doing X. In addition, it is important to understand Hasker’s definition of “power.”
By A “having the power” to bring about something in the circumstances that A is in, Hasker
means that there is nothing that logically or causally precludes A from bringing about that thing
in the specified circumstances.167
Consider now the first part of his argument:
H1. Agent A is in circumstances c, the counterfactual of freedom ‘C □→ Z’ is true of her,
and she freely chooses to do z. (Molinist premise)
H2. A is in c, and it is in A’s power to refrain from doing z. (From [H1] and definition of
libertarian freedom)
H3. It is in A’s power to bring it about that: A is in c, and A refrains from doing z. (From
[H2])
H4. If it is in A’s power to bring it about that P, and ‘P’ entails ‘Q’ and ‘Q’ is false, then it
is in A’s power to bring it about that Q. (Power Entailment Principle)
H5. (A is in c and refrains from doing z) ⇒ (C □→ ~ Z). (Molinist premise)
H6. If it is in A’s power to bring it about that A is in c and refrains from doing z, and ‘(C
□→ ~ Z)’ is false, then it is in A’s power to bring it about that (C □→ ~ Z). (From [H4,
H5])

166. Hasker, “The (Non‐)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals,” 31.
167. Hasker makes this understanding of “power” clear in his more recent article: William Hasker, “Molinism’s
Freedom Problem: A Reply to Cunningham,” Faith and Philosophy 34, no. 1 (Jan 2017): 93-106.
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H7. It is in A’s power to bring it about that (C □→ ~ Z). (From [H1, H3, H6])168
So far Hasker’s argument seems to be correct, and Molinists should see no problem with
the conclusion he reaches in H7. He establishes in H1 that A would freely do z in c, so the CCF
(C □→ Z) is true. In H2, the Molinist should agree that, given that A is in c, it must be within A’s
power to refrain from doing z; that is, since A has libertarian freedom, there must be no logical
or causal factors that preclude A from not doing z in c even though A actually does freely do z in
c. Then H3 is correct that there must be nothing that logically or causally prevents A from being
in c and doing something such that, if A were to do it, it would entail that A refrains from doing
z (whereas the history of the world alone—apart from A doing that thing—does not entail that A
refrains from doing z in c). Hasker gives an argument for H4 that is not stated here and will not
be disputed. Certainly, H5 is correct that A being in c and refraining from z would entail the truth
of the CCF (C □→ ~ Z). Then H6 and H7 seem to follow, and the Molinist ought to agree with H7
that there must be nothing that logically or causally prevents A from doing something in c such
that, if A were to do it, the CCF (C □→ ~ Z) would be true. 169
Let us now move to the second part of Hasker’s argument in which he aims to produce a
conclusion from Molinist principles that contradicts H7. Hasker points out that “according to
(BA), if the agent is to bring about the truth of a counterfactual (C □→ X), it must not be the

168. Hasker, “The (Non‐)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals,” 31-32. The CCF (C □→ Z) should be
understood as: “If A were in c, A would freely do z.” The CCF (C □→ ~Z) should be understood as: “If A were in c,
A would freely refrain from doing z.” Also note that the symbol ‘⇒’ represents entailment or necessitation.
169. Note that the truth of H7 does not mean that A is a truth-maker that causes the CCF to be true. As I
explained previously, what makes a CCF true (if CCFs need a truth-maker) is the fact that if the counterfactual state
of affairs described in the antecedent of the CCF were made actual then the consequent accurately describes what
the agent would do. H7 only means that there is nothing that logically or causally prevents A from doing something
in c such that, if A were to do it, the CCF (C □→ ~ Z) would be true. Thus, H7 is just accepting the libertarian
freedom of A to have refrained from doing z in c and allowing that if it were true that A would refrain from doing z
in c then (C □→ ~ Z) would be true and (C □→ Z) would be false.
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case that (H ⇒ (C □→ X)). That is to say, the counterfactual must not be entailed by the world’s
past history.”170 But Hasker thinks that all true CCFs (again, he is granting only for the sake of
argument that there are true CCFs) would necessarily be entailed by the past history of the world.
This does not mean that the history of the world would make the CCF true (since the CCF would
be true even if God never created anything). Rather, it means that the history of the world is the
way it is because God designed it that way in virtue of the truth of the CCF. Given that the world
is ordered the way it is, that entails that the antecedent of the CCF will be made actual (i.e., the
agent will be in the specified circumstances). The agent will thus (since the CCF is true) act in
accordance with the consequent of the CCF. So the truth of the CCF has had a causal impact on
events in the past history of the world, since God was ordering the world as He did because He
knew the truth of the CCF and wanted the agent to do what is specified in the CCF. Therefore,
Hasker argues that if (C □→ Z) is true, then it is impossible for A to bring it about that (C □→ ~
Z) is true. Given that the history of the world (made up of events that have occurred and that are
now unchangeable) is intimately bound up with the truth of (C □→ Z), there is no possible world
in which A is in c and freely refrains from doing z. That means there is no possible world in
which (C □→ ~ Z) can be true. So there is nothing that A can do in c such that the truth value of
(C □→ Z) or (C □→ ~ Z) would be different. From this, he concludes that it is not within A’s
power to bring it about that (C □→ ~ Z). So the premises for the second part of Hasker’s
argument are:
H8. It is not in an agent’s power to bring about the truth of the counterfactuals of freedom
about her. (Argued for above)
H9. It is not in A’s power to bring it about that (C □→ ~ Z). (From [H8])171

170. Hasker, “The (Non‐)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals,” 32.
171. Ibid., 34.
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So H8 contends that the agent is logically or causally prevented from doing something in
any circumstances in which she finds herself such that, if she were to do it, any CCF about her
that is already true would be false or any CCF about her that is already false would be true. For
example, if (C □→ Z) is true and this CCF is causally bound up with the history of the world,
then there is no possible world in which A freely does something in c such that (C □→ ~ Z) is
true. So from H8, Hasker concludes H9. H9 contradicts H7, and Hasker concludes that since both
H9 and H7 seemingly must be true if there are true CCFs and since they contradict each other,
then he has offered a successful reductio ad absurdum argument that shows that it is incoherent
for there to be true CCFs. Molinism, therefore, is false.
A crucial mistake in Hasker’s argument is pointed out well by Thomas Flint, and it
involves the second part of the argument. Let us grant to Hasker his contention that if there are
true CCFs then the history of the world would necessarily include all true CCFs. In arriving at
H8, Hasker is assuming the following flawed assumption (FA): “If it’s not possible that A brings
it about that X, then it’s not possible that A has the power to bring it about that X.”172 His FA
comes into play in H8 because he correctly recognizes (assuming, again, that we grant that all
true CCFs are indeed included in the history of the world) that there is no world in which A
actually brings it about that any true CCF is false or that any false CCF is true; however, he
wrongly infers from this that there is no world in which A has it in her power to act freely so as
to bring it about that any true CCF is false or that any false CCF is true. For example, Hasker is
correct that there is no world in which A freely brings it about that (C □→ ~ Z). This is because
A would freely do z in c (and, in fact, did do z in c), as H1 makes clear. So there simply is no
world in which A would freely refrain from doing z in c; that is just not what A would freely do

172. Flint, “Whence and Whither the Molinist Debate: A Reply to Hasker,” 41.
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in c. But it is not legitimate to start with the fact that in no world does A “bring it about that (C
□→ ~ Z)” and then infer that there is no world in which A has “the power to bring it about that
(C □→ ~ Z).”173 This is because, if A has libertarian freedom, there is nothing that logically or
causally precludes A from doing something such that, were she to do it, she would refrain from
doing z in c—even though there is no world in which she would freely refrain from z in c. An
agent can have freedom to refrain from doing z in c, and yet it can still be the case that there is
no world in which the agent freely refrains from doing z in c.
So even if we grant that all true CCFs are bound up in (i.e., entailed by) the history of the
world, Hasker’s argument does not succeed. Of course, if we do not grant that all true CCFs are
bound up in the history of the world, then Flint is correct in pointing out that “Hasker has given
us no reason at all to think that [H8] is true.”174 Thus we may conclude that Hasker’s argument is
in trouble either way. Flint sums things up nicely with regard to Hasker’s “bring about”
argument by saying:
Molinists think that certain counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true. The truth of
those counterfactuals, they believe, does not interfere with the relevant creatures’ freedom
to do otherwise. Even though (C □→ Z) is true and A is in C, A still is able to do ~ Z. Had
she done ~ Z, (C □→ Z) wouldn’t have been true. Instead, (C □→ ~ Z) would have been
true. So A has the power to do something (~ Z), such that, had she done it, a counterfactual
that is true—namely, (C □→ Z)—would have been false. Of course, God in fact believed,
and acted on the belief, that (C □→ Z) was true (as were innumerably many other such
counterfactuals). And those beliefs, along with the creative actions which they informed,
have had causal consequences. So Molinists think that a creature such as A can have the
power to do something such that, were she to do it, God never would have believed, and
never would have acted on, the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom he in fact believed
and acted on, but instead would have believed and acted on other counterfactuals of
creaturely freedom; and had he acted on them, some of the causal consequences that in fact
followed from his actual beliefs and actions might well not have occurred.

173. Flint, “Whence and Whither the Molinist Debate: A Reply to Hasker,” 42.
174. Ibid., 43.
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That’s the Molinist view. Is it reasonable? I and others have argued that it is—that the type
of ‘power over the past’ that it affords us is one that, carefully considered, is extremely
plausible. Hasker and others disagree. But Hasker has little new to say in opposition to this
view, and I have little new to say in defense of it. What I am convinced of, though, is that
attempts to ‘refute’ this view by this, that, or the other elaborate account of ‘bringing
about’ is not going to get us very far.175
Beyond the above defensive measures aimed at upholding the coherence of true CCFs by
responding to the “grounding” and “bring about” objections, it is important to recognize that
there are positive reasons to accept the truth of CCFs. Perhaps most significantly, it is intuitively
quite reasonable to think that some CCFs are true. Plantinga remarks that the claim that there are
no true CCFs “seems odd” on the surface of things simply because “it seems that we often
believe them to be true.”176 For example, Plantinga is convinced that “if Bob Adams were to
offer to take me climbing at Tahquitz Rock the next time I come to California, I would gladly
(and freely) accept.”177 As Craig points out, we commonly accept the truth of CCFs in everyday
life, making statements such as: “If I had known you were coming, I would have baked a
cake.”178 We can even see that some CCFs turn out to be true. Freddoso asks us to imagine the
Apostle John, just prior to the arrest of Jesus, making the following statement: “If Peter were
tempted anytime soon to deny Jesus, he would succumb.” Then, after Peter does deny Christ,
Freddoso contends that John could legitimately “maintain that what he asserted was true.”179
Although Peter’s denial provides John with the evidence that his statement was true when he

175. Flint, “Whence and Whither the Molinist Debate: A Reply to Hasker,” 43-44.
176. Plantinga, “Reply to Robert M. Adams,” 374.
177. Ibid., 373.
178. Craig, The Only Wise God, 139. It is even common to believe that life-altering outcomes would have been
different if circumstances had been different. For example: “If his vision had not been blocked by the sign, he would
not have run out into the road and been killed.”
179. Freddoso, “Introduction,” 72. Jonathan Kvanvig makes a similar point. See Jonathan Kvanvig, The
Possibility of an All-Knowing God (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 138.
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made it, Freddoso rightly points out that John’s statement would still be true even if Peter was
never tempted (regardless of whether we have epistemic justification for knowing it is true).
Additionally, CCFs follow the Law of Conditional Excluded Middle180 and must, therefore,
be either true or false. Craig reasons that “since the circumstances C in which the free agent is
placed are fully specified in the counterfactual’s antecedent, it seems that if the agent were
placed in C and left free with respect to action A, then he must either do A or not do A. For what
other alternative is there?”181 There must, to offer an example, be a truth about what Mary would
have done in response to Robert sending her a text message this morning at 9:50 a.m. EDT that
read, “Would you like to go to a movie with me tonight?” Robert did not send the text. If,
however, he had sent it to her, then there is surely a truth about what she would have freely done
in response. Regardless of the fact that humans can never have certainty about what Mary would
have done (indeed, Mary, if asked later about what her response would have been if Robert had
sent her that exact text at 9:50 a.m. EDT this morning, may not be sure about what precise words
she would have used in her response to Robert at that time), it seems clear that she would have
had to respond in some particular way (even if the response was to ignore him). It seems that the
following CCF must either be true or false: If Mary received a text from Robert at 9:50 a.m. EDT
this morning that asked “Would you like to go to a movie with me tonight?”, then Mary would
have sent Robert a text at 9:54 a.m. EDT with the words “That sounds fun. Let’s do it!” If this

180. The Law of Conditional Excluded Middle holds that: (P → Q) v (P → ~Q)
181. Craig, “Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the ‘Grounding Objection,’” 338. Suggesting as a third
alternative that the agent probably would do A does not work, since “probably” merely reflects epistemic
uncertainty that one might have about predicting the outcome and is not a genuine alternative; there is surely a truth
about what the outcome would be (either A or not A) even if we cannot know what it would be. Craig comments in
the footnote on this page that Peter van Inwagen’s “objection that it might be the case that the agent would on one
occasion do A and on a second go-around not do A actually supports the Molinist case, for there are two different
turns and thus different sets of circumstances, and by Van Inwagen’s own lights on each turn the agent would do
something (Peter Van Inwagen, ‘Against Middle Knowledge,’ lecture dated April 12, 1996).”
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CCF is true, then the reason it is true is because the consequent accurately describes what would
have resulted if the antecedent conditions had been actual. If this CCF is false, it is because the
consequent does not accurately describe what would have resulted if the antecedent conditions
had been actual. The CCF must either be true or false.
We have now seen that, in addition to the Bible affirming the truth of CCFs, some CCFs
intuitively appear to be true. In addition, we have discovered that neither of the most prominent
objections to the truth of CCFs seem to carry much force. To my knowledge, nobody has yet to
offer a forceful philosophical reason to call into question the strong reasons for thinking that
CCFs are true. It seems to be at least possible—if not plausible—that there are true CCFs. Apart
from a compelling argument against the possibility of true CCFs, one appears to be justified in
thinking that the intuition most people seem to have that there are true CCFs is reasonable. Let us
now turn our attention to the remaining key philosophical challenge to Molinism: Can God know
CCFs logically prior to His decision to create the existing world?
God’s Knowledge of Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom
It might seem obvious that if CCFs can be true, then God, because He is omniscient, must
know these truths. Yet some philosophers disagree. Richard Swinburne, for example, holds that
even if we “suppose that there are counterfactuals of freedom with truth-value,” we would be
“wrong in supposing that anyone could have incorrigible knowledge of the truth-value of a
counterfactual of freedom.” Why does Swinburne insist that such a truth cannot be known? It is
for the same reason “that no one can foreknow incorrigibly the future free actions of an agent in
circumstances which will be realized.”182 That is, he thinks it is logically impossible to know any

182. Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 131.
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true proposition about how a creature with libertarian freedom will act unless and until the
creature acts. His reasoning concerning the future actions of free creatures is as follows:
Consider such a free agent f faced with a choice tomorrow of doing x or not doing x; and
any pre-cognizer G. If G were to know today what f will do tomorrow, he will have a belief
about this—for knowledge entails belief. Given that, of logical necessity, the past is
unaffectable by present actions (causes cannot follow their effects), then G’s belief today
will be what it is before and independently of what f does tomorrow. If f is indeed free, he
is free to make G’s belief, whatever it is, false. He may not do so, but he has it in his power
to do so, and so G’s belief cannot be necessarily true, and so cannot amount to incorrigible
knowledge.183
So, for Swinburne, the reason that God cannot know CCFs (or future free actions, for that
matter) is that there is no justification for God knowing what a free creature would (or, in the
case of future free actions, will) choose to do. Because the actions of a creature with libertarian
freedom are “not necessitated by other agents or prior states of the world,” Swinburne holds that
it would be a “very fortunate coincidence” if God should be lucky enough to hold true beliefs
about all such actions apart from them actually happening.184 This means that true CCFs that
never come to pass can never be known, and any true proposition involving future free actions
cannot be known until the event occurs. It also means that Swinburne, since he still wants to hold
that God is omniscient, must revise the traditional understanding of God’s omniscience in order
to accommodate the fact that there are numerous true propositions of which God is ignorant.
Departing from the traditional definition of omniscience (“knowing all true propositions and only
true propositions”), Swinburne claims that omniscience should be understood as “knowledge at
every time of all that is logically possible for God to know at that time. This knowledge does not
include knowledge of the true propositions about the future actions of free agents.”185 So, just as

183. Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 132.
184. Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 170-171.
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God’s omnipotence is not limited by His inability to perform logically impossible tasks such as
making a square circle, Swinburne does not consider God’s inability to know truths concerning
the unactualized actions of free creatures to be problematic because he considers such truths
logically impossible to know.186
In response to Swinburne’s position, it should first be noted that his attempt to redefine
omniscience such that God can be considered omniscient despite being ignorant of countless true
propositions is problematic. Jonathan Kvanvig rightly argues that the analogy Swinburne makes
between excluding logically impossible tasks from God’s omnipotence and excluding truths that
are (purportedly) logically impossible to know from God’s omniscience is “crucially
defective.”187 Kvanvig asserts: “Whereas an unknowable truth is still a truth, an unfeasible task is
not a task at all.”188 God, for example, cannot make a square circle because it is not a thing at all;
thus, this “limitation”189 on God’s omnipotence is “a limitation regarding the thing done: selfcontradictory descriptions are not descriptions of any task at all.” However, when it comes to an
omniscient being’s ability to know a legitimately true proposition, one cannot say that there is no
proposition to be known; rather, “the apparent limitation regards the person in question: the
knower is somehow unable to access the proposition.”190 So Swinburne’s redefinition truly puts

185. Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 133-134. William Hasker redefines omniscience in a
similar way. See Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 187.
186. Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, 175.
187. Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God, 22.
188. Ibid.
189. Of course, as Kvanvig correctly clarifies, it is technically a “misnomer” to describe God’s inability to
perform logically impossible tasks as a “limitation” on His omnipotence because these are not tasks to perform.
190. Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God, 23. One might say there are other “limitations” on God’s
omnipotence that do not involve self-contradictory tasks (e.g., God cannot act immorally). In such cases, however, it
is simply impossible that God would act in opposition to His essential attributes. God cannot act immorally because
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God’s attribute of omniscience at stake. If Swinburne is correct that God does not know all true
propositions, then He cannot be considered omniscient in any legitimate sense.
Swinburne has provided no convincing evidence that CCFs (or future free actions, for that
matter) cannot possibly be known by God. As we have seen, Swinburne’s contention is that it is
not possible for God to know how a free creature would act “before and independently” of the
free creature acting. God cannot perceive the action, since it has not yet occurred. Moreover,
since the creature is free and is not determined to choose to act one way rather than another,
there are no causal factors that allow God to deduce with certainty what the free creature would
do in the specified circumstance. He thus concludes that it cannot be known how the free
creature would act. Swinburne’s view, however, assumes without warrant a perceptualist model
of God’s knowledge.
The perceptualist model assumes that God can only know things by directly perceiving
them or inferring them based on existing causes. This, however, seems to be a highly dubious
requirement to place on God’s means of acquiring knowledge. Craig’s point is a good one:
How do we know that the heavy reliance which we as embodied persons have on
perception and causal inference would apply to an infinite disembodied Mind? Obviously
God does not have knowledge based on sense perception (since he has no organs). So could
he not possess all knowledge apart from causal inferences as well?191
If one instead adopts a conceptualist model of divine knowledge by which God innately
possesses the knowledge that He has, then Swinburne’s objection is resolved. This would not be,
as Swinburne fears, a case of “causes following their effects”; this is an epistemological matter
rather than an ontological matter, and there is no backward causation taking place. If God

He is essentially the very paradigm of goodness. God cannot give up any of His essential attributes or act in
opposition to them because to do so would mean that He is not God, which is impossible.
191. Craig, The Only Wise God, 121.
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eternally has an innate knowledge of all true propositions (which, as has been argued, includes
CCFs), then He need not “observe” things that occur or reason to things that will (or would)
occur in order to know them. Swinburne must show that it is impossible for God to have such
innate knowledge if he hopes to reject the possibility of God knowing CCFs (or even future free
actions). This seems to be a tall order. When it comes to the heart of this question concerning the
possibility of God’s complete omniscience, Craig seems to be on target in saying:
Of course, someone might persist in demanding, ‘How can God have innate knowledge of
all future-tense [and counterfactual] propositions?’ But the purport of this question is not
altogether clear. It cannot mean, ‘How did God come by such knowledge?’, for His
knowledge is said to be innate. Nor do I think the question means, ‘How is the concept of
innate knowledge possible?’, for the concept does not appear to be incoherent. Perhaps the
question really means, ‘How is it the case that God has innate knowledge?’ But then it
appears to be just an expression of incredulity which could be posed of any of the divine
attributes: how is it that God exists necessarily? How is it that God is omnipotent? How is
it that God is morally perfect? This sort of ‘how’ question does not seem to have any
answer—He just is that way. . . . Being maximally excellent, He has that property in all
worlds in which He exists and since He exists in the actual world, it is the case that God
knows all true propositions. To ask how it is that God is omniscient is therefore like asking
how it is that vacuums are empty.192
Having seen that CCFs are plausibly true and that God’s omniscience would seem to
require that He must know these truths, the key remaining question is whether God can know
CCFs logically prior to His decision to create the actual world. Anthony Kenny puts forth a
prominent argument that God cannot know CCFs logically prior to His creative decree:
The difficulty is simply that if it is to be possible for God to know which world he is
actualizing, then his middle knowledge must be logically prior to his decision to actualize;
whereas if middle knowledge is to have an object, the actualization must already have
taken place. As long as it is undetermined which action an individual human being will
take, it is undetermined which world is the actual world.… And as long as it is
undetermined which world is actual, it is undetermined which counterfactuals about human
free behaviour are true.193
192. Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom, 229. Of course, God also has justification in believing
everything that He believes simply by virtue of knowing that He is God and possesses the essential property of
omniscience.
193. Anthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 71.
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Kenny thus contends that God cannot use His knowledge of CCFs to determine the actual
world that He will create because He cannot know the truth of CCFs until the actual world exists.
If an actual world must exist before CCFs can be true, then how can God know them and utilize
them logically prior to creating the actual world? Robert Adams offers a similar argument.194
Contrary to this objection from Kenny, it is simply not true that a world must be actualized
in order for middle knowledge “to have an object.” Since CCFs are true or false apart from the
existence of the circumstances and agents described in them, there does not need to be an actual
world already in place in which the relevant agents or circumstances exist in order for God to
know these truths (so long as one accepts the conceptualist model of divine knowledge and
allows that God can somehow know CCFs in an innate way). The problem with Kenny’s
objection is that it requires that every aspect of the actual world must be fully actualized by God
before there can be true CCFs, but this is not the case. Eef Dekker rightly argues that it is “not
possible that no world is actual. There is a logical order in the way the world is ‘built up,’ and at
one level the actuality is dependent on God’s volition, while at another (‘earlier’) level it is
not.”195 What Dekker is showing is that, even logically prior to God’s creative decision, an actual
world exists because numerous truths exist that do not depend upon God’s creative decisionmaking for their truth.
Craig, in agreement with Dekker, points out that Kenny overlooks the fact that
“corresponding to the logical sequence in God’s knowledge there is a logical sequence in the
instantiation of the actual world as well.”196 That is, the way the actual world is logically “built

194. Adams, “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” 118-120. Note what Adams says beginning on p.
118 about his Premise (9).
195. Eef Dekker, Middle Knowledge (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2000), 58.
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up” mirrors the three logical moments that Molina describes concerning God’s knowledge. First
of all, in correspondence with God’s natural knowledge, there are clearly many necessary truths
that are already actual prior to any creative decision by God. As Plantinga says, God does not
“actualize his own existence; that is to say, he does not create himself. Nor does he create his
own properties. . . . Again, since God did not create numbers, propositions, pure sets, and the
like, he did not actualize the states of affairs consisting in these things.”197 Next, in
correspondence with the second logical moment of God’s knowledge (i.e., middle knowledge),
which is still logically prior to God’s decree to create the world, there are additional truths about
the world. In this way, the “actual world is even more instantiated than at the first moment. For
now all those states of affairs corresponding to true counterfactuals of freedom obtain.”198 Like
necessary truths, God’s knowledge of how any free creature that He might add to this world
would freely act in whatever possible circumstances that God considers placing him or her does
not depend on God choosing to actualize anything. Thus, although at this logical point God has
not yet issued a decree to actualize anything, Craig agrees with Dekker that God is able to build
up all of the feasible worlds via His middle knowledge. Once the divine mind then freely
“actualizes all remaining states of affairs” (those that depend on the divine creative decree), the
actual world fully obtains. Craig rightly concludes that, “Once it is appreciated that there is a
logical sequence in the exemplification of the actual world just as much as there is in God’s
knowledge, then objections to middle knowledge based on counterfactuals’ being true ‘too late’
to facilitate such knowledge disappear.”199 Kenny’s objection thus appears to be resolved.
196. Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom, 265. See Craig’s analysis, which is much like
Dekker’s, on page 265-267.
197. Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 169.
198. Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom, 266.
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Beyond the fact that arguments such as Kenny’s do not succeed, there is good reason for
thinking that God knows CCFs logically prior to His creative decree. If, as I have argued, it is
correct that CCFs can be true and that God, in His omniscience, knows them, then it follows that
God must know them logically prior to His creative decree. As Craig notes, “If God knows
counterfactual truths about us only logically posterior to his decree, then there really are no
counterfactuals of freedom.”200 In this case we would not possess libertarian freedom because
our actions would be determined by God’s decree. Craig gives a forceful argument to this effect
that runs as follows:
WC1. If there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, then God knows these truths.
[I have argued for this above.]
WC2. There are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. [I have argued for this above.]
WC3. If God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, God knows them either
logically prior to the divine creative decree or only logically posterior to the divine creative
decree. [These are the only alternatives.]
WC4. Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom cannot be known only logically posterior to
the divine creative decree. [A counterfactual truth known only subsequent to the divine
creative decree would not be a counterfactual of creaturely freedom. It would mean that
God knows what creatures would do in all possible circumstances because He decrees what
they will do in all possible circumstances and then only on that basis knows these truths.]
WC5. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. [This follows from
WC1 and WC2 by modus ponens.]
WC6. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom either logically
prior to the divine creative decree or only logically posterior to the divine creative decree.
[This follows from WC3 and WC5 by modus ponens.]
WC7. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom logically prior to
the divine creative decree. [This follows by disjunctive syllogism from WC4 and WC6.] 201

199. Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom, 267.
200. Craig, “The Middle-Knowledge View,” 143.
201. Ibid., 136-137.
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So WC1 and WC2 are the crucial premises in this argument, as WC3 and WC4 should be
uncontroversial and the remaining premises follow logically from the first four. I have already
argued that WC1 and WC2 are true (i.e., that there are true CCFs and that God would know any
true CCFs). If these two premises are true, then this argument gives us good reason to think that
God must know true CCFs logically prior to His creative decree. And if God knows true CCFs
logically prior to His creative decree, then God possesses middle knowledge. Molinism is true.
We have now seen that the truth of Molinism is well supported. Molinism is in agreement
with the biblical data. It has the powerful theological advantage of being the only system that
reconciles human libertarian freedom with God’s sovereignty, providence, and election of
individuals to salvation. Moreover, when it comes to the philosophical coherence of Molinism,
there is also good reason to agree with Plantinga’s statement: “I don’t believe there are any good
arguments against counterfactuals of freedom, or middle knowledge, or the claim that some of
God’s actions are to be explained in terms of middle knowledge.”202
With this brief case for the viability of Molinism in place, we are now in position to return
to the soteriological difficulty that is described in the first chapter: How can an omnibenevolent,
omnipotent, omniscient God allow some persons to be lost who would have freely chosen to be
saved if placed into different circumstances? In the next chapter, we will explore how some
thinkers—particularly William Lane Craig—utilize Molinism in an attempt to resolve this
problem. I will identify theological and philosophical difficulties with these Molinist solutions,
and this will reveal the value of offering a different theodicy that draws upon the explanatory
power of Molinism.

202. Plantinga, “Reply to Robert M. Adams,” 378-379.

115

CHAPTER 3
ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING MOLINIST THEODICIES
Molinism’s unique ability to reconcile human libertarian freedom with God’s sovereignty
and providence has inspired many contemporary Molinists to attempt to harness the power of
Molinism in a variety of creative ways. As Craig puts it, even though divine middle knowledge is
consistent with Scripture and philosophically defensible, “the strongest arguments for the
Molinist perspective are theological. Once one grasps the concept of middle knowledge, one will
find it astonishing in its subtlety and power.”203 Besides its relevance to reconciling God’s
providence and election with human libertarian freedom (which was Molina’s aim), the doctrine
of divine middle knowledge has been leveraged in contemporary scholarship in an attempt to
make sense of theological issues as diverse as: showing how perseverance of the saints might
work; justifying God’s ability to inspire the biblical authors to write in their own words exactly
what God wants them to write; attempting to show the reasonableness of the Roman Catholic
doctrine of papal infallibility; endeavoring to show how evolutionary theory is not incompatible
with intelligent design; suggesting how the consistency of quantum indeterminacy and divine
sovereignty might be upheld; offering a theodicy against the problem of the gratuitousness of
evil; and reconciling intelligent design with certain alleged biological design flaws.204 Of course,
a Molinist is not committed to accepting every theory that makes use of divine middle
knowledge, for the truth of divine middle knowledge (a doctrine that I have argued is consistent
with the Bible and philosophically coherent) obviously does not require that God utilizes this
knowledge to accomplish the particular objectives that all such theories suppose. What is clear,
203. Craig, “The Middle-Knowledge View,” 125.
204. William Lane Craig and Kirk MacGregor offer helpful lists of scholarly works that apply Molinism to
these areas. See: Craig, “The Middle-Knowledge View,” 125; MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 248-270.
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however, is that middle knowledge is a powerful theological doctrine that opens up many
possibilities for how God may choose to exert His sovereignty and achieve His desired ends.
This chapter will examine how Molinism has been applied to answering the residual difficulty
concerning the soteriological POE that was introduced at the end of the first chapter. I will
contend that the Molinist soteriological theodicies that have been proposed to date are inadequate
and that it is possible to offer an even better Molinist theodicy.
As we have seen, the residual difficulty identified in the concluding pages of the first
chapter—referred to hereafter as the “problem of the contingently lost” (PCL)—seeks to
demonstrate that P1 and P2 are inconsistent by adding P8 and P9. Recall that these premises have
been stated as follows:
P1. God possesses the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence.
P2. Some persons do not accept the forgiveness that is available via receiving Christ and are
thus damned.
P8. God will necessarily not allow persons to exist who are lost in their actual
circumstances but who would have been saved if placed into different circumstances.
P9. Some persons who freely reject the grace that God offers them in their actual
circumstances and are lost would have freely accepted God’s grace and been saved in
different circumstances.205
Recall that the PCL argues that God’s possessing the attributes of omniscience,
omnipotence, and omnibenevolence (P1) entail that God would not create persons who are lost in
their actual circumstances but who would have been saved if placed into different circumstances

205. Refer to Table 1.1 on p. 62 for a summary of all of these premises. P1 and P2 are the two basic premises
that proponents of the soteriological POE claim are in conflict, as Craig rightly identifies in: Craig, “‘No Other
Name’: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation Through Christ,” 180. Since there is no
explicit contradiction between P1 and P2, we have considered various arguments that conjoin additional premises to
these two basic premises in order to make the contradiction explicit. The PCL involves adding P8 and P9. As
previously explained, if one denies that God has middle knowledge so that He cannot know for sure whether any of
the lost would have been saved if placed into different circumstances, then P8 could instead be stated as: “God will
necessarily not allow persons to exist who are lost in their actual circumstances but who would have had a
significantly better opportunity to be saved if placed into different circumstances.”
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(P8). The PCL further makes the claim that P2’s recognition that those who never place faith in
Christ are lost plausibly makes it unavoidable—given the lack of access to hearing the Christian
gospel and other difficult life circumstances that many non-Christians face—that some of the lost
are only contingently lost (P9); that is, it appears quite likely that some of the lost (e.g., at least a
portion of the lost who are unevangelized) would have freely accepted God’s grace and been
saved if only God had placed them into different circumstances (e.g., being born in a strong
Christian home where they hear the gospel faithfully presented). Thus, if P8 and P9 are both true,
then we seem to have a contradiction. God’s attributes would then be incompatible with the
purported reality that some of the lost are contingently lost. Thus, if the PCL is to be refuted, one
must show that either P8 or P9 (or both) should be rejected. One must show that at least one of
these two premises is neither necessarily true nor required by Christian doctrine.
There seem to be three general categories of strategies that have been utilized in an attempt
to provide a Molinist soteriological theodicy that resolves the PCL. The similar theodicies
proposed by Donald Lake and Jerry Walls as well as the quite different proposal offered by Jason
Marsh are representative of the first broad category. In all of the theodicies within this first
category, Molinism is combined with postmortem opportunities for salvation. We will see that
Marsh utilizes Molinism and postmortem opportunities for salvation in a different way than Lake
and Walls, but they may be fairly regarded as falling under the same umbrella. After exploring
and rejecting these sorts of Molinist theodicies, we will examine an interesting proposal by
David Hunt that falls into a second category. Hunt, who is not himself a Molinist and thus does
not endorse his own Molinist proposal, has suggested a means by which he thinks God could
achieve both a resolution of the PCL and universal salvation if God were to possess middle
knowledge. We will see that Hunt suggests that God could create soulless automata to fill the
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role of all lost persons so that universalism could be achieved on Molinism. After quickly
examining this sort of view and finding it inadequate, we will turn to a third category of Molinist
theodicies (those involving God’s optimization of the soteriological balance) and focus on the
theodicy that has famously been put forth by William Lane Craig. We will examine and assess
Craig’s view carefully before briefly surveying a view that has recently been given by Kirk
MacGregor and is derived from Craig’s view. MacGregor actually attempts to merge Molina’s
soteriological view with Craig’s Molinist theodicy. Craig’s position is by far the most prominent
Molinist theodicy concerning the contingently lost, and it will be the primary focus of this
chapter. We will see that Craig claims that God providentially uses His middle knowledge to
arrange the world in such a way that nobody is contingently lost. Moreover, Craig attempts to
show that God’s middle knowledge enables Him to minimize the number of those who are lost
relative to the number of those who are saved. This chapter will critique Craig’s position,
identifying both its strengths and weaknesses. However, before arguing for the inadequacy of
these Molinist theodicies, let us begin by examining why the adoption of Molinism does not
commit one to a particular view of election and predestination. This fact will highlight why it is
possible to incorporate Molinism into a variety of quite different soteriological theodicies and
why it is critical to scrutinize the biblical and philosophical viability of such theodicies.
Molinism’s Relationship to Theories of Election and Predestination
Before exploring the ways in which contemporary theodicies have utilized Molina’s basic
concept in their rejection of the PCL, it is critical to recognize that Molinism does not entail a
certain theology of election and predestination. The mere fact that God possesses middle
knowledge does not, by itself, say anything about what soteriological objectives God might have;
moreover, it says nothing about how He might make use of His middle knowledge to accomplish
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His objectives. Examining the divergent perspectives held by the two most prominent early
Molinists—Molina himself and Francisco Suarez—illustrates this well.
Molina’s reconciliation of libertarian freedom with God’s sovereignty runs him directly
into deep questions concerning the nature of divine predestination. Given that, logically prior to
actualizing a world, God knows what every human in that world would freely do in the
circumstances in which God creates him or her, it is true that God has always known the eternal
destiny of every human that will exist in the actual world and that God could have brought about
a different world that results in different soteriological outcomes. By actualizing one particular
world of free creatures rather than other worlds of free creatures that He could have actualized,
God guarantees the eternal fate of each person that will exist in the actual world—despite the fact
that each person has genuine libertarian freedom. This is an unavoidable conclusion on
Molinism. So the question arises as to what aims God might have in terms of why He opted to
create the world of free creatures that He did (in which certain people exist and are saved or lost)
rather than a different world of free creatures (in which other people exist and are saved or lost).
Why this world? What soteriological goals might God have wanted to achieve via his middle
knowledge by actualizing the particular world of free creatures that He did? Molinists can and do
adopt all sorts of positions on this question.
Molina took a particular position on the issue of predestination, but his position clearly is
not demanded by the truth of divine middle knowledge. Based on his understanding of Scripture
(in particular, Romans 9), Molina held firmly that God unconditionally elects individuals to
salvation.206 Contrary to Arminius, who saw election as corporate and held that the “elect” is

206. MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 25-28, 135-140. MacGregor has a helpful discussion of Molina’s
interpretation of Romans 9, citing the relevant portions of the Concordia (especially the—as of yet—untranslated
Part VII). To date, the only published English translation of Molina’s Concordia is Alfred Freddoso’s translation of
Part IV of the Concordia (the part that discusses middle knowledge), which I have previously cited. There is no
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merely the group of people who ultimately freely choose to accept Christ, Molina took Romans 9
to be teaching that God is sovereign over which individuals are saved and lost and that no quality
of any individual can compel God to save or damn that individual. If one were to allow that the
characteristics of a person could determine whether that person is saved or lost, Molina thought it
would detract from God’s sovereign choice over the eternal destiny of each person.207 Yet
Molina insisted that God offers prevenient grace to all people in such a way that nobody receives
grace that is irresistible but all people receive sufficient prevenient grace so that they are able to
choose to accept or reject it.208 Molina also thought that God uses His middle knowledge to
uphold human libertarian freedom while achieving unconditional election of individuals in the
following way. God decides that He will create a world of free creatures. He determines that He
will create a world without regard for which persons would exist in this world and without regard
for who would be saved and lost in this world. That is, the world that God creates is based upon
His sovereign choice, and God does not save or damn anyone because of some quality or
characteristic of that person that requires God to save or damn that person. Molina speculated
that every human that God creates would freely choose to be saved in some world that God could
actualize and would also freely choose to be lost in some world that God could actualize.
Moreover, every human that God creates would also not exist in some world of free creatures
that God could actualize. Molina considered it unlikely that (given our fallen nature) any human
would freely choose to be saved in all feasible (i.e., actualizable) worlds in which he or she

published English translation of the rest of the Concordia. It is in Part VII that Molina expounds his view on
predestination, and the key points related to Romans 9 are especially found in 7.23.4.
207. Molina especially emphasizes these points in 7.23.1/2.2; 7.23.4/5.1; and 7.23.4/5.4 of his Concordia. Note
the footnotes on the following page for the relevant parts of the Concordia and MacGregor’s translations of the key
passages: MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 26-27, 135-140.
208. Molina emphasizes this in 3.14.13.40.2-17; 3.14.13.40.18-27; and 7.23.1/2.1.5, 8 of his Concordia. Note
the comments MacGregor makes about these key passages on: MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 142.
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exists, and he similarly doubted that any human is so bent against God that he or she would be
lost in all feasible worlds in which he or she exists. If this is the case, then God did not have to
save any particular person who is saved in the actual world or damn any particular person who is
lost in the actual world. The existence and eternal destiny of every person is entirely up to God
despite humans having libertarian freedom with regard to their decision about whether or not to
accept God’s salvation.209 Therefore, on Molina’s soteriological view, everyone who is saved is
contingently saved, and everyone who is lost is contingently lost. Thus, every person who exists
in the actual world could have been freely saved, freely damned, or nonexistent—it was all
dependent upon God’s sovereign choice about which world to actualize. Given this view of
predestination, it is notable that Molina would have no objection to P9.
Despite the fact that God’s decree to actualize a certain world ensures the fate that all
people in that world will freely choose for themselves, it is not clear that Molina ever speculated
about what specific soteriological purposes God might have behind actualizing the particular
world that He did. God’s decree to create the actual world is simply an act of His sovereign will.
Molina does, however, depart strongly from the Dominican position that God’s decision to create
the world that He did is based upon the prior goal of ensuring the election of certain individuals
and the reprobation of others.210 Whatever God’s soteriological motivations may have been for
creating the actual world, Molina held that God did not have the goal of damning and saving

209. Molina especially expounds these points beginning in 7.23.4/5.1. See MacGregor’s comments and helpful
translations of Molina in: MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 27-28, 145-157. For example, MacGregor (p. 27) translates a
key passage from the Concordia (Molina’s direct words are in quotes) that indicates the following: Despite
affirming human libertarian freedom with regard to accepting or rejecting Christ, Molina held that “the total effect
of predestination … depends only on the will of God.” It was thus within God’s power to have predestined “any of
the elect to have been truly reprobate” and any “of the reprobate to be truly elect” (Concordia 7.23.4/5.1.2).
MacGregor also highlights (p. 147) how Molina held that every person who exists in the actual world would have
freely chosen the opposite soteriological outcome (i.e., the opposite of what he or she chooses in the actual world) in
at least one other world that God could have actualized (Concordia 7.23.4/5.7.1.1).
210. Molina, Concordia 4.53.1.3, 199. Note the translator Freddoso’s comments in footnote 6 of that page.
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certain people logically prior to His determination to create the world. Craig nicely summarizes
Molina’s position on predestination as follows:
Molina held that God’s choosing to create certain persons has nothing to do with how they
would respond to His grace; He simply chooses to create the world order He wants to, and
no rationale for this choice is to be sought other than the divine will itself. In this sense,
predestination is for Molina wholly gratuitous, the result of the divine will, and in no way
based on the merits or demerits of creatures.211
So, for Molina, God simply creates the world that He does for (presumably morally
acceptable) reasons known only to Him. God gives sufficient grace for all to choose to be saved,
but He knows which people will freely accept salvation in the world He creates. Molina does not
appear to find any theological or moral problem with God opting to create people who are
contingently lost, and he gives no theodicy to suggest why God might have a good reason for
creating them. Indeed, as we have seen, he thinks it is theologically important (in order to uphold
his understanding of unconditional election) that all people who are lost are contingently lost and
all people who are saved are contingently saved. Given the more limited knowledge of the
religious diversity of the world at Molina’s time as compared to today, it is likely that the PCL
was simply not a matter of great concern to Molina or his contemporaries.
Francisco Suarez, in contrast to Molina, held a Molinist view that—aside from recognizing
that human libertarian freedom is involved in the acceptance or rejection of Christ—is almost

211. William Lane Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to
Suarez (New York: Brill, 1988), 204. MacGregor, as we will discover in more detail later, does suggest that Molina
implicitly held that God would only actualize a world that is as soteriologically optimal (and overall good) as any
other world; however, MacGregor thinks Molina held that there were an infinite number of soteriologically optimal
worlds (i.e., they are all “tied” in terms of having an optimal balance of saved versus lost and in terms of the overall
goodness of the world) so that God could gratuitously select a world from within that range of optimal worlds (since
everyone in the actual world who is saved is lost in one of the worlds in that range and everyone in the actual world
who is lost is saved in one of the worlds in that range). MacGregor acknowledges that Molina never specifically
states that God would only actualize a world that has a balance of saved versus lost that is as good as any other
world of free creatures that is feasible for God to actualize, but he thinks that Molina would have held to this
because of the goodness of God and His genuine desire for all to be saved. See MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 145-146
(especially footnote 53). We will examine this in more detail when we get to MacGregor’s theodicy later in this
chapter.
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identical to Calvinism with regard to election and predestination. Suarez, a Spanish Jesuit
theologian and a contemporary of Molina who picked up on Molina’s ideas, advanced the
position that God did intend to damn and save certain people logically prior to His determination
to create the world. Suarez contends that God first desires the salvation of the elect, and then He
ensures their salvation by placing them into circumstances in which He knows they will freely
choose to be saved. Similarly, God ensures the damnation of the reprobate by placing them into
circumstances in which He knows they will freely choose to reject Him and be lost. Suarez’s
view is called Congruism because he held that God provides “congruent grace” to the elect and
withholds such grace from the reprobate. Congruent grace includes the circumstances and aids
that God places into the life of an elect person to ensure that he or she freely chooses to be saved.
This grace is perfectly suited to each person; that is, the grace is “congruent” with the person’s
freely willing to be saved.212 Because Suarez contended that God can give congruent grace to
any person He wishes, every lost person is contingently lost (so Suarez would accept P9).
It is evident that neither Molina nor Suarez have it as their aim to utilize Molinism in a way
that would resolve the PCL.213 Moreover, the difference between their views highlights the fact
that Molinism leaves plenty of room for soteriological speculation. Any Molinist theodicy that is
applied to the Christian God must, therefore, be assessed to determine whether it is biblically
faithful and philosophically reasonable. We now turn to such an assessment of the primary ways
Molinism has been used in theodicies against the PCL.

212. Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez, 226-229.
Craig provides a useful comparison of Suarez’s view of predestination with that of Molina. Craig also offers useful
quotations from Suarez’s writings that unpack his Congruism, especially: De concursu et auxilio Dei 3.14.9 as well
as De scientia Dei 2.6.7.
213. Both Molina and Suarez would accept P9, and they do not seem concerned that this might be seen as
conflicting with the divine attributes (as P8 suggests). There is little doubt that they would reject P8 and uphold
God’s goodness despite God permitting some to be contingently lost; however, addressing the issue of how God’s
omnibenevolence fits with Him allowing some to be contingently lost is not their concern.
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Category #1 of Molinist Theodicies Against the PCL: Appeals to Postmortem Salvation
The Theodicies of Donald Lake and Jerry Walls
The first of the three broad categories of Molinist strategies that have been suggested for
formulating a theodicy against the PCL involves combining Molinism with postmortem
opportunities for salvation. Within this category, at least two sorts of strategies have been put
forth. We begin with the first of these two varieties, which is exemplified by Donald Lake and
Jerry Walls. Lake and Walls propose very similar theodicies, which attack P9 by appealing to
God’s middle knowledge of the circumstances in which those who are never saved within this
present earthly life would have freely chosen to be saved. Let us begin with Lake’s position.
Lake agrees with P8 that God would not allow a person to be lost as a consequence of being
placed into circumstances that are not conducive to that person accepting the gospel. However,
Lake finds it is hard to deny that P9 also appears to be true; it seems that many who are lost
would have been saved if placed into better circumstances. Backed into this corner, Lake asserts
the following claim: “God knows who would, under ideal circumstances, believe the gospel, and
on the basis of his foreknowledge, applies that gospel even if the person never hears the gospel
during his lifetime.”214 When Lake uses the term “foreknowledge” here, he is really speaking of
God’s middle knowledge. Lake acknowledges that some people go through life without
accepting the gospel, even though they would have accepted it under other circumstances.
However, he still rejects P9 by arguing that God will grant at the time of judgment that such
people (who otherwise would be contingently lost) will automatically receive the saving benefits
of Christ’s atonement. This is because God will judge people on the basis of what He knows (via

214. Donald M. Lake, “He Died for All: The Universal Dimensions of the Atonement,” in Grace Unlimited, ed.
Clark H. Pinnock (Minneapolis: Bethany Fellowship, 1975), 43.
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His middle knowledge) they would have done if He were to have placed them into “ideal
circumstances” for accepting the gospel. Lake’s proposal, therefore, is that nobody will be
contingently lost.215
Walls puts forth a view that is very similar to Lake’s. Walls is an Arminian who thinks that
Molinism is possibly true, though he is unsure of its philosophical viability.216 Despite his
reservations, Walls proposes what he believes is the best way to make use of Molinism against
the PCL. Like Lake, Walls accepts P8, affirming that “it does not seem God would allow anyone
to be damned through unfavorable circumstances.”217 Walls then makes use of God’s middle
knowledge to attack P9 by proposing that God gives an “optimal measure of grace” to all people.
If a person rejects God in this life, then God knows via His middle knowledge whether this
negative response is “decisive” or not. Walls clarifies that “a negative response to God is
decisive only if one persists in rejecting God in the most favorable circumstances.”218 God will
not allow anyone to be contingently lost; instead, “God will give [the otherwise contingently lost
person] the grace at the moment of death to begin to become what he would have become” under
the ideal circumstances—circumstances in which the person chooses to be saved.219 Given that
215. Lake’s comments are made in the context of discussing the problem of the unevangelized, but his theory
seems to extend to all of the contingently lost—those who would have believed the gospel and been saved under
“ideal circumstances.” That is how I interpret him. If he does intend to limit his theory only to the unevangelized
who would be contingently lost (or some other subgroup), such a limitation seems arbitrary and unjustified. Many of
the evangelized live in circumstances that are far from optimal for believing the gospel.
216. Jerry L. Walls, “Is Molinism as Bad as Calvinism?,” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of
Christian Philosophers 7, no. 1 (1990): 89. Walls’ concern is that the “manner in which” God can have middle
knowledge is “quite mysterious” (alluding to the grounding objection). For more on Walls’ perspective on the
viability of Molinism, see Walls and Dongell, Why I Am Not a Calvinist, 134-141.
217. Ibid., 92.
218. Ibid., 93. See also: Jerry L. Walls, Hell: The Logic of Damnation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1992), 89. Walls says that God will tailor the grace that He offers to each person so that everyone has
the opportunity to receive “the maximal amount of grace which [God] can give without abrogating freedom.”
219. Ibid., 93.
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so many seem to lack optimal grace in this life, Walls contends, “If there can be no opportunity
to receive grace at or beyond the point of death, then it seems most likely that grace is not, and
perhaps cannot be, optimally bestowed on all persons.”220
The proposal that Walls puts forth is effectively the same as Lake’s in that (1) the only
persons who are lost are those who would choose to be lost in every possible set of
circumstances (even the “most favorable”),221 and (2) everyone who either accepts God’s grace
through faith in Christ or would have accepted God’s grace through faith in Christ in some set of
circumstances will be saved. There is, however, one notable difference: Walls claims that God
will allow persons whom He knows would have accepted His grace in some set of circumstances
to place saving faith in Christ while in a postmortem condition. In this way, Walls allows that
“further spiritual growth could occur after death.” God will “bring about the appropriate
favorable circumstances during the passage of death” so that the person is able to make the “fully
deliberate response to God” that his circumstances did not allow during his lifetime.222 By
contrast, Lake proposes that God simply applies His saving grace to the contingently lost after
they have died based on His mere knowledge that they are contingently lost.

Difficulties with the Theodicies of Lake and Walls
Unfortunately, although these theodicies would certainly succeed in undermining P9 and
resolving the PCL, they suffer from a fatal weakness: They are not supported by the biblical data.
First, these views interestingly deny both exclusivism and inclusivism. They are in opposition to

220. Walls, Hell, 92.
221. Such people would be, to use Craig’s term, transcircumstantially damned.
222. Walls, “Is Molinism as Bad as Calvinism?,” 93.
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exclusivism because they hold that God will save some people without them having explicit
knowledge of the gospel during their lifetime. As we have seen, this is a dubious proposition in
light of the biblical evidence for exclusivism. Yet they go even further and transgress inclusivism
by allowing that one may be saved without even responding to general revelation or having
implicit faith in Christ in this life. Lake and Walls both allow that one who is unevangelized
could entirely ignore God’s general revelation in nature and conscience in this life and still be
saved (though Walls at least requires a postmortem faith response). Inclusivist Clark Pinnock
finds this unacceptable, correctly pointing out that the idea of “allowing certain persons salvation
without exercising any faith at all” is problematic from a biblical perspective.223 The biblical
authors unanimously and consistently preach the message that God’s grace is given only to those
who accept this gift by faith (e.g., Jn 3:16; Ac 15:9; Rom 1:5, 17; 3:21-5:1; 10; Gal 3; Eph 2:8-9;
Heb 11). Even if one adopts inclusivism, one recognizes that there must be faith of some kind
(even if it is merely expressed via an appropriate response to God’s general revelation) in this
lifetime if one is to be saved. This is a fundamental tenet of Scripture.
Second, there is absolutely no indication in Scripture that anyone will be judged according
to faith that he or she would have had in Christ in other circumstances; rather, quite the opposite
is taught in the Bible. Jesus claims that the wicked and godless people of Tyre, Sidon, and
Sodom would have repented and turned to God if they had been given the opportunity to see His
miracles, yet that does not stop Jesus from declaring that these people will be condemned (albeit
less severely than the towns to which Jesus preached) for their rejection of God (Mt 11:20-24). If
Lake and Walls were correct, then these people who were wicked and godless in this lifetime
would ultimately be saved and not punished at all, since they are only contingently lost. Also,

223. Pinnock, A Wideness in God’s Mercy, 161.
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Jesus repeatedly makes clear the importance of always being prepared for His return and being
ready to face the judgment. Jesus warns us to “be on the alert, for you do not know which day
your Lord is coming” (Mt 24:42). The person who remains unfaithful to the Lord until His return
will have no last-minute (or postmortem) opportunity to repent, for the Lord will come suddenly
and will condemn that person (Mt 24:45-51). This is also the point of Jesus’ parable about the
unwise virgins who were not prepared when the bridegroom arrived (Mt 25:1-13). From these
teachings of Jesus, it is evident that one’s choices in this life determine whether one accepts or
rejects God’s grace. As the author of Hebrews says, “It is appointed for men to die once and after
this comes judgment.” When Christ returns, it will be to save “those who eagerly await Him”
(Heb 9:27-28). No hope is ever promised to those who merely would have been awaiting Christ
in other circumstances.
Third, Lake and Walls allow that one who is actually evangelized can reject Christ and still
be saved so long as that person is not placed into the most “ideal circumstances” for accepting
the gospel. For example, consider a person who knows all about the gospel, believes that it is
true, and still chooses to reject it. This person despises God’s truth and ignores the many
opportunities for salvation that God offers him. Nevertheless, it turns out that there is some set of
circumstances in which this person would have freely chosen to be saved. Even though this
person is contingently lost, it does not seem correct that he lacked the opportunity to make a
decisive decision to accept the gospel during his lifetime.
A final difficulty is that these theodicies do not address the question of why God would
create persons who reject His grace even under the most optimal circumstances and are lost (the
transcircumstantially damned). Why would a loving God create such people at all? God,
according to this view, could certainly save all of the contingently lost without creating any who
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are transcircumstantially damned; it is not as though God would need to create people who are
transcircumstantially lost in order for them to serve a role that aids in bringing about a better
balance of saved versus lost. Walls himself acknowledges that this is a mystery his view does not
solve.224 Given God’s universal salvific will and the fact that universalism could easily have
been achieved by God on the views of Lake and Walls, the fact that the Bible does not teach
universalism (e.g., Mt 7:13-14; 13:40-43, 49-50; 25:30-46; Rev 20:11-21:27) counts strongly
against the truth of their views.
The theodicies of Lake and Walls must, therefore, be rejected. Lake illegitimately regards
counterfactuals concerning a person’s choices as more important than the person’s actual
choices, and they both run into troubling theological difficulties. We must never minimize the
significance of the choice that we have to accept or reject Christ in this life, for Scripture
portrays eternal life or death as hinging upon this decision.

The Theodicy of Jason Marsh
Jason Marsh’s theodicy also falls within the first of the three broad categories of Molinist
strategies for formulating a theodicy against the PCL, as it involves combining Molinism with
postmortem opportunities for salvation. Unlike Lake and Walls, however, Marsh does not
suggest that God uses His middle knowledge to take into account whether those who were never
saved in this life would have accepted Christ under ideal circumstances; rather, Marsh proposes
that God uses His middle knowledge to keep as many people as possible who are not saved

224. Walls, “Is Molinism as Bad as Calvinism?,” 96. If nobody is transcircumstantially damned, then Walls
would have to hold to universalism because his view requires that nobody is ultimately contingently lost. Since he
knows that universalism is unbiblical, he is puzzled as to why God would create anyone who will be lost (i.e., those
who are transcircumstantially damned).
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during this present earthly lifetime from being hardened against God so that these people can be
saved in the afterlife. Marsh’s theodicy arises in response to an article by Stephen Maitzen in
which Maitzen argues that the geographical distribution of theists and non-theists is unlikely if
theism were true. Maitzen points out that Saudi Arabia, for example, is almost entirely made up
of theists (Muslims) whereas Thailand is almost entirely composed of non-theists (Buddhists).
Maitzen argues that such a distribution would be odd on theism but unsurprising on naturalism.
He finds it difficult to account for why the hiddenness of God would be so unevenly distributed
if a loving God were to exist, since the eternal implications that such a distribution would seem
to have on the people of certain regions of the world are severe.225
Marsh responds to Maitzen’s argument by suggesting that this clumping—what Marsh calls
a “grouping strategy”—of unbelievers into certain geographical areas may actually be the means
by which God protects certain people from becoming hardened to the love of God so that they
will ultimately be saved. Marsh points out that God may be concerned with much more than
mere theistic belief. God may want people to respond to Him properly and enter into a love
relationship with Him.226 It may be that God has middle knowledge and knows that some persons
would refuse to love God under any circumstances in this life. Marsh suggests that God may
have, in His providence, used His middle knowledge to arrange the world such that any person
who is sequestered into an area in which people lack belief in a personal deity and never has a
good opportunity to believe in God in this life is a person who would freely refuse to love God
under any circumstances in this life.227 Marsh proposes, however, that these people who would
225. Stephen Maitzen, “Divine Hiddenness and the Demographics of Theism,” Religious Studies 42 (2006):
177–191. I will address Maitzen’s concern later when I discuss the plausibility of William Lane Craig’s proposal
that God may be optimizing the balance of saved versus lost over the course of human history.
226. Jason Marsh, “Do the Demographics of Theistic Belief Disconfirm Theism? A Reply to Maitzen,”
Religious Studies 44 (2008): 466–467.
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refuse to love God under any circumstances in this lifetime would freely choose to love God in
the afterlife if they were kept from being hardened against the love of God in this present life and
if they were presented with “something like a beatific vision” in the afterlife. So, God groups
these people together in this present earthly life as a means of keeping “these individuals
innocent for a later time, when they will be in a position truly to love God.” Marsh is open to
universal salvation and views this theodicy as a way for God to bring about universal salvation in
the afterlife.228 In defending his theodicy, he notes that some large groups of people who had
previously been geographically separated from hearing about God have converted in large
numbers once missionaries reached that location. In response to this fact, Marsh contends that it
just shows that God can have different reasons for His grouping strategy. In some cases, the
grouping strategy is intended to preserve the innocence of the people so that they will be
converted in the afterlife; in other cases, God groups people so that it will result in mass
conversion during this lifetime.229 Although Marsh is attempting to respond to Maitzen’s
particular challenge to theism rather than responding to the PCL, it is not hard to see that this
theodicy—if true—would also resolve the PCL.
Difficulties with the Theodicy of Marsh
Like the theodicies of Lake and Walls, even if Marsh’s theodicy may be philosophically
coherent, it is certainly not biblically faithful. For this reason, it cannot serve as an effective
theodicy that can be applied to the Christian God. It is not enough for a theodicy to defend a

227. Marsh, “Do the Demographics of Theistic Belief Disconfirm Theism? A Reply to Maitzen,”467.
228. Ibid., 468.
229. Ibid., 469.
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generic sort of theism. Any theodicy that appeals to unbiblical concepts is inadequate for
defending Christian theism against the PCL.
Two of the same criticisms that apply to the theodicies of Lake and Walls apply to Marsh’s
proposal as well. First, Marsh’s view goes beyond inclusivism and allows that one need not place
any sort of faith in God—even the implicit sort of faith that inclusivism requires—in this life in
order ultimately to be saved. Second, Marsh’s view allows that one who is actually evangelized
in this life can reject Christ and still be saved so long as that person accepts Christ in the afterlife.
This denies the many biblical warnings I have highlighted that stress urgency in turning to God
in this life in view of the fact that one’s fate is sealed when one dies and faces God’s judgment.
Since I have already examined the biblical problems associated with both of these points in the
above critique of Lake and Walls, I need not repeat those here. There simply is no explicit
teaching in the Bible that there will be postmortem opportunities for salvation, and the Bible in
fact explicitly teaches the opposite.
The universalism that Marsh espouses is also unbiblical. Clearly, Scripture teaches that
there will be a judgment of all humanity and that some will be lost (e.g., a few of these passages
include Mt 7:13-14; 13:40-43, 49-50; 25:30-46; Rev 20:11-21:27). While Marsh’s appeal to
universalism is problematic from a biblical perspective, it is not necessary to examine this point
closely for two reasons. First, the concerns noted in the previous paragraph are enough to show
that this theodicy is not an adequate Christian response to the PCL. Second, it seems that this
universalist aspect of his theodicy could be excised entirely and is not central to his theodicy—at
least it is not central in terms of applying it as a theodicy against the PCL. One could simply
make the following sort of proposal: God uses His middle knowledge to arrange the world so
that as many people as possible either come to accept Christ in this life or are kept from being
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hardened against God in this life so that they will accept Him in a postmortem state. One could
make such an appeal without also adding, as Marsh does, that nobody will be lost in the end. The
PCL would be overcome if nobody is contingently lost, and that would be the case even if some
continue to reject God in the afterlife. So long as nobody who rejects God in the afterlife would
have repented and turned to God (either in the present life or in the afterlife) if only God had
placed them into different circumstances, then nobody is contingently lost. In any case, even if
the universalist aspect of Marsh’s theodicy is removed, we have seen that—like the theodicies of
Lake and Walls—it is not consistent with Scripture.
Category #2 of Molinist Theodicies Against the PCL: The Lost Lack a Soul
The Theodicy of David Hunt
The second of the three broad categories of Molinist theodicies against the PCL that have
been proposed involves God leveraging His middle knowledge to ensure that all humans that He
creates (i.e., all those with a human mind or soul) are saved and that everyone else who appears
to be a human is actually a human-looking automaton that lacks a human mind or soul. This
intriguing proposal has been put forth by David Hunt, who is not himself a Molinist and thus
does not endorse his own Molinist proposal. His claim, however, is that if God did have middle
knowledge then God ought to be able to ensure universal salvation by employing this sort of
strategy. God could create soulless simulacra to fill the role of all lost persons so that
universalism could be achieved on Molinism.
Here is how Hunt lays out this Molinist theodicy. Hunt first suggests that one may assume
that God desires that people would enjoy “eternal felicity and communion with Him” and that, in
order to allow for this postmortem condition, it may have been necessary for these people to
have “a pre-mortem history” (i.e., this present life) in which they have the opportunity to decide
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whether or not they want to spend eternity with God. Hunt also suggests that God surely does not
desire that anyone should eternally suffer in separation from Him and that God would not bring
about the pre-mortem existence of the lost for the purpose of ensuring that the lost eternally
suffer in their postmortem state; rather, the “eternal suffering of the damned is held to be an
unfortunate concomitant of the eternal felicity of the blessed.”230 That is, God would only create
the lost because the impact that the lost have on the world in their pre-mortem existence is
plausibly crucial to the saved being in pre-mortem circumstances in which they freely choose to
be saved. So the postmortem condition of the lost is just the unfortunate outcome that results
from God needing to create the lost in their pre-mortem circumstances in order to bring about a
world in which He knew that the saved would freely choose to be saved. So the only thing (in
terms of pre-mortem conditions) that leads God to bring about a pre-mortem state at all is that
God wants to ensure that the saved are placed into an environment in which they are able to
choose freely that they want to love God and accept His salvation. But if God were to have
middle knowledge, Hunt suggests, then there is no reason why God could not bring about a
world in which all of the saved have a pre-mortem existence in which they all freely choose to be
saved without God creating any human who is lost. Hunt argues that the saved could still be
placed in an environment in which they “have actual experiences of trials and temptations”
without there being any “pre-mortem instantiation of the damned.” Even if the lost play an
essential role in affecting the circumstances of the saved so that all of the latter freely choose to
be saved, this could be accomplished by God creating “soulless simulacra” to play the roles that
would otherwise be played by actual humans (with a soul) who would be eternally lost if they
existed in this world. Hunt thinks that “each of us [real humans with a soul] could have exactly

230. David P. Hunt, “Middle Knowledge and the Soteriological Problem of Evil,” Religious Studies 27, no. 1
(March 1991): 21.
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the experiences we actually have even though (unbeknown to us) none of the other bodies in our
experience is itself a centre of experiences.” So Hunt avers that a God who possesses middle
knowledge ought to create only the elect with “a mind or soul,” and everyone else should be
merely simulacra playing the roles that God knows is conducive to bringing about the salvation
of the elect.231 Hunt realizes that some may object to his proposal on the grounds that it involves
deception and is contrary to the nature of God. Hunt responds that “it is far from obvious” that
his proposal would involve deception (though he opts not to make a case to support this claim);
moreover, Hunt stresses that even if this theodicy does involve some level of deception, it is a
morally better approach for God to take than the alternative of creating actual people who are
lost to an eternity in hell. It is often thought that God’s permitting evil is morally permissible
because of the various benefits that it allows (character building, free will, etc.). How much
more, argues Hunt, does the avoidance of eternal suffering in hell justify God engaging in a bit
of deception?232 So, if God has middle knowledge, Hunt thinks God should providentially
arrange the world so that all genuine humans (who have a soul) are placed into circumstances in
which they are saved and nobody is lost. It is only if God lacks middle knowledge (which Hunt
believes is the case) that Hunt thinks God would be justified in creating humans who end up
freely choosing to be lost.233
Difficulties with the Theodicy of Hunt
Hunt’s proposal is intriguing. There are, however, two major moral problems with it, and
these alone undermine it as a viable soteriological theodicy. The first problem is that it certainly
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does appear that this theodicy would involve massive deception on the part of God—deception
that is surely beneath God. The second problem is that on this view God would be the initiator of
the evil acts performed by the simulacra (since they lack a mind and are not free agents).
Although Hunt is correct that, in responding to the problem of evil, theists have rightly suggested
that God may permit certain evils in order to bring about greater goods, what Hunt is suggesting
is not a case of God permitting evil; rather, God would be carrying out evil. God would be
engaging in the evil of massive deception, and He would be responsible for initiating the evil
acts carried out by the simulacra. Both of these problems are simply unacceptable—even if
engaging in them would allow God to achieve universal salvation. Let us examine each of these
problems in turn.
The first problem—that God would be carrying out massive deception if Hunt’s proposal
were true—has been identified and stated well by William Lane Craig. It is worth quoting him at
length. Craig says:
But to my mind, Hunt’s proposal is so morally abhorrent and unworthy of God that He
could not entertain it. After all, we are not talking here of the sort of mild deception
involved by, say, Berkeleian idealism. We are talking about a world filled with automata
with which the elect enter into significant human relations, a scenario which constitutes a
moral offence to the elect of unspeakable proportions. Can one imagine being married to an
automaton, giving oneself to that thing in love, trust, and sexual surrender? Or giving birth
to and loving an automaton? Or having a mother and father or trusted friends who are
automata? I cannot convince myself that God would create such a world. And though the
fate of the lost is tragic, their creation involves no moral failure on God’s part as does
Hunt’s proposal. It must always be remembered that God loves the lost, desires their
salvation, and provides sufficient grace for them to be saved; their ability to reject God’s
love is testimony to their status as morally significant persons whom God treats with due
respect. By contrast Hunt’s proposal involves God’s treating real persons without the moral
respect they deserve.234
It would be misleading for God to intermingle simulacra that appear to be freely acting
persons with true persons who possess a mind and freedom of the will. As Craig says, God
234. Craig, “Middle Knowledge and Christian Exclusivism,” 133-134.
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would be giving us good reason to believe that we are interacting in deep and meaningful
personal relationships with other persons like ourselves when this is actually not the case. Now
Hunt is arguing that we ought not hold to Molinism because, were God to possess middle
knowledge, God should be able to bring about universalism using this simulacra strategy; since
Hunt recognizes that there is a “paucity of scriptural support for universalism,” he argues that we
ought to think that God must not have middle knowledge.235 But surely Hunt underestimates how
serious God’s deception would be if He were to lead us to believe that we have personal
relationships with things that are not persons. Any such proposal (including the similar proposal
that each real person undergoes his or her pre-mortem existence in a virtual reality in which
everyone around him or her is not a real person) is morally beneath God. For this reason alone,
Hunt’s theodicy is simply not adequate for Christian theists to adopt.
A second crucial problem with what Hunt proposes is that it makes God the initiator of the
evil acts performed by the simulacra. The soulless simulacra would have to lack free agency.
They are not creatures who have a will of their own, as they have no mind that stands apart from
their actions and is the source and initiator of their actions. Indeed, it is for this very reason that
they are not condemned to hell (which is the key benefit that Hunt emphasizes in proposing this
theodicy). As I have argued previously, in order to be a moral agent who is worthy of
punishment for wrongdoing, a creature must be capable of making libertarian free choices. A
creature has to have a mind that initiates choices, and that mind must be capable of choosing to
act other than how it does act. Hunt is correct that simulacra would not be worthy of eternal
punishment because they lack a mind and lack moral agency; however, this advantage gets
turned on its head as soon as one asks who is responsible for the actions of these simulacra.

235. Hunt, “Middle Knowledge and the Soteriological Problem of Evil,” 24.
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Clearly, it would have to be God. God would be the creator of these things and would be using
His middle knowledge to cause them to act in precisely the ways that He knows will lead to the
world playing out in such a way that no human freely chooses to reject God. This means that
when a simulacrum engages in sin (whether it be a “white lie” or whether it be murder or rape or
child molestation), it is God who is causing the simulacrum to take this action. That means God
would not merely be responsible for permitting evil; He would undeniably be responsible for
causing evil as well.
So this soteriological theodicy is clearly unacceptable for the Christian theist, as it produces
problems far greater than it solves. Although God may permit certain evils in order to bring
about greater goods, we have seen that Hunt’s theodicy entails that God Himself carries out all
sorts of evils. Regardless of the advantages that Hunt’s proposal may offer as a soteriological
theodicy, it is contrary to the character of God and only amplifies the broader problem of evil.
Even if, as I have argued, God does possess middle knowledge, it is not hard to see why He did
not opt to carry out Hunt’s simulacrum strategy. Hunt’s view must be rejected.
We now turn to the final category of Molinist theodicies against the PCL that have been put
forth—a category that, most notably, includes William Lane Craig’s famous theodicy. Craig’s
view utilizes Molinism in an entirely different way than the proposals that we have considered
above. While his theodicy is insightful and has many positive aspects, we will see that Craig’s
view has its own difficulties.
Category #3 of Molinist Theodicies Against the PCL: Optimizing the Soteriological Balance

The third and final category of Molinist theodicies against the PCL that we will examine
includes theodicies that have the common feature of proposing that God actualizes a world in
which some people freely choose to be saved and others freely choose to be lost but that God
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ensures an optimal soteriological balance such that the ratio of saved to lost is as good as
possible (given human freedom). I will first examine and critique Craig’s soteriological theodicy
in significant detail. After that I will give brief attention to Kirk MacGregor’s recent
modification to Craig’s theodicy.
The Theodicy of William Lane Craig
Craig’s theodicy requires significant attention because my own theodicy draws upon—and
departs from—key concepts in his theodicy and because Craig’s theodicy against the PCL is by
far the most prominent of all the Molinist theodicies that deal with the PCL. Like all of the above
Molinist proposals, Craig’s theodicy accepts P8 while attacking P9. This, however, is where the
similarities between these theodicies end. Craig does not appeal to postmortem opportunities for
salvation or to a soulless simulacra strategy or to the idea that anyone will be saved on the basis
of what God middle-knows the person would have done in non-actual circumstances. Instead,
Craig argues that God uses His middle knowledge to arrange the world such that none of the lost
are contingently lost and that God ensures that as many people as possible are saved and as few
as possible are lost. Let us now explore Craig’s theodicy, a position that can be boiled down to
three key claims.
Craig’s first claim is that it may be the case that nobody is contingently lost because God is
able to arrange the world such that all of the lost are transcircumstantially damned (TD). This
term, coined by Craig, was introduced in the first chapter. We have seen that Craig defines TD as
“a contingent property possessed by an individual essence if the exemplification of that essence
would, if offered salvation, freely reject God’s grace and be lost no matter what freedompermitting circumstances God should create him in.” A transcircumstantially damned person is
also “transworldly damned.” He or she would freely choose to reject God and be lost in any
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world that God could actualize.236 So, in order to reject P9, Craig argues that God could ensure
that “anyone who actually is lost would have been lost in any world in which God had created
him.”237 Craig describes his position as follows:
With respect to persons who do not respond to His grace under especially disadvantageous
circumstances, God can so order the world that such persons are exclusively people who
would still not have believed even had they been created under more advantageous
circumstances. Far from being cruel, God is so loving that He arranges the world such that
anyone who would respond to His saving grace under certain sets of circumstances is
created precisely in one such set of circumstances, and He even provides sufficient grace
for salvation to those who He knows would spurn it under any circumstances.238
Craig’s claim is quite remarkable. Since God has middle knowledge, He knows what any
person whom He might create would do in any possible set of circumstances. God, therefore,
knows if a person is TD or not. Craig thinks that God uses His middle knowledge to actualize a
world in which every person who is not TD is placed into a circumstance in which God knows
that he or she will freely choose to be saved. Moreover, everyone who is lost would have been
lost under any freedom-permitting circumstances and in any world in which that person has free
will; these people are TD and would reject God no matter what graces God generously places
into their lives. The fact that many of the lost are unevangelized or face other circumstances that
are not conducive to accepting the gospel could not count against God’s omnibenevolence. As
Craig points out, those who fail to hear the gospel and are lost “would also not have responded to
the gospel had they heard it. Hence, no one is lost because of lack of information due to
historical or geographical accident. All who want or would want to be saved will be saved.”239
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This first component of Craig’s proposal that raises the possibility of all of the lost being TD, if
consistent with Scripture, would be enough to undercut the PCL.
Craig’s second key point is that all persons—even the unevangelized and all of the TD—
receive sufficient grace to be saved in this life. Craig rightly wants to show that all of the lost do
have a genuine opportunity to take advantage of the grace that God offers through Christ—even
if they would never choose to take advantage of it. To accomplish this, Craig suggests that
Scripture teaches Christian inclusivism in Romans 2:7, a passage which indicates that God will
give eternal life to “those who by perseverance in doing good seek for glory and honor and
immortality.” Craig thinks this shows that “God doesn’t judge people on the basis of whether
they’ve placed their faith in Christ. Rather God judges them on the basis of the light of God’s
general revelation in nature and conscience that they do have.” So long as one who has never
heard of Christ senses her own moral guilt and seeks forgiveness from God, God will save her
through Christ even though she has no conscious knowledge of Christ.240 This, Craig suggests,
means that everyone at least has an opportunity to be saved because all people are offered
general revelation and have the opportunity to be saved by responding to it; nevertheless, he
thinks the New Testament indicates that few actually do come to be saved in this way.241
Regardless of whether or not many unevangelized persons access salvation in this way, Craig
holds that all of them at least have the opportunity to access salvation by responding properly to
general revelation.
Craig’s third claim supplements his first claim, and it is intended to bolster his case for
God’s omnibenevolence. In considering Craig’s first claim, one might wonder why God creates
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the TD. If God knows that these people will choose to be lost in any circumstances into which
they are placed, why create them at all? In agreement with Craig, recall that I argued in the first
chapter that God may not be able to create a well-populated world in which there is universal
salvation. Although God would ideally prefer a well-populated world in which everyone is freely
saved, the truth of certain counterfactuals concerning human freedom may render such a world
infeasible for God. So, given that it may not be feasible for God to avoid some persons freely
choosing to be lost in any well-populated world of free creatures, Craig’s third key claim is that
God plausibly does the best thing that He can do by optimizing the balance of saved versus lost:
God wants to maximize the number of the saved: He wants heaven to be as full as possible.
Moreover, as a loving God, He wants to minimize the number of the lost: He wants hell to
be as empty as possible. His goal, then, is to achieve an optimal balance between these, to
create no more lost than is necessary to achieve a certain number of the saved.242
So, along with his contention that all of the lost are TD and his appeal to inclusivism, Craig
proposes that God brings about an “optimal balance” (i.e., an optimal ratio) of saved versus lost.
God does this by using His middle knowledge to create a world in which each person—whether
one who will be saved or one who is TD—is born into the precise time and place in history that
will ultimately result in the most soteriologically-optimal world. The existence of a single person
and the events that take place in that person’s life can have an enormous impact upon the lives of
many other people down through history. God providentially orders the world to ensure that just
the right people come into existence in just the right circumstances so that (1) the only people
who are ever lost are TD and (2) there is an optimal balance of saved versus lost over the course
of human history. An “optimal balance” means that the only feasible worlds of free creatures in
which there is a better ratio of saved to lost are worlds in which God must “so drastically reduce
the number of the saved as to leave heaven deficient in population (say, by creating a world of
242. Craig, “No Other Name,” 183.
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only four people, three of whom go to heaven and one to hell).”243 So the actual world is
soteriologically optimal in the sense that, out of all the feasible worlds containing a sufficiently
large number of people, none of those worlds has a better ratio of saved to lost than the actual
world. This third point is a useful supplement to Craig’s first point. Although his first point alone
would undermine P9, without this third point one could question whether God had to make so
many TD individuals. Adding this third point removes the sting of that concern.
Advantages of Craig’s Theodicy
Craig’s proposal certainly appears to be a philosophically viable solution to the PCL so
long as God does possess middle knowledge. Drawing upon Alvin Plantinga’s concept of
transworld depravity, Craig’s concept of TD244 is an insightful recognition of the central issue
surrounding P9. The truth of the assertion that nobody is contingently lost (the negation of P9)
would require that anyone who actually is lost must be TD. It seems entirely possible that certain
individuals could be TD, and there is no philosophical argument one can give—so far as I can
see—to show that it is impossible for a God who has middle knowledge to ensure that that all of
the lost are TD. Certainly, if the people of the world were randomly distributed geographically,
then it would be overwhelmingly unlikely that all of the lost are TD and that none of the
numerous individuals who never hear the gospel would have accepted it if they had heard it. One
must remember, however, that Craig’s proposal is that God has providentially ordered the world
using His middle knowledge to ensure that none of the lost are TD. If God has middle
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knowledge, then there is no apparent philosophical reason why God could not arrange the world
in the way that Craig proposes. Although it would require an incredibly complex providential
plan in order to ensure that all of the lost are TD and that there is an optimal balance of saved
versus lost, a God who is omnipotent and whose omniscience includes middle knowledge surely
could carry this out. If He did, then there is no way for humans to know that He did this simply
by examining the world. Just because many unevangelized persons respond to the gospel when
they first hear it, that says nothing about whether God has arranged the world so that all persons
who never accept the gospel—including all persons who remain unevangelized throughout their
lives—are TD.245
There also does not seem to be any way to show that God is not optimizing the balance of
saved versus lost over the course of human history. We saw that Stephen Maitzen has argued that
the geographical distribution of religious adherents in the world is unlikely if theism were true,246
and one may similarly think that this distribution makes soteriological optimization unlikely;
however, there is simply no way for us to have any confidence that the geographical distribution
of the adherents of various religions and worldviews that we observe in the world at present is
incompatible with soteriological optimality over the course of human history. We do not know
how many centuries or millennia may remain in human history, and it is beyond our ken to have
any level of confidence that there is incompatibility between the religious demographics of the
world at present and the likelihood that a God who possesses middle knowledge is providentially
carrying out a plan in which soteriological optimality is achieved by the end of human history.
Even if one thinks that God likely could have achieved a better balance of saved versus lost up to
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this point in history if He were to have arranged certain things differently, there is absolutely no
way to know whether or not the present state of the world is conducive to God achieving an
optimal soteriological balance over the entirety of human history. It may be that it is only in a
world with the particular false religions and the specific geographical distribution of religions
and worldviews found in the world today that the optimal soteriological balance will ultimately
be achieved. It may be that there will be an explosion of evangelism in the world in two centuries
that was only made possible because the world is the way it is at present. The complexity of such
things ought to give anyone pause who would suggest that we can be confident that God is not
bringing about an optimal ratio of saved to lost over the whole of human history.
In addition, if inclusivism were true, Craig is right that this would provide a philosophical
basis for thinking that everyone—even those who never hear the gospel and are lost—could
receive sufficient grace from God to be saved; all people could have a genuine opportunity to be
saved. There would be something that every person could have done such that, if he or she had
done it, he or she would have been saved. So Craig’s view, if true, would ensure that: nobody
who is lost is contingently lost; God has actualized a world that has a soteriological balance that
is as favorable as any feasible world of free creatures; and everyone has sufficient grace to be
saved. There seems to be no evident philosophical reason (so long as divine middle knowledge is
accepted) to think that his proposal fails. It seems to undermine the claim of P9 that some are
contingently lost and resolve the PCL.
Besides the philosophical attractiveness of Craig’s theodicy, it is also beneficial in several
other ways. First, Craig’s view sees God’s election as purposeful and consistent with His perfect
love. Unlike Suarez—who we have seen held that God utilizes middle knowledge in His
predestination of individuals for the specific purpose of ensuring the salvation and damnation of
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particular people—Craig proposes that God uses His middle knowledge to create a world in
which there is an optimal balance of saved versus lost. This idea of an optimal soteriological
balance is appealing and theologically reasonable (though we will see that certain divine goals
may limit this optimality). Why would an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God who possesses
middle knowledge not want to save as many people as possible and damn as few as possible? As
I argued in the first chapter, Scripture indicates that God has a universal salvific will (1 Tim 2:4;
2 Pt 3:9; Ezek 18:23). Moreover, there is biblical support for the idea that God providentially
places each person in a specific time and place with the goal of causing people to reach out and
find Him for salvation. The apostle Paul, speaking to an audience of philosophers in Athens, says
The God who made the world and all things in it . . . gives to all people life and breath and
all things; and He made from one man every nation of mankind to live on all the face of the
earth, having determined their appointed times and the boundaries of their habitation, that
they would seek God, if perhaps they might grope for Him and find Him, though He is not
far from each one of us; for in Him we live and move and exist (Acts 17:24-28a).
So the proposal that God’s creative effort is oriented toward the goal of bringing about a
soteriologically-optimal world is more than philosophically reasonable; it is biblically supported
(though not explicitly stated in Scripture), and it seems to me that it is quite plausible.
Second, Craig takes seriously God’s sovereignty and providence within this present earthly
existence. One might think that any Molinist theory would take a high view of God’s sovereignty
because, as seen in chapter two, the truth of Molinism entails that God has the ability to exercise
an incredible amount of providential control—even over worlds of free creatures. Nevertheless,
we saw that the Molinist theodicies of Lake and Walls (and, to a large degree, Marsh) propose
that God makes use of His middle knowledge merely to clean up the PCL after this present life is
over. Craig, on the other hand, attempts to explain how God in His providence uses His middle
knowledge to order this world of free creatures so that nobody is contingently lost to begin with.
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While I will (for biblical reasons) disagree with Craig’s position that God has sovereignly
arranged the world so that all of the lost are TD, His strong view of God’s sovereignty is a
positive feature of his theodicy.
Finally, Craig’s theodicy is also to be commended for affirming that God grants sufficient
grace to all—even the lost—and for being consistent with the truths that God genuinely wants all
to be saved and that Jesus died for all. I have already argued for these positions, though I will
have more to say about the way in which God offers sufficient grace to all persons when I
unpack my own theodicy. While I think it is wrongheaded for biblical reasons to appeal to
inclusivism in order to uphold the sufficient grace and opportunity for salvation that God
provides to all people, Craig correctly sees the importance of accounting for this in some way.
Difficulties with Craig’s Theodicy
It is not enough for a theodicy against the PCL—at least a theodicy that applies to the
Christian God—to be philosophically sound; it must also be consistent with Scripture. It need not
be explicitly stated in Scripture, but it must not contradict biblical teaching. Craig’s theodicy
does not adopt such biblically problematic concepts as postmortem salvation or universalism or
divine deception; however, crucial aspects of his theodicy do appear to come into conflict with
biblical teaching, and this points toward the need for Christian theists to adopt a different
theodicy against the PCL. Most significantly, there are two strong biblical indications that some
people are contingently lost, and this is incompatible with Craig’s key proposal that all of the lost
are TD. First, Jesus asserts that Sodom, Tyre, and Sidon would have repented if they had been
exposed to different revelation (Mt 11:20-24; Lk 10:13-15). If Jesus means this literally (and we
will see why biblical commentators widely interpret it literally), then these people would be
contingently lost. Second, the Bible seems to affirm in a number of places that a person can
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genuinely accept the gospel through faith in Christ and then later reject God and His salvation by
abandoning his or her faith. Since anyone who apostatizes cannot be TD, this is another problem
for Craig’s theodicy. I will first unpack both of these difficulties for Craig’s suggestion that all of
the lost are TD. His proposal that all people who will be lost may be TD is the critical claim in
his theodicy that must be plausible if it is to have force in undercutting the PCL. Anyone who
thinks that Craig’s suggestion that all of the lost are TD rests uncomfortably with Scripture will
not be convinced that his theodicy succeeds in undermining P9 and resolving the PCL for
Christian theism. After that, I will examine briefly the difficulty with the way Craig tries to
justify that his appeal to inclusivism is biblical—an appeal that, as we have seen, Craig makes in
order to try to show how all people (even the unevangelized) receive grace that is sufficient for
them to have an opportunity to be saved. If his particular appeal to Scripture to justify
inclusivism fails, then this reinforces my earlier claim that one ought not assume the truth of
inclusivism. It reaffirms why it is valuable to remain consistent with exclusivism when offering a
way of justifying that all of the lost receive sufficient grace and have an opportunity to be saved.
Jesus’ Statement Concerning Sodom, Tyre, and Sidon
The first biblical strike against Craig’s proposal that all of the lost may be TD arises from
the comments that Jesus makes about the wicked people of Sodom, Tyre, and Sidon. Despite
Jesus’ incredible teachings and miracles, He faced widespread rejection from the people living in
Capernaum (His base of operations during His ministry) and other towns that He visited. Faced
with this direct rejection, Jesus began to denounce the many people who had seen His miracles
and yet still hardened their hearts against Him and His message:
Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the miracles had occurred in Tyre
and Sidon which occurred in you, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and
ashes. Nevertheless I say to you, it will be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of
judgment than for you. And you, Capernaum, will not be exalted to heaven, will you? You
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will descend to Hades; for if the miracles had occurred in Sodom which occurred in you, it
would have remained to this day. Nevertheless I say to you that it will be more tolerable for
the land of Sodom in the day of judgment, than for you (Mt 11:21-24; see also the account
in Lk 10:13-15).
In this passage, Jesus explicitly says that the notoriously sinful people of Tyre, Sidon, and
Sodom would have chosen to repent if they had witnessed Jesus’ miracles. Even the people of
Sodom, a city that is infamous for being destroyed by God for its wickedness (Gen 18-19),
would have repented and turned to God if they had seen the miracles that Jesus performed.
If this statement by Jesus is taken at face value, then there is an obvious difficulty with the
proposal that all of the lost are TD. If Jesus is revealing God’s middle knowledge that the sinful
people in these towns literally would have repented and turned to God (presumably finding
salvation) if placed into different circumstances, then Jesus is claiming that this is a case of
people who are contingently lost. Had Jesus appeared in Sodom and performed miracles there
prior to the destruction of the city, they would have repented. If Jesus meant His statement
literally, then we ought not think that the people of these wicked cities are TD. Contrary to
Craig’s position, these would be people who are actually lost but who would have freely chosen
to change their ways and turn to God if only they had been placed into different circumstances.
Although they were wicked and freely chose to reject what revelation they did have, they would
have responded to the miracles of Jesus had they been given the opportunity to see them.
Craig, of course, is aware of this passage and its implications for his view. He takes a
position on the interpretation of this passage that, if true, would avoid this problem. Craig
suggests that “Matthew 11 is probably religious hyperbole meant merely to underscore the depth
of the depravity of the cities in which Jesus preached.”247 So Craig’s stance is that Jesus, in order
to make his point forcefully about the extent of the hardness of heart and rebelliousness of the

247. Craig, The Only Wise God, 137. See the footnote on this page.
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people who were rejecting Him and ignoring His miracles, might have only been exaggerating
matters so as to shock His hearers. Craig, therefore, doubts that Jesus is revealing true middle
knowledge in this particular instance about what the people of the wicked cities of Tyre, Sidon,
and Sodom would have freely chosen to do in different circumstances.
Now there can be no doubt that Jesus did intend for His comments to shock His Jewish
listeners; the idea that they are more deserving of punishment than notoriously evil pagan cities
is supposed to be startling. However, there is strong contextual evidence that Jesus intended for
His statements to be taken as literally true. If Jesus did not mean that the wicked cities literally
would have repented in great remorse had they seen His miracles, then His concluding comment
about how the people of those wicked cities will be judged relative to those who heard and
rejected Jesus (Mt 11:22, 24) becomes quite difficult to understand.
Jesus concludes his speech by declaring that “it will be more tolerable” for the wicked
cities “in the day of judgment” than for those who saw His miracles and failed to repent. This
proclamation ties the counterfactual statement about what the people of the wicked cities would
have done in non-actual circumstances to the real-world fact about how they will actually be
judged less severely. If Jesus’ statement that the wicked cities would have repented had they seen
His miracles is not a true counterfactual, then it seems to undercut the basis for Jesus concluding
that the people of these wicked cities will actually be judged less severely than the people who
rejected Jesus’ miracles. The wicked cities are guilty for failing to live up to the revelation that
they had received and will thus be punished, but they will not be judged as harshly as the towns
that rejected the miracles of Jesus because the wicked cities would have responded positively to
that same revelation had they been given it. So Jesus indicates that there are two factors involved
in the reason why God will give the wicked cities a lighter punishment than those who rejected
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Jesus’ miracles: the different amount of revelation that the two groups received and the fact that
those with less revelation would have responded to the greater revelation had they been given it.
One might contend that Jesus’ conclusion about the differing amounts of punishment
would still make sense even if His counterfactual statement concerning the wicked cities is not to
be taken literally. That is, one might argue that the wicked cities will be judged less severely
merely because they received less revelation (i.e., that is the only factor that is in play). However,
it must be taken seriously that Jesus’ primary point of emphasis in this passage is not merely on
the disparity in the amount of revelation; rather, He emphasizes just as strongly the fact that the
wicked cities would have repented if they had been given the additional revelation. Both factors
are emphasized, so why would only one factor be relevant to Jesus’ conclusion that there will be
lighter punishment for the wicked cities? Jesus’ condemning blow to those who reject His
miracles seems to be based upon both factors.
Significantly, if Craig’s interpretation of the above passage were correct that Jesus is
merely engaging in hyperbole in His condemnation of the towns that ignored His miracles (an
interpretation that we have seen is necessary if Craig is to avoid a conflict between this biblical
passage and the proposal he makes in his theodicy that all of the lost are TD), then it is difficult
to see why God would punish the people who rejected His miracles more severely than any other
lost people. If the lost people of the wicked cities of Sodom, Tyre, and Sidon are TD, as Craig’s
theodicy requires, then they would have rejected Jesus’ miracles even if they had been given the
opportunity to see them (contrary to what Jesus actually says in this passage). So why should the
people of the wicked cities be judged less severely than those who rejected Jesus’ miracles when
they would have done the same thing had they been placed into those circumstances? Those
people who rejected Jesus’ miracles merely had the misfortune of being born at a time and place
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in which they were given more revelation than other TD individuals, but God (via His middle
knowledge) knows that they do not despise His grace more than any other TD person that He has
created. If God did indeed providentially arrange the world so that all of the lost are TD in order
to ensure that nobody who is lost can object that God was unloving to them by placing them into
circumstances in which they are contingently lost, then surely this strategy creates another
problem if (according to Craig’s interpretation of Mt 11:21-24) God also punishes some lost
people less severely merely because they received less revelation and does not take into account
the fact that all of the lost are TD. The problem is that it may just as easily be argued that God
would be unloving or unfair if He were to factor into the level of punishment of each lost person
the amount of revelation that the lost person received when all lost persons are TD and would
have rejected any revelation that God presented to them.
It should also be noted that biblical commentators widely accept as literal Jesus’ statement
that the people of the wicked cities would have repented if they had seen His miracles. D. A.
Carson’s position is representative of such commentators. Carson says:
Three large theological propositions are presupposed by Jesus’ insistence that on the Day
of Judgment (see on [Mt] 10:15; cf. [Mt] 12:36; Acts 17:31; 2 Peter 2:9; 3:7; 1 John 4:17;
Jude 6), when he will judge ([Mt] 7:22; 25:34), things will go worse for the cities that have
received so much light than for the pagan cities. The first is that the Judge has contingent
knowledge: he knows what Tyre and Sidon would have done under such-and-such
circumstances. The second is that God does not owe revelation to anyone, or else there is
injustice in withholding it. The third is that punishment on the Day of Judgment takes into
account opportunity. There are degrees of felicity in paradise and degrees of torment in hell
(Rom 1:20-2:16). The implications for Western, English-speaking Christendom today are
sobering.248

248. D. A. Carson, Matthew Chapters 1-12, The Expositor’s Bible Commentary Series (Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan, 1995), 273. See also: Frederick Dale Bruner, The Christbook: Matthew 1-12, vol. 1 of Matthew: A
Commentary, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 525. Adrian Leske, “Matthew,” in The International
Bible Commentary: A Catholic and Ecumenical Commentary for the Twenty-First Century, ed. William R. Farmer
(Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1998), 1292.
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Molina himself actually cited Matthew 11:20-24 as a case in which Scripture supports
divine middle knowledge. Molina interpreted Jesus as speaking literally about what the people of
the wicked cities would have done, and Molina regarded this passage as evidence that some
people who are lost in the actual world would have been saved had God placed them into
different circumstances.249 Kirk MacGregor’s assessment of Craig’s exegesis of this passage is
correct when he states that it “falls clearly outside the mainstream of Matthean scholarship.” He
concludes that “Craig’s interpretation of this text seems a clear case of allowing philosophical
presuppositions to trump grammatico-historical exegesis.”250 While the possibility that Jesus’
statement is merely hyperbolic may exist, such an understanding is not strongly warranted by the
text itself. As a result, this biblical passage rests quite uncomfortably indeed with Craig’s
proposal that all of the lost are, in fact, TD.
The Possibility of Apostasy
The second biblical reason that it is best to avoid a theodicy that requires all of the lost to
be TD is that Scripture seems to warn in numerous places that a believer can abandon his or her
faith and reject God’s grace after having previously accepted it. Although this issue of
“perseverance of the saints” (the view that one who accepts God’s grace by faith will never turn
from that faith and reject God’s gift of salvation) is an area of disagreement among Christians
and cannot possibly be handled in great depth in this section, I will aim to make a brief but
powerful case that the biblical data strongly supports the conclusion that one can freely choose to
walk away from saving faith just as one can freely choose to accept God’s grace by faith in the

249. Kirk MacGregor cites where Molina indicates this in his Concordia (7.23.4/5.1.4.13; 7.23.4/5.1.11.41;
4.14.13.49.9). See footnote 56 in: MacGregor, Luis de Molina, 147.
250. MacGregor, A Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology, 69. See footnote 22.
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first place. If believers can apostatize, then this fact counts as yet another strike against Craig’s
position. That is because one who apostatizes and is lost would have been saved in a feasible
world that is identical to the actual world up until a certain point: a world in which the one who
apostatizes in the actual world had instead died subsequent to accepting God’s grace by faith but
prior to apostatizing. When I later unpack my own theodicy, it will be clear that the viability of
my theodicy is not affected by the truth or falsity of perseverance of the saints. Craig’s theodicy,
however, is not compatible with the falsity of perseverance of the saints because it requires that
all of the lost are TD.251 Ultimately, even if one does hold that Scripture supports the truth of
perseverance of the saints and that the arguments against it are not powerful enough to warrant
its rejection, the fact that there are numerous biblical passages that—at the very least—strongly
call this doctrine into question makes it attractive if a theodicy against the PCL does not depend
on the truth of this controversial doctrine.
Since at least the time of Augustine, the idea of perseverance of the saints has been held by
some Christians. This doctrine later became one of the five points of Calvinism, and it is not hard
to see why. If the Calvinist conception of the other four points were true, then it seems to follow
that one who is unconditionally elected and is unable to resist God’s grace will necessarily
persevere in his or her faith and be saved. There are also some Christians who have adopted
perseverance of the saints by itself (i.e., without holding to the other points of Calvinism).
Proponents of perseverance of the saints appeal to a variety of biblical passages that they believe
support this doctrine. For example, in John 10:28-29 Jesus says concerning his elect, “I give
eternal life to them, and they will never perish; and no one will snatch them out of My hand. My
Father, who has given them to Me, is greater than all; and no one is able to snatch them out of

251. Although we will later note the interesting fact that Craig himself has expressed that Scripture indicates
that believers can apostatize, this position is not consistent with his own theodicy against the PCL.
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the Father’s hand.” Similarly, Paul writes to the Philippian believers that “He who began a good
work in you will perfect it until the day of Christ Jesus” (Phil 1:6), and he assures the Roman
believers that “neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things
to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor any other created thing, will be able to separate
us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord” (Rom 8:38-39). Paul also tells
Timothy that God is “able to guard what I have entrusted to Him until that day” (2 Tim 1:12).
Because there is no power that can take away a believer’s salvation, the Apostle John is likewise
able to tell his readers that they “may know that [they] have eternal life” (1 Jn 5:13).
In view of such passages, we must minimally conclude that one undeniable blessing of
being a believer in Christ is the assurance of knowing that no person or thing can rob a believer
of his or her salvation. Moreover, God is faithful in His promise to grant eternal life to those who
are saved. There is truly nothing that can snatch a believer in Christ out of God’s loving hand. A
believer can and should have the blessed assurance of knowing with certainty that she is saved
and that this salvation cannot be taken from her against her will and is not contingent upon her
maintaining her salvation by upholding a certain standard of good works.
Nevertheless, as Jack Cottrell points out, it does not seem that any biblical text “affirms
that every saved child of God will unconditionally and infallibly remain in his saved state until
he dies.”252 Passages such as those cited above are not at all in conflict with “the possibility that
the believer himself may exercise his free will and voluntarily give up his salvation” by refusing
to maintain faith in Christ.253 I have argued previously that it is both indicated in Scripture and
morally important that all humans possess libertarian freedom of the will, and the Bible in no

252. Cottrell, The Faith Once for All, 376.
253. Ibid. The emphasis is mine.
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way implies that one who freely chooses to accept God’s grace by faith subsequently undergoes
a loss of libertarian freedom with regard to his or her ability to choose freely whether or not to
reject his or her faith. Moreover, the Bible never affirms that a believer can lack faith in Christ
and still be saved. On the contrary, there are numerous warnings against turning from the faith,
and these warnings are powerful evidence that one’s faith—and thus one’s salvation—can be
abandoned if one so chooses. It needs to be recognized at this point that, in such warnings
against apostasy, a believer’s choice to continue in faith (just like his or her choice to accept
Christ by faith originally) ought not be viewed as a work in the sense of Ephesians 2:8-9—a
passage in which Paul stresses that we are saved by God’s grace through faith as a gift from God
and not by our own effort. As Grant Osborne rightly puts it, faith must not be regarded as a work
“because it is not an active agent by which we save ourselves.” Saving faith is properly
understood as “a passive surrender to the God who saves us, an opening up of ourselves to God,
who works salvation in us. But it is still a free choice.”254 Humans cannot save themselves or
keep themselves saved, but they can refuse to accept salvation and can refuse to continue in faith.
Let us examine some of the warnings against apostasy.
The writer of Hebrews, in particular, often warns against apostasy, passionately calling his
ethnically Jewish readers who are believers in Christ to resist the temptation to abandon
Christianity and return to Judaism. He implores them to maintain their Christian faith despite the
hardships and pressures that Jewish Christians faced. Indeed, as Ben Witherington correctly
observes, one of the most prominent themes of the book of Hebrews appears to be warnings to
Christian believers against the dangers of apostasy and the need to persist in their faith.255 It is

254. Grant R. Osborne, “A Classical Arminian View,” in Four Views on the Warning Passages in Hebrews, ed.
Herbert W. Bateman IV (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2007), 87.
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certainly true that a believer can fall into sin and stray from the Lord without being separated
from Christ. As James 5:19 indicates, such temporary wandering from the Lord occurs when one
“strays from the truth and [another] one turns him back.” Nevertheless, multiple passages in
Hebrews seem to warn genuine believers against engaging in a decisive rejection of Christ. This
theme arises especially in chapters three, six, and ten of Hebrews.
In chapter three, the author of Hebrews warns:
Take care, brethren, that there not be in any one of you an evil, unbelieving heart that falls
away from the living God. But encourage one another day after day, as long as it is still
called ‘Today,’ so that none of you will be hardened by the deceitfulness of sin. For we
have become partakers of Christ, if we hold fast the beginning of our assurance firm until
the end (Heb 3:12-14).
It is crucial first of all to note that the author of Hebrews is addressing this warning to
“brethren” (ἀδελφοὶ). Indeed, the author addresses the “brethren” throughout the book of
Hebrews. There is good reason to think that this is a reference to believers in Christ—a group
that includes the author himself. Just a few verses earlier, in Hebrews 3:1, the author makes it
clear that he is speaking to “holy brethren [again, ἀδελφοὶ], partakers of a heavenly calling,” and
he is asking them to “consider Jesus, the Apostle and High Priest of our confession.” Since the
brethren are “holy” (ἅγιοι) and confess Jesus as their “Apostle and High Priest” and the author
himself adheres to the same confession as these brethren (note the pronoun ἡμῶν, which is
genitive, plural, and first-person), this certainly seems to be a description of genuine believers.
The author again (in 10:19) addresses the brethren (ἀδελφοὶ) and again includes himself among
the brethren, noting that “we” (i.e., the author and all those who are among the “brethren”) are
those who: “have confidence to enter the holy place by the blood of Jesus” (10:19); “have a great

255. Ben Witherington III, Letters and Homilies for Jewish Christians: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on
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158

priest [Jesus] over the house of God” (10:21); have “full assurance of faith, having our hearts
sprinkled clean from an evil conscience” (10:22); and have reason to “hold fast the confession of
our hope without wavering, for He who promised is faithful” (10:23). The author also references
the ἀδελφοὶ in the conclusion of the book of Hebrews (13:22) by making it clear that this entire
letter of exhortation is addressed to the “brethren.” So, returning to the passage under
consideration in Hebrews 3:12-14, when the author warns the “brethren” in 3:12 to be careful not
to have “an evil, unbelieving heart that falls away from the living God,”256 there is good reason
to think that he is addressing true believers in Christ. There is no reason to think that the brethren
the author references in 3:12 is a different group than the brethren he addresses throughout the
book of Hebrews—and certainly not different than the group to which he refers just a few verses
earlier when he makes clear that he is addressing the “holy brethren” who recognize Jesus as “the
Apostle and High Priest of our confession.”
Given that the author seems to be addressing Christians in 3:12-14, the warning that he
issues is significant. He emphasizes that the brethren must not turn away from the “living God”
to any other god. Regarding the title of “living God,” Donald Guthrie notes:
This particular title for God, which is familiar in the Old Testament, occurs several times in
the New Testament, frequently, as here, without the article. The form without the article
draws attention more vividly to the adjective ‘living’. The Christians in pagan
environments would warm to the contrast between the living God, whom they worshipped,
and the dead idols of paganism (cf. Acts 14:15). The title was of equal appeal to a Jewish
disciple, as in Peter’s confession at Caesarea Philippi (Mt. 16:16), or to a Jewish high priest
as the oath in Matthew 26:63 shows. There are other places in Hebrews where the same
title is used (9:14; 10:31; 12:22). The words convey the idea of a dynamic God and are
particularly significant in any comments about men falling away from him (cf. especially
10:31).257

256. The Greek word for “falls away” is ἀποστῆναι, from which we get the English word “apostasy.”
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Guthrie points out that if this falling away has to do with a “return to Judaism,” as seems to
be the case in the book of Hebrews, then the reference to the “living God” is especially
significant. One must ask: “[In] what sense could this [return to Judaism] be described as a
falling away from the living God, since Jews did acknowledge God?” Guthrie’s conclusion is
that “the answer must be that ‘apostates’ in this sense would not find God in Judaism, having
turned their backs on the better way provided in Christ.”258 Also, the fact that the author is telling
the brethren to “encourage one another” (3:13; cf. 10:25) to avoid this rejection of God indicates
that he is addressing those who are within the community of Christians. It is, after all,
“impossible to exhort one another unless one is part of a fellowship. In the present case a
hardening of heart is linked closely with ‘sin’ and this must have been a tendency in the case of
the Hebrews who were tempted to turn away from Christianity.”259 Ultimately, in 3:14, the
author indicates that “we” (again, including himself) are only “partakers of Christ” if it is the
case that “we hold fast the beginning of our assurance firm until the end.”
In chapter six, the author of Hebrews speaks of “those who have once been enlightened and
have tasted of the heavenly gift and have been made partakers of the Holy Spirit, and have tasted
the good word of God and the powers of the age to come” (Heb 6:4-5). It is difficult to deny that
such a description refers to anyone other than saved believers in Christ. The author goes on to
say that if such persons later “[fall] away, it is impossible to renew them again to repentance,
since they again crucify to themselves the Son of God and put Him to open shame” (Heb 6:6).
There may be no passage in Scripture that stands against the doctrine of the perseverance of the
saints more forcefully than this one. This warning is first of all given to those who are
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“enlightened.” With regard to the phrase άπαξ φωτισθεντας (“who have once been enlightened”),
Scot McKnight notes that the “only other occurrence of the verb φωτίζω in Hebrews is in 10:32
where it apparently refers to conversion (‘remember the former days, the days after which you
had been enlightened’), as it regularly signifies conversion in early Christian literature.”260 Those
receiving the warning are also said to have “tasted of the heavenly gift and have been made
partakers of the Holy Spirit.” The concept of tasting the heavenly gift, as Donald Guthrie rightly
recognizes, “implies experience of it. This is an Old Testament usage (cf. Ps. 34:8). In the New
Testament 1 Peter 2:3 contains the same idea.”261 The fact that the gift is “heavenly” shows that
what is experienced is a gift from God that “is not one of human making.” Moreover, “the word
used here for ‘gift’ (dorea) is exclusively used of spiritual gifts in the New Testament.”262 For
example, it is the same word for “gift” (δωρεὰν) that Peter uses in his presentation of the gospel
at Pentacost when, in response to his audience asking him what they must do to be saved, Peter
tells them how to “receive the gift of the Holy Spirit” (Acts 2:38). Although some have
suggested that the “tasting” (γευσαμένους) of this heavenly gift may carry the idea of partially
tasting something to get a sense of it without fully eating (such that the author is describing those
who have merely been exposed to God’s truth but have not actually become Christians), there is
no basis for this. William Mounce points out that the word γευσαμένους literally refers to tasting
or eating, and the figurative sense of the word refers to “partaking of” something. He notes that

260. Scot McKnight, “The Warning Passages of Hebrews: A Formal Analysis and Theological Conclusions,”
Trinity Journal 13, no. 1 (March 1, 1992): 45-46. Support for McKnight’s claim that this term regularly has to do
with conversion in the early Christian literature can be found in: Harold W. Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews: A
Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1989), 169-70 (see especially note 43
on p. 169).
261. Guthrie, The Letter to the Hebrews, 141.
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this word is used figuratively (as it clearly is in Heb 6:4) in Hebrews 2:9 to refer to “Christ’s
tasting of death on the cross, through which he partook of death for everyone who believes in
him.” It also is used figuratively when Jesus “refers to the disciples’ not tasting death until they
see the kingdom of God (Mt. 16:28; Mk. 9:1; Lk. 9:27; Jn. 8:52).”263 Certainly, in these
figurative uses of the word, it does not imply a partial experience of anything. Jesus did not
receive a mere partial experience of death on the cross. So, why think that the figurative use of
this word in Hebrews 6:4 is any different than the way the author uses the word in 2:9? There is
nothing about the word itself that implies a partial experience as opposed to a full experience
when it is used figuratively in this way, and there seems to be nothing in the context that would
indicate anything less than a full experience. Scot McKnight is correct that “the degree is not the
issue” that is being communicated by the use of this term in this passage.264 In addition, being
“partakers of the Holy Spirit” clearly connects this gift with that given by the Spirit (much like
what Peter stated in Acts 2:38 referenced above). The subsequent statement that when such
people (i.e., those who have experienced the gift of the Spirit) fall away they “again crucify to
themselves the Son of God and put Him to open shame” makes it quite difficult to avoid the
conclusion that apostasy is in view. In this phrase “the compound verb used (anastaurountas)
shows that the writer is thinking of a repetition of the crucifixion. He could not have expressed
the seriousness of the apostasy in stronger or more tragic terms.” This is because those who fall
away from Christ are acting against Christ in a way that is on par with (if not worse than) His

263. William D. Mounce, Mounce’s Complete Expository Dictionary of Old and New Testament Words (Grand
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2006), 707. Mounce recognizes that the use of the word in 6:4-5 is controversial because of
the soteriological implications of this passage, but he clearly shows that there is nothing about this word that, when
used figuratively, has to carry the idea of a partial experience of something or a minimal partaking in something.
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crucifixion in terms of the contempt that is shown for Him.265 The fact that this crucifying makes
it “impossible to renew them again to repentance” further indicates the seriousness of what is
being discussed. This cannot be a description of the sort of temporary backsliding that James
5:19 seems to be describing. It is also significant that the author introduces this warning in
chapter six by saying “let us press on to maturity” (6:1), again including himself as one of those
who needs to persevere in the faith and continually grow in the faith.
In chapter ten there is yet another warning that seems to implore Christian believers not to
apostatize: “For if we go on sinning willfully after receiving the knowledge of the truth, there no
longer remains a sacrifice for sins, but a terrifying expectation of judgment and the fury of a fire
which will consume the adversaries” (Heb 10:26-29). The author emphasizes that he is here
describing a person who rejects Christ as Lord and Savior after having previously been sanctified
and that such a person brings guilt and punishment upon himself because he “has trampled
underfoot the Son of God, and has regarded as unclean the blood of the covenant by which he
was sanctified, and has insulted the Spirit of grace” (Heb 10:29). As noted already, the author’s
use of “we” (“if we go on sinning”) in 10:26 is connected with his use of “brethren” and “we” in
10:19. The author of Hebrews is including himself (one who is, of course, saved) within the
group to whom this warning is addressed. These brethren are to “hold fast the confession of our
hope without wavering” (10:23). Surely the fire (a common image used to describe the final state
of the lost) that will consume God’s adversaries in this warning (10:27) is a reference to God’s
final judgment of humanity. The author again uses phrases that emphasize the contempt that one
who abandons faith in Christ has for Christ and for the Spirit (“trampled under foot the Son of
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God” and “insulted the Spirit of grace”), and he stresses that it is a horrible thing for one who has
been “sanctified” through the “blood of the covenant” to then turn from the truth.
If it were literally impossible to abandon the faith, this prominent theme of warnings in the
book of Hebrews would seem to be unnecessary. The severity of these warnings and the strong
evidence that they are directed toward genuine Christians266 ought to at the very least give
serious pause to those who hold to the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints (where, once
again, that doctrine is understood to mean that a believer herself cannot reject her faith in Christ
and refuse salvation). Yet, beyond the warnings found in the book of Hebrews, there are other
indications in the New Testament that it is possible to apostatize.
The Apostle Paul seems to speak of—and warn against—apostasy on many occasions.267
Consider, for example, the following statement of Paul to the Colossians. Paul, speaking to
believers (those who were “formerly alienated and hostile in mind”), affirms that Christ has
“now reconciled you in His fleshly body through death, in order to present you before Him holy
and blameless and beyond reproach.” However, this reconciliation is conditional; it depends
upon a life lived in faith. Paul says that Christ has reconciled you “if indeed you continue in the
faith firmly established and steadfast, and not moved away from the hope of the gospel that you
have heard” (Col 1:21-23).

266. McKnight gives an excellent account of the way the author of Hebrews refers to his audience throughout
the book of Hebrews. See: McKnight, “The Warning Passages of Hebrews,” 43-44. He summarizes his findings on
p. 44, highlighting why the intended audience of the author’s warnings should be regarded as regenerate Christians:
“In summary, the author ascribes to the audience the fullness of early Christian experience: conversion (2:3-4; 6:4-5;
10:22, 32-34), gifts and manifestations of the Holy Spirit (2:3-4; 10:29), spiritual growth, and a Christian
commitment that included resistance under considerable pressure (10:32-34). In short, the author treats them as
‘believers’ (4:3) because he saw them as ‘holy brothers’ (3:1). Phenomenologically, the author believes them to be,
and presents them as, believers in the fullest sense possible. If these descriptions are accurate, and we believe they
are, these readers are most plausibly to be seen as regenerate.”
267. See, for example: Rom 11:17-24; 1 Cor 9:24-27; 15:1-2; Gal 5:4; Col 1:21-23; 1 Thes 3:5; 1 Tim 1:18-20;
2 Tim 2:17-18.

164

Paul even goes beyond mere warnings against apostasy and speaks directly of the fact that
some have actually departed from their faith.268 In his first letter to Timothy, Paul reminds
Timothy that “the goal of our instruction is love from a pure heart and a good conscience and a
sincere faith.” Yet, Paul makes it clear that there are some who do not share this goal. He notes
that “some men, straying from these things, have turned aside to fruitless discussion” and have
become false teachers (1 Tim 1:5-6). A few verses later he stresses to Timothy the importance of
“keeping faith and a good conscience, which some have rejected and suffered shipwreck in
regard to their faith” (1 Tim 1:19). Paul then identifies two people who have experienced this
shipwrecking of faith, saying, “Among these are Hymenaeus and Alexander, whom I have
handed over to Satan, so that they will be taught not to blaspheme” (1 Tim 1:20). Let us consider
this passage carefully to see why Paul seems to be speaking of apostates. Paul indicates that it is
the same sort of faith that Timothy has—and that Paul encourages Timothy to keep—that some
others (including Hymenaeus and Alexander) have possessed and thrown away.269 The use of the
word “shipwreck” (ἐναυάγησαν) reveals that what happened to their faith is a total catastrophe.
These people have rejected, or—more literally—thrust away (ἀπωσάμενοι), their faith so that it
is a total loss and has gone down in a wreck. Paul does not say that these people have merely
stopped professing their faith; rather, he indicates that “their faith” (as the NASB rightly
translates τὴν πίστιν) has been shipwrecked. Some have suggested that this phrase with the
article τὴν should be translated as “the faith” and should be taken to indicate a rejection of

268. The strong warnings in Scripture against apostasy serve as a powerful sign that apostasy is possible;
however, one may still argue that nobody actually does apostatize. One could argue that the warnings are part of the
means by which God keeps believers in Christ from apostatizing so that they persevere in their faith. But the first
chapter of 1 Timothy indicates otherwise. Here I will show that there is evidence that some actually do apostatize.
269. B. J. Oropeza, Jews, Gentiles, and the Opponents of Paul: Apostasy in the New Testament Communities
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Christian doctrine or the Christian gospel and not their own personal faith in Christ.270 But such
an interpretation is not warranted by the text. As B. J. Oropeza notes (in agreement with the
translation of the NASB above), “The definite article before ‘faith’ probably functions as a
pronoun of possession to indicate ‘their faith’ rather than ‘the faith.’”271 Since the concept of
being shipwrecked “often seems to convey utter ruin in ancient traditions” (the idea of a
“complete loss of the ship”), it seems that Paul “could hardly be talking about minor damage”
when he uses this word and thus “the term makes very little sense if attributed to the ruin of the
Christian faith.”272 Paul is surely not saying that the Christian faith itself is utterly destroyed;
instead, it is much more likely that the utter rejection of their own personal faith is in view. Paul
“handed over to Satan” Hymenaeus and Alexander, using the same phrase that he used to
describe his removal of a sinful man from the church in Corinth (1 Cor 5:5). Although the latter
was removed due to known sexual sin, the former were removed for blasphemy and rejecting
their faith. In any case, it is clear that Hymenaeus and Alexander were removed from the church
by Paul in the hopes that they would repent and cease their blasphemy.273
The Apostle Peter also appears to speak of those who commit apostasy when he says:
[If], after they have escaped the defilements of the world by the knowledge of the Lord and
Savior Jesus Christ, they are again entangled in them and are overcome, the last state has
become worse for them than the first. For it would be better for them not to have known the
way of righteousness, than having known it, to turn away from the holy commandment
handed on to them. It has happened to them according to the true proverb, ‘A dog returns to
its own vomit,’ and, ‘A sow, after washing, returns to wallowing in the mire’ (2 Pe 2:2022).
270. Judith M. Gundry Volf, “Apostasy, Falling Away, Perseverance,” in Dictionary of Paul and His Letters: A
Compendium of Contemporary Biblical Scholarship, ed. Gerald F. Hawthorne, Ralph P. Martin, and Daniel G. Reid
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993), 44.
271. Oropeza, Jews, Gentiles, and the Opponents of Paul, 2:267.
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273. For a discussion of this concept of Paul handing these two men over to Satan and a comparison with the
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Peter is speaking of those whose defilement has been cleaned by the blood of Jesus through
faith in Him (since such people have actually “escaped” this defilement by knowing Jesus) but
who then abandon the faith to return to a life that is devoted to sin and impurity. This is no mere
backsliding, since Peter can say of the person who escaped defilement and then returned to it that
“it would be better for them not to have known the way of righteousness” at all. A person who is
saved but backslidden is certainly better off than a person who has never known God. It seems
likely that in this passage Peter is speaking of those who are motivated to apostastize and
abandon Christian faith entirely.
From the sampling of passages cited above, it is clear that there is at least significant
biblical support for the idea that one can apostatize. Interestingly, despite his theory that all of
the lost are TD, Craig himself accepts that Scripture teaches the reality of apostasy. It is unclear
how Craig justifies accepting this position while at the same time putting forth his theodicy
against the PCL that appeals to the possibility that all of the lost are TD; nevertheless, it is quite
clear that Craig does not hesitate to affirm that there is “clear biblical teaching that the elect can
fall away and be lost.”274 Moreover, Craig does not presume to think that he himself is above the
possibility of abandoning his faith. He confesses:
One of my greatest concerns as a Christian is that I might somehow fall away from the
faith and so betray Christ. It would be the height of folly and presumption to think that this
could not happen. Think of what happened to Judas. It’s amazing that a man who was one
of the original twelve disciples, who had been for years in such close proximity to Jesus,
should in the end turn against him. Is it then any wonder that we can similarly fall away
and betray Christ? Paul speaks of several whom he knew who had left the faith (1 Tim
1:20; 2 Tim 2:17; 4:10). He warns, ‘Let anyone who thinks that he stands take heed lest he
fall’ (1 Cor 10.12 ESV). Paul included himself in that admonition, ‘lest after preaching to
others I myself should be disqualified’ (1 Cor 9.27 ESV). If someone of Paul’s spiritual
stature and commitment took seriously this danger, how much more should we? Paul urges
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us, ‘Examine yourselves, to see whether you are holding to your faith’ (2 Cor 13.5
RSV).275
While I applaud Craig for his humility and his recognition of what I also take to be biblical
teaching on this subject, the inconsistency of this position with his theodicy against the PCL that
all of the lost are TD is unavoidable for the reason that I explained at the beginning of this
section. If one can freely choose to walk away from saving faith, then such a person who
commits apostasy and is lost would have been saved in another world—a world that is clearly
actualizable. Had this person died after accepting God’s grace by faith but prior to apostatizing,
then he or she would have been saved. Thus, any person who commits apostasy is necessarily
contingently lost and not TD. Even if one is not fully convinced by the biblical case offered
above that one can apostatize, the fact that a strong case can be made for the reality of apostasy
(along with the strong evidence that Jesus indicates that some people are contingently lost in
Matthew 11:21-24) makes it attractive if one can offer a theodicy that does not depend upon the
claim that all of the lost are TD. Certainly, many Christians will find such a theodicy unhelpful.
As we conclude this section on apostasy, it is interesting to raise the following possibility
in passing. Given the biblical evidence that apostasy is possible in the actual world and the
likelihood (in view of God’s omnibenevolence and universal salvific will) that God would want
to actualize a world that is soteriologically optimal, the following question arises: Might it
possibly be the case that God could only achieve the most optimal balance of saved versus lost
(one key point in Craig’s theodicy) by not providentially arranging the world such that all who
are lost are TD (i.e., by not carrying out another key point in Craig’s theodicy)? It is interesting
that the two may actually be in conflict with each other such that it is only in a world in which
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certain people apostatize (and thus are contingently lost) that the best balance of saved versus
lost is achieved. While it is conceivable that in many ways some TD individual that God could
have created may be able to play the same role in the world as some contingently lost individual
(i.e., they may freely make the same choices in a wide range of circumstances), there is at least
one thing that a TD individual would never do: apostatize. If it happens to be true that it is only
in a world in which certain people apostatize that the optimal balance of saved versus lost can be
achieved, then Craig’s proposal that God optimizes the soteriological balance would conflict
with his proposal that all of the lost are TD. While it is impossible to know this for sure (since it
depends on the truth values of CCFs to which we do not have access), it is interesting that
Craig’s two key proposals possibly cannot both be achieved by God. If it is the case that they are
incompatible, then it would not be surprising if God would choose to create a world in which
there is an optimal soteriological balance and forego ensuring that all who are lost are TD.
Craig’s Appeal to Inclusivism
We have now examined two biblical reasons why it is desirable to formulate a theodicy
against the PCL that does not require Craig’s appeal to the possibility that all of the lost may be
TD. Let us now address in brief another aspect of his theodicy that does not rest comfortably
with biblical teaching: his appeal to inclusivism to justify that all people at least have the
opportunity to be saved. If inclusivism were true, then every individual—even those who are
unevangelized—is given revelation to which he or she could respond and be saved.
I have already made the case in the first chapter that there is strong biblical support for
exclusivism and that it is therefore valuable for a soteriological theodicy not to make any appeal
to inclusivism in order to justify that all people have an opportunity to be saved. While it was not
necessary for my purposes to engage in a critique of all the various arguments for inclusivism, I
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did make the case that—in view of the many biblical passages that underscore the elevated place
of responding to the gospel in the New Testament teaching concerning soteriology and the fact
that there seems to be no clear teaching in Scripture that one who lives in the New Testament era
can be saved without hearing and accepting the gospel—one at least ought to find it preferable to
avoid relying upon inclusivism in one’s theodicy. I also offered in the first chapter a way of
showing how exclusivism can be true and yet all people can have an opportunity to be saved, and
I noted that I will offer an even more nuanced exclusivist justification that all people have an
opportunity to be saved when I unpack my own theodicy. Nevertheless, since one aspect of
Craig’s theodicy appeals to inclusivism and since Craig holds that a particular passage of
Scripture teaches inclusivism, I will in this section go a bit further and at least offer a brief
response to this specific claim of Craig so as to support my position that inclusivism is not taught
in any clear way in Scripture and that it is better if a theodicy does not need to rely on the truth of
inclusivism.
Craig holds that Scripture teaches inclusivism in Romans 2:7. He contends:
[According] to the Bible, God doesn’t judge people who have never heard of Christ on the
basis of whether they’ve placed their faith in Christ. Rather God judges them on the basis
of the light of God’s general revelation in nature and conscience that they do have. The
offer of Romans 2:7—‘To those who by patiently doing good seek for glory and honor and
immortality, he will give eternal life’—is a bona fide offer of salvation. Someone who
senses his need of forgiveness through his guilty conscience and flings himself upon the
mercy of the God revealed in nature may find salvation. This is not to say that people can
be saved apart from Christ. Rather it’s to say that the benefits of Christ’s atoning death can
be applied to people without their conscious knowledge of Christ.276
So Craig interprets Romans 2:7 (without, so far as I can see, offering any detailed
exegetical argument in support of his interpretation of this passage in any of his writings) to be
teaching that any person—even one who has never heard of Christ—may be saved if one senses
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one’s own moral guilt and seeks forgiveness from the God revealed in nature. This passage in
Romans appears to be the only place in Scripture that Craig cites as teaching inclusivism.
In examining this biblical passage carefully within its context, however, it is not at all
plausible that it supports the truth of inclusivism. Indeed, it appears to have nothing to do with
God’s offer of grace through any kind of faith—and certainly not an implicit faith that involves
sensing in one’s conscience one’s need for forgiveness from the God revealed in nature. To the
contrary, in the second chapter of Romans Paul seems to be talking about “the conditions that
prevail within the sphere or system of law, or about how a person is judged for either
justification or condemnation under the provisions of God’s law.”277 Paul’s discussion of these
conditions builds up to his point that nobody is saved by persisting in obeying the law and that
this reveals the need for all people to be saved through faith in Christ.
To understand this, let us examine Paul’s thought in the second chapter of Romans and see
how his thought flows into the third chapter of Romans. In 2:1-5, Paul stresses that all people—
which, of course, includes both Jews and Gentiles—fall under God’s judgment for failing to live
a perfectly righteous life. In 2:6-11 (the key passage that Craig cites), Paul’s point is that Jews
and Gentiles are both going to be judged by God impartially. There will be no favoritism shown
to the Jews, and God will apply the same standard of the law to all people when judging them.
Paul seems to be describing the way God’s judgment of people is carried out under the law and
apart from God’s grace. Under the law, the same conditions apply to all people: those who
perfectly keep the law and persevere in doing only what is good will receive eternal life, and
those who fail to persist in keeping the law perfectly will be punished by God. (Since nobody can
perfectly keep the law, we will see that Paul is setting up his audience for the key point that
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God’s grace is necessary because—when judged by the standards of the law—we all fall short.)
In 2:12-16, Paul stresses that, under God’s judgment of humanity according to the law, everyone
has knowledge of the law (i.e., we all at least have the law that is written on our hearts), but it is
obeying the law that matters and not merely possessing it. In 2:17-29, Paul warns the Jews not to
put confidence in having the law or in their circumcision because they all break the law in one
way or another and because, when they are judged by the law, circumcision will count for
nothing. In 3:1-20 Paul emphasizes that God is right in judging all people by the law and that all
people are under sin and break the law. Nobody will be saved by persevering in doing good
works. Then Paul follows up this distressing news with the incredible news that “now apart from
the Law the righteousness of God has been manifested” (3:21) and is found in God’s grace
through Christ.278
Douglas Moo is correct that in 2:6-11 Paul “simply sets forth the criterion of salvation
apart from gospel without implying that anyone meets that criterion.” Paul is not yet discussing
salvation under God’s grace by faith; rather he is explaining “the standard by which God judges
all human beings [under the law]. That standard is works (v. 6).” According to the law (and apart
from God’s grace in Christ), Paul says in 2:6 that God will Ἀποδώσει (render what is due) to all
people. If one does evil, one is punished; if one persists in doing good, then one will be granted
eternal life. It is crucial to see that “it is the criterion of judgment, not the people who meet that
criterion, that Paul has in mind. We must remember that Paul is building a case.”279 That case
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builds up to the declaration that nobody meets the requirements of the law that he is describing
and nobody accesses salvation by persisting in doing good (Rom 3:20, 23).
So, with the context of Paul’s flow of thought in mind, we ought not think that Romans 2:7
is intended to be, as Craig describes it, “a bona fide offer of salvation” to “someone who senses
his need of forgiveness through his guilty conscience and flings himself upon the mercy of the
God revealed in nature.”280 God’s grace and forgiveness are not in view until Paul gets to 3:2131. The passage in 2:6-11 is instead an explanation of the way God judges all of humanity
according to the criterion of the law. Ultimately, as I have noted in the first chapter, responding
in faith to the gospel is central in Paul’s letter to the Romans. The “word of faith” (Rom 10:8)
Paul has been preaching is that “if you confess with your mouth Jesus as Lord, and believe in
your heart that God raised Him from the dead, you will be saved; for with the heart a person
believes, resulting in righteousness, and with the mouth he confesses, resulting in salvation”
(Rom 10:9-10). It seems that one needs to hear the gospel in order to believe and confess and
accept God’s salvation (Rom 10:14-15). For “faith comes from hearing, and hearing by the word
of Christ” (Rom 10: 17).
The Theodicy of Kirk MacGregor
Recently Kirk MacGregor has proposed a modification to Craig’s theodicy that, like
Craig’s view, fits within the third category of Molinist theodicies (i.e., it involves God creating
an optimal soteriological balance in a world of people who freely choose either to be saved or
lost). MacGregor’s aim is to merge Molina’s soteriological view with Craig’s theodicy. Recall
that at the beginning of this chapter we explored Molina’s soteriological position and saw that
Molina’s interpretation of Romans 9 led him to hold that God unconditionally elects individuals
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to salvation. Molina affirmed that God is sovereign over which individuals are saved and lost and
that no quality of any individual ensures that God will save or damn that individual. Molina
thought that rejecting this doctrine would detract from God’s sovereignty. He insisted that God
offers sufficient prevenient grace so that all people are able to choose to accept or reject it and
that God uses middle knowledge to uphold human libertarian freedom while achieving
unconditional election of individuals. He speculated that every human that God might create
would freely choose to be saved in some world that God could actualize and would also freely
choose to be lost in some world that God could actualize. Moreover, every human that God
might create would also not exist in some world of free creatures that God could actualize. Thus,
God did not have to save any particular person who is saved in the actual world or damn any
particular person who is lost in the actual world. The existence and the eternal destiny of every
person is entirely up to God. This would mean that everyone who is saved is contingently saved,
and (contra Craig’s proposal that nobody is contingently lost) everyone who is lost is
contingently lost. For this reason (and also because Molina held that Jesus is literally expressing
middle knowledge about the wicked cities in Mt 11:20-24), MacGregor correctly points out that
“Molina would have regarded as false and unbiblical the doctrine of transworld damnation,
formulated by leading contemporary Molinist William Lane Craig.”281
Even though Molina rejected the idea that anybody is TD, MacGregor points out that
Molina would agree with the other two components of Craig’s theodicy. Just like Craig, Molina
held to inclusivism on the basis of Romans 2:7.282 Moreover, while Molina never explicitly says
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this, MacGregor suspects that Molina would agree with Craig that God would likely use His
middle knowledge to optimize the balance of saved and lost.283 So MacGregor sets about the task
of showing how Molina’s affirmation of unconditional election (and rejection of the idea that
anyone is TD) can fit with the other two components of Craig’s theodicy (inclusivism and God
optimizing the soteriological balance). MacGregor wants to offer a new approach to the problem
of the unevangelized that upholds unconditional election and does not need to rely upon anyone
being TD.
Now it should be noted from the outset that MacGregor’s proposed theodicy—even if it
were successful—would only address the problem of the unevangelized (PU) and not the
problem of the contingently lost (PCL). The PU is merely one aspect of the PCL. The PU is the
objection that some people who remain unevangelized throughout their lives and are lost would
have been saved in a feasible world in which they had heard the gospel. The PCL recognizes that
there are other sorts of contingently lost people who (even though they may have heard the
gospel at least once in their lives) were in life circumstances that made it difficult to accept the
gospel and who would have been saved if only their circumstances were better—perhaps even
just marginally better. We have seen that Craig’s theodicy, if it were successful, would resolve
the PCL because nobody would be contingently lost. MacGregor—whether or not he realizes
that Craig’s theodicy addresses the PCL and not merely the PU—only aims to resolve the PU
with his theodicy.
In order to accomplish the merging of Craig’s theodicy (or at least Craig’s components of
inclusivism and divine optimization of the soteriological balance) with Molina’s rejection of TD
and affirmation that all people would have a predestinary status in another feasible world that is
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the opposite of the one that they actually have, MacGregor proposes the following. At the logical
moment in which God decides which of the infinite feasible worlds to actualize, God eliminates
from consideration all feasible worlds in which there is not an optimal soteriological balance. Let
us call the remaining feasible worlds, which MacGregor suggests might possibly still be infinite
in number, the range of optimal worlds (ROOW). God will only consider actualizing a world that
is within ROOW. MacGregor then proposes the possibility that, for every person P within
ROOW, there may be “at least one world [in ROOW] where P is freely saved, at least one world
[in ROOW] where P is freely lost, and at least one world [in ROOW] where P does not exist.”284
MacGregor recognizes that it is likely the case that within ROOW there are worlds in which
some unevangelized people who are lost would be evangelized and saved in some other feasible
world.285 In order to eliminate such worlds and resolve the PU without anyone being TD and
without undermining unconditional election, MacGregor proposes that God reduces ROOW to
an even more narrow range of optimal worlds (NROOW). As was the case with the ROOW, in
order to uphold unconditional election and ensure that God is sovereign over the choice of
whether any P is saved, lost, or nonexistent, MacGregor proposes that there are an infinite
number of worlds in NROOW286 and that every P who exists in NROOW must: exist in at least
one world in NROOW in which P is freely saved; exist in at least one world in NROOW in
which P is freely lost; and not exist in at least one world in NROOW. Then, in order to resolve

284. MacGregor, “Harmonizing Molina’s Rejection,” 348-349. I have added “in ROOW” since MacGregor
makes clear that this is what he is thinking. He makes this clear on p. 349 where he notes that “it certainly seems
logically possible that there is an infinite spectrum of salvifically optimal worlds and that the spectrum contains at
least the three relevant worlds.” His reference here to “the spectrum” is what I am calling ROOW.
285. Ibid., 349.
286. Ibid., 348. See footnote 3. MacGregor holds the controversial position that an actually infinite number of
things is possible. He then points out that a subset of an infinite set of things can still be infinite (e.g., the set of
positive integers is infinite just as the set of all integers is infinite).
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the PU, MacGregor suggests that every P in NROOW must be one of only two types. The first
type (Type I) of P is “saved in at least one [feasible] world where P receives only general
revelation at the moment of salvation (although P could receive special revelation at some point
thereafter) and is lost in every [feasible] world where P receives special revelation without first
appropriating salvation through general revelation.”287 So God could save a P of Type I via P’s
free response to general revelation in at least one feasible world, but God could not bring it about
that such a P is saved in any feasible world via a free response to the gospel. A P of Type I will
only accept the gospel if he or she was already saved via a free response to general revelation.
No P of Type I is TD because there is at least one feasible world in which such a P is saved (a
feasible world in which P responds appropriately to general revelation), but no P of Type I who
remains unevangelized throughout life and is lost would have responded to the gospel if he or
she had heard it. The second type (Type II) of P is never “lost when receiving only general
revelation” in any world in NROOW (i.e., such a person will always be saved in any world in
NROOW in which he or she remains unevangelized throughout life) and also is “saved in at least
one [feasible] world where P receives special revelation without first appropriating salvation
through general revelation and is lost in at least one [feasible] world where P receives special
revelation without first appropriating salvation through general revelation.”288 So God could save
a P of Type II in some feasible world via a free response to the gospel, but in at least one other
feasible world this person would freely reject the gospel (and general revelation) and be lost;
however, in order to resolve the PU a P of Type II must never be lost in any world in NROOW in
which he or she remains unevangelized throughout life—for that would mean that God could

287. MacGregor, “Harmonizing Molina’s Rejection,” 349.
288. Ibid., 349.
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actualize a world in which this unevangelized person would be lost due to historical and
geographical circumstances (since a P of Type II would respond to special revelation in some
feasible world). The purpose of creating Type II individuals is so that God ensures that nobody
who would respond to the gospel and be saved can take credit for their salvation because “God
could have just as easily created them in a different [feasible] world where they heard the gospel
and yet freely chose to reject it.”289
MacGregor thinks his proposal is at least possibly true, and he emphasizes the theological
and theodical value that it offers. The world would be as soteriologically optimal as any feasible
world of free creatures. Humans would have libertarian freedom—even with regard to the most
crucial choice of accepting or rejecting the free gift of salvation that is offered in Christ. He
thinks that unconditional election would be true in the sense that everyone in NROOW has the
possibility of being saved or lost or nonexistent—it all depends upon which world in NROOW
that God sovereignly chooses to actualize (and all worlds in NROOW are soteriologically
comparable). In addition, every person would have an opportunity to be saved in virtue of the
truth of inclusivism. The PU would also be resolved because anyone who is unevangelized and
lost in the actual world would have rejected special revelation in any feasible world in which he
or she receives it; moreover, nobody who is freely saved via accepting the gospel is saved merely
because God allowed that person to hear the gospel (since any such person would also be freely
lost in at least one world in which he or she is evangelized). Finally, all of this is accomplished
without anyone being TD—an attractive feature given the theological difficulties with TD that I
have already identified.

289. MacGregor, “Harmonizing Molina’s Rejection,” 350.
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Difficulties with MacGregor’s Theodicy
Although MacGregor’s theodicy is clever and has a number of attractive features, it
nevertheless suffers from both theological and philosophical problems. Let us begin with the
theological challenges that it faces. One key difficulty is his heavy reliance upon the truth of
inclusivism. It is crucial to his theodicy that one can be saved—even in the New Testament era—
by responding to general revelation apart from special revelation, and he appeals in his argument
(in agreement with both Craig and Molina) to Romans 2:7 to justify this position biblically. In
light of the argument that I have already given for rejecting this interpretation of Romans 2:7 and
the biblical case that I have offered in favor of exclusivism, this feature of MacGregor’s theodicy
alone is problematic. Anyone who regards inclusivism as unbiblical will immediately find his
proposal unhelpful as a Christian theodicy. Even if one does not consider inclusivism to be
decisively unbiblical, it is preferable if one can put forth a theodicy that does not depend upon
such a controversial doctrine.
Even if inclusivism were true, a second theological problem is that it seems to be contrary
to Scripture that anyone would be Type I or Type II. A person who is Type I would freely reject
all special revelation—including, of course, the gospel itself—and be lost in every feasible world
in which he or she receives special revelation without first being saved via a response to general
revelation. Nevertheless, someone who is Type I would freely respond to general revelation and
be saved apart from (or at least prior to) hearing the gospel in at least one feasible world.
Scripture teaches that the gospel is the power of God for our salvation (Rom 1:16). Is it
acceptable to think that a person who would always freely reject the gospel (along with general
revelation) in any world in which the person hears the gospel and has not yet been saved via a
response to general revelation would freely come to saving faith in some world via general
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revelation alone? Such a proposal seems to entail that the gospel and general revelation together
are actually less effective in drawing some people to saving faith in Christ than general
revelation alone. In view of a passage like Romans 1:16, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that
this is an unacceptably low view of the power of God to utilize the gospel in drawing people to
himself. Likewise, a person who is Type II will always be saved via a response to general
revelation in any feasible world in which he or she never receives special revelation, yet such a
person is lost in some world in which he or she receives special revelation. This again implies
that the Holy Spirit is less effective in drawing a person to Christ with the gospel than apart from
the gospel. Adopting inclusivism and allowing that one can be saved apart from hearing the
gospel is problematic enough, but it is even more troublesome to suggest that general revelation
by itself may be more effective than the gospel in drawing people to saving faith.
Another theological point that should be made (though I do not consider this a problem
because I do not hold that Scripture teaches unconditional election) is that it is dubious that
genuine unconditional election is upheld by MacGregor’s proposal. As soon as MacGregor
allows that humans have libertarian freedom with regard to accepting or rejecting the gospel, the
possibility of unconditional election seems to be undermined. Imagine for example, that a man
named Bob is Type I and exists in the actual world and is saved. Had Bob not been Type I or
Type II, then on MacGregor’s theodicy God would not have actualized Bob and would not have
actualized this world that includes Bob. Bob would have no chance at existing or being saved.
The CCFs that are true about Bob are a necessary condition for Bob existing (and one must exist
in order to be saved). Even if we grant that God could have actualized a feasible world (with just
as good of a soteriological balance as the actual world) in which Bob was lost and one in which
Bob does not exist, the fact that Bob exists and is saved in the actual world does partially have to
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do with some characteristic about himself. He is saved both because of God’s decision to create a
world in which Bob exists and freely chooses to be saved and also because of the sort of free
choices that Bob would make in various worlds. The latter depends upon Bob, so he is not
unconditionally elected to salvation.
In terms of philosophical difficulties, there is one290 problem that is especially significant:
the fact that MacGregor’s theodicy (if true) would at most only handle the PU and not the PCL.
Craig’s theodicy aims to resolve the PCL, but MacGregor’s theodicy still leaves room for
troubling aspects of the PCL. The PU is just one part of the broader PCL, as some contingently
lost people may be evangelized and yet face horrible circumstances for accepting the gospel.
MacGregor’s theodicy (even if one brushes aside its theological difficulties) leaves open the
unsavory possibility that someone could be lost in the actual world who would have been saved
in some other soteriologically optimal world if only God would have put that person into just
slightly different circumstances. Imagine the case of an inner-city teen who has an incredibly
rough life and is raised by abusive parents who are hostile to religion. This teen is presented with
the gospel once in her life, but she does not accept it. She is then killed at the age of sixteen in an
act of random gang violence. Imagine further that, had God allowed this teen to live just one

290. A philosophical challenge to MacGregor’s theodicy that I will not address in detail and will merely note
here is that MacGregor assumes the controversial position that there can be an actually infinite number of worlds
that God knows. MacGregor discusses this at: MacGregor, “Harmonizing Molina’s Rejection,” 348. See especially
footnote 3 on this page where MacGregor says that “actually infinite sets of worlds can exist in the mind of an
omniscient being and that it is possible for such a being to know an actually infinite number of things.” It seems to
me, however, that this controversial assumption that an actually infinite number of things is possible (even in the
mind of God) may not be crucial to MacGregor’s argument. Perhaps he could make the same case even if the
number of feasible worlds that God knows is an extremely large finite number and is not infinite. Then again,
perhaps not. Perhaps if there are a finite number of feasible worlds to begin with and then this group of feasible
worlds is reduced to ROOW and then further reduced to those in NROOW, then the number of worlds in NROOW
may be too small to accomplish what MacGregor wants to accomplish in NROOW. Ultimately, however, since we
do not know the number of worlds in NROOW, it may be that there is still an extremely large finite number of
worlds in NROOW—perhaps enough that what MacGregor proposes is at least possible (which is all that his
argument requires).
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more day and had God placed the teen into a circumstance the day after she actually died in
which someone witnesses to her in a way that helps her see the gospel in a new way (assume that
this circumstance was feasible for God to bring about in a world that is still soteriologically
optimal), then the teen would have freely accepted the gospel and been saved.291 There is nothing
in MacGregor’s theodicy that prevents the possibility of such a thing from happening. Indeed,
the teen described above would fit into MacGregor’s Type II because she heard the gospel and
was lost in the actual world but would have responded to the gospel and been saved in another
feasible (and, in this case, soteriologically optimal) world. MacGregor’s proposal allows that a
person could slip through the soteriological cracks; that is, a (barely) evangelized person could
be lost who would have responded to the gospel without undue pressure or coercion in another
feasible world. It would seem that God would want to eliminate such cases—especially if He
could do so without harming the soteriological balance. It is hard to see how it would be any less
problematic for an omnibenevolent God to allow cases such as the one above than to allow cases
in which a person is unevangelized and lost but would have been saved in another feasible world
in which he or she hears the gospel. MacGregor’s theodicy rules out the latter but not the former.
What if, however, there is a feasible world that is as soteriologically optimal as any other, but
nobody in that world slips through the cracks like the (barely) evangelized inner city teen?
Would it not be attractive to offer a theodicy in which nobody narrowly misses out on salvation
due to such unfortunate circumstances? Is it not the case that allowing a person to be
contingently lost in this sort of way is as much of a challenge to the omnibenevolence of God as

291. I credit David Baggett with raising this sort of scenario to me and stressing the importance of my own
theodicy handling such troubling cases. Jerry Walls expresses his own concern about the difficult nature of similar
sorts of cases at: Walls, Hell, 86. We will see that my theodicy does handle such cases even though it allows that
some people are contingently lost (in ways that do not call God’s omnibenevolence into question). Craig’s theodicy
(setting aside its theological difficulties) would also handle such cases because it ensures that nobody at all is
contingently lost. MacGregor’s theodicy, however, does not handle such cases.
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allowing an unevangelized person to be lost who would have been saved if only she had heard
the gospel? Surely it would be an advantage to offer a theodicy that shows how it is possible that
nobody is contingently lost in these troubling ways (although a good theodicy could still allow
that some may be contingently lost in ways that do not count against God’s omnibenevolence).
Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter, that is exactly what I aim to do.
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CHAPTER 4
A NEW MOLINIST THEODICY AGAINST THE PROBLEM OF THE CONTINGENTLY
LOST
We have now examined and critiqued Craig’s Molinist theodicy against the PCL as well as
several other Molinist proposals that attempt to undermine the PCL (or at least the PU). All of
these proposals have insights as well as various drawbacks. It is now time to propose my own
theodicy for dealing with the PCL. It is important at this juncture to emphasize once again that
the PCL is a theological and philosophical challenge for which the Bible does not provide a
specific solution. Consequently, the theodicy offered here is humbly put forth merely as one that
I consider to be philosophically plausible and biblically faithful. While I find it to be consistent
with Scripture, it certainly is not an explicit teaching of Scripture.
Recall once again the nature of the PCL as laid out in the first chapter. The PCL seeks to
demonstrate that P1 and P2 are inconsistent by adding P8 and P9. These premises are as follows:
P1. God possesses the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence.
P2. Some persons do not accept the forgiveness that is available via receiving Christ and are
thus damned.
P8. God will necessarily not allow persons to exist who are lost in their actual
circumstances but who would have been saved if placed into different circumstances.
P9. Some persons who freely reject the grace that God offers them in their actual
circumstances and are lost would have freely accepted God’s grace and been saved in
different circumstances.292

We examined in the first chapter how the defender of the PCL contends that the truth of P8
and P9 brings out an implicit contradiction between P1 and P2 such that God’s attributes are

292. Refer to Table 1.1 on p. 62 for a summary of all of the premises that were introduced in the first chapter
when I examined various key arguments that are part of the soteriological problem of evil.
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incompatible with the purported reality that some of the lost are contingently lost.293 So, refuting
the PCL requires one to show that P8 or P9 (or both) should be rejected. One must show that at
least one of these two premises is neither necessarily true nor required by Christian doctrine.
Although Craig’s theodicy aims to show that P9 is not necessarily true, I have made the
case that this premise ought to be accepted on the basis of certain biblical teachings. The
theodicy that I will flesh out and defend in this chapter will allow that some people are
contingently lost (thus accepting the truth of P9). I will instead attack P8 by contending that there
are (for all we know) only two types of contingently lost persons that God permits and that both
of these are types that God would plausibly allow because neither type conflicts with His
omnibenevolence or with any other divine attribute.
My theodicy may be summarized as follows. God has sovereignly arranged the world in
such a way that nobody is lost due to lack of information (e.g., not hearing the gospel) or due to
the sin and corrupting influences of those around them (i.e., being in the wrong circumstances to
accept the gospel when they hear it). It is possible that every lost person is lost as a consequence
of his or her own sin and not epistemological or circumstantial limitations, and my theodicy aims
to show how this may be the case even if one must hear the gospel and respond to it in this life to
be saved (i.e., even if Christian exclusivism is true). As far as we know from Scripture
(especially considering the statements of Jesus concerning the wicked cities in Matthew 11 and
the many biblical warnings throughout Scripture against apostasy), it seems that we only need to
make room for two types of contingently lost people. I will propose that God has used his middle

293. As noted in the first chapter, the PCL does not call into question God’s justice, as justice does not demand
that God save anybody. God’s decision to forgive any of us through Christ’s sacrifice is more than anyone deserves
and more than justice demands. The focus of the PCL is instead on God’s omnibenevolence (as well as His
omnipotence and omniscience). The idea is that God would not be maximally loving if He allowed people to be lost
when He was capable of putting them into circumstances in which they would be saved. We saw in the first chapter
that the PCL alleges that P8 follows from P1, and P9 is plausibly unavoidable given P2.
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knowledge to arrange the world so that there are only the following two types of contingently
lost people. The first type is one who would not accept the gospel under any sufficiently nonpressured circumstances but would accept it if given revelation that would be unacceptably overt
in terms of the sort of impact that it would have on that person. In order for such a person to
repent and accept God’s grace, he or she would have to be given revelation that is so overt that it
places excessive pressure on him or her to turn away from sin and towards God. I propose that
the Sodomites who would have repented if they had seen Jesus’ miracles fall under this first
type. The second type of contingently lost person is anyone who willfully rejects God’s grace
after previously accepting it (i.e., one who apostatizes). My suggestion is that these are the only
two types of contingently lost persons, and I will argue that in neither of these cases should
God’s omnibenevolence or other divine attributes be called into question.294 I will also suggest
that God is so good that He uses His middle knowledge to optimize the balance of saved versus
lost—but this soteriological balance is optimized only within the bounds of (at least) two key
parameters that I will contend are important to God. Although upholding these parameters—
which include God’s (relative) hiddenness and His allowing Satan to tempt us—may result in a
less optimal balance of saved versus lost over the course of human history than might otherwise
be achieved if God did not uphold these parameters, I will argue that the soteriological balance

294. Although Scripture does not require me to make room for a third type of contingently lost person and a
God who possesses middle knowledge could certainly ensure that the above two types of contingently lost persons
are the only two types of contingently lost persons, it is worth mentioning that there is a third sort of contingently
lost person that we could probably allow without it being any threat to God’s attributes. This third type of
contingently lost person is one who is thoroughly evangelized and has all sorts of opportunities to accept the gospel
in the actual world but continually rejects it, yet this person would have accepted the gospel in some feasible world.
It is hard to see how it would be a strike against God’s goodness or love to allow such a person to be lost in the
actual world. The most important thing in a theodicy against the PCL is to show how it may be the case that no lost
person who is put into disadvantageous circumstances would have freely chosen to be saved if only he or she were
given better (but non-coercive) circumstances. The key thing is to ensure that nobody “slips through the
soteriological cracks” like the inner-city teen mentioned earlier or like an unevangelized person who would have
immediately accepted the gospel if a missionary had delivered the gospel to her village. So, although nothing that I
see in Scripture requires one to do so, one could probably add to my theodicy that God may also allow this third type
of contingently lost person.
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may well be as optimal as it can be given the two parameters and that these two parameters are
consistent with God’s perfect goodness and love. They are consistent with God’s goodness and
love because they ensure an environment that allows humans to make a morally significant
choice to love God, and this is a great good.
A key feature of my theodicy is its utilization of a slightly modified version of Reformed
epistemology to propose a process by which the Holy Spirit might break down a person’s sinful
resistance to accepting the gospel. This process, which also draws upon God’s middle
knowledge, is put forth as a plausible and biblically-consistent way of showing how God might
go about ensuring that: all people who would accept the gospel without undue pressure will
come to accept it; nobody is lost due to lack of information or the sin of others; and everyone has
an opportunity to be saved even given the truth of exclusivism. Let us, therefore, begin by
introducing Reformed epistemology and the two modifications to it that I will propose. After
that, I will be in position to unpack my theodicy in more detail and defend it.
A Modification to Reformed Epistemology
Alvin Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology plays an important role in my theodicy. A
slightly modified, or qualified, version of this epistemology will provide a structure for how my
theodicy achieves key objectives while accounting for the role of sin, propositional evidence,
God’s providential direction of our lives, and God’s design of our cognitive faculties in our
coming to faith. Plantinga, along with Nicholas Wolterstorff, began formulating and defending
Reformed epistemology in the early 1980s. Plantinga most fully explicates and defends his
epistemology in his 2000 book Warranted Christian Belief. His aim is to show that both theistic
belief and Christian belief are warranted and that this warrant does not depend upon
propositional evidence. Warrant is what sets genuine knowledge apart from mere true belief.
187

Plantinga holds that a belief has warrant if four key criteria are met. First, one’s cognitive
faculties must be working properly in the way that they are designed to work (i.e., one’s faculties
must not be experiencing any dysfunction in producing the belief in question). Second, when
producing the belief in question one’s cognitive faculties must be operating within the sort of
environment in which they are designed to work properly. Third, one’s cognitive faculties must
be aimed at producing true beliefs (rather than being aimed at some other purpose, such as
merely aiding in survival) as one arrives at this belief. Fourth and finally, the design plan for
one’s cognitive faculties must be such that the cognitive faculties are designed to produce true
beliefs.295
Plantinga first lays out his model for warranted theistic belief before extending his model to
address warranted Christian belief. In agreement with John Calvin, Thomas Aquinas, and
Plantinga’s interpretation of Romans 1:18-20, Plantinga holds that we all have a sensus
divinitatis (i.e., a sense of God).296 Plantinga understands the sensus divinitatis to be a cognitive
faculty297 by which we know in a properly basic way certain truths about God (including the

295. Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 155-156.
296. Ibid., 170-171.
297. Ibid., 170-174. Plantinga says that the sensus divinitatis is “a disposition or set of dispositions to form
theistic beliefs in various circumstances, in response to the sorts of conditions or stimuli that trigger the working of
this sense of divinity” (p. 173). He then explores the sort of experiences of general revelation that may naturally
trigger in us the formation of belief in God (pp. 173-174). William Lane Craig, although a proponent of Reformed
epistemology, rejects the idea that humans have a cognitive faculty that recognizes the truth of theism apart from the
testimony of the Holy Spirit. See: William Lane Craig, “A Classical Apologist’s Response,” in Five Views on
Apologetics, ed. Steven B. Cowan (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), 285-287. Craig finds no biblical
justification that theistic belief is grounded in “a natural instinct or inborn awareness of the human mind rather than
in the witness of the Holy Spirit.” He does, however, find “wide biblical support” for there being an inner witness of
the Spirit (p. 285). Plantinga does appeal to the testimony of the Holy Spirit when he extends his model to argue that
Christian belief (and not just theistic belief) is properly basic, but Craig thinks Plantinga should bring the testimony
of the Holy Spirit into the picture when it comes to theistic belief as well. For further discussion of this, see also:
Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 153-154. Craig is correct that Scripture does not make it clear that
God has given humans an innate cognitive faculty that recognizes the existence of God apart from the testimony of
the Holy Spirit. Our cognitive faculties may be designed to work in conjunction with the testimony of the Spirit to
recognize in a properly basic way that God exists (i.e., we may not have a cognitive faculty that would recognize the
truth of theism apart from the testimony of the Spirit). In any case, what is crucial to Reformed epistemology on this
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existence of God) so long as this faculty is not damaged or blocked by sin. A properly basic
belief is one that is foundational and that we rightly hold in a natural and immediate way rather
than by inferring it on the basis of other beliefs. For example, we rightly believe that the external
world exists even though we cannot know this via inference; unless there is a defeater for
thinking the external world exists, we seem to be justified in believing this in a natural and
immediate way. It is a basic belief that is not inferred, and it seems proper to hold it. Theistic
belief, Plantinga contends, is properly basic with respect to both justification (i.e., one does not
fail in any epistemic responsibilities in holding this belief) and warrant (i.e., we can know it).
This is because if God exists, then God plausibly designed our cognitive faculties to work
properly and to arrive at true beliefs concerning the existence of God in the environment in
which God has placed us. If this is the case, then we will naturally come to know that God exists
in a properly basic way when our cognitive faculties are working properly and are not impeded
by sin. Sin, Plantinga contends, is the only reason why anyone does not naturally believe in
God.298 So if God exists, then the four criteria for knowledge are met and theistic belief seems
warranted. Moreover, Plantinga’s model agrees with the biblical teaching that sin can blind us to
the things of God and that there is no excuse for atheism (e.g., Rom 1:18-20; Ps 14:1).
Plantinga thus argues that the ontological issue of whether or not God exists is the
determining factor in whether or not theistic belief is warranted. Plantinga explains that if God
does not exist, then there is no basis he can see for theistic belief having warrant. It certainly
could not have warrant that rises to the level of knowledge, since knowledge requires true belief.

point is that God has designed our cognitive faculties and has placed us into an environment in which we can come
to know in a properly basic way that God exists (i.e., we can have an immediate recognition of God in response to
our environment that need not be inferred) so long as sin does not prevent our cognitive faculties from recognizing
this truth.
298. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 175-186.
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Indeed, theistic belief would seem to have no warrant at all if theism is false because there would
be no God who designed our cognitive faculties and our environment so that we will recognize
His actual existence. If atheism were true, it is hard to see how any of our cognitive faculties
could be both aimed at truth and leading us toward belief in God.299 But if theism is true, then
there is good reason to think theistic belief is warranted. This is because it is most likely that God
would design our cognitive faculties in such a way that we would be able form true beliefs about
God.300 So, the question of whether theistic belief is warranted “is not, after all, independent of
the question whether theistic belief is true.”301 Plantinga has made a strong case that one would
have to show that theism is false in order to show that theistic belief is irrational.
Next, and in a similar way, Plantinga extends his model to show that Christian belief—and
not just theistic belief—is warranted if Christianity is true. By “Christian belief,” he means the
core beliefs that comprise the Christian gospel or that are accepted by all Christians (i.e., “mere
Christianity”). Here he brings into the picture both Scripture (i.e., the gospel message, which
may either be read or heard) and the prompting of the Holy Spirit. Through these, God
communicates to us the truth of the gospel. If Christianity is true, then belief in the gospel has
warrant because the belief is formed by properly working cognitive faculties that are designed by
God to detect truth and that are aimed at detecting truth; moreover, God ensures that our
cognitive faculties are put in the right environment to recognize the truth of the gospel (an
environment that includes the beauty of the gospel message and the witness of the Holy Spirit).

299. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief,
300. Ibid., 188-190.
301. Ibid., 190-191.
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In addition, if Christianity is true then belief in the truth of the gospel can be held strongly
enough to be genuine knowledge.302
So, according to Plantinga’s model, one comes to know that the gospel is true by hearing it
and then becoming convicted that it is true via the testimony of the Holy Spirit. This belief in the
gospel, Plantinga stresses, is properly basic and not inferred on the basis of arguments and
evidence.303 As with theistic belief, sin may block us from coming to believe the Christian
gospel. Sin corrupts both our cognitive faculties and our will, damaging them so that one can fail
to recognize the Holy Spirit’s self-authenticating witness that the gospel is true.304 Pride, envy,
disobedience, distrust of God, and pursuit of our own selfish ambition over the good things of
God are all factors.305 Plantinga stresses that “were it not for sin and its effects, God’s presence
and glory would be as obvious and uncontroversial to us all as the presence of other minds,
physical objects, and the past.”306 Plantinga allows that both our own sinful choices and the sin
of those in our environment that are beyond our control (e.g., being indoctrinated with antiChristian ideas by one’s parents or growing up in a culture of self-indulgence and immorality)
can corrupt our minds and wills.307 So unless we are impeded by sin, upon hearing the great
truths of the gospel, “the Holy Spirit teaches us, causes us to believe that that teaching is both

302. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 205-206.
303. Ibid., 250-252.
304. Plantinga is correct to recognize the importance of the will. As William Wainwright points out, the fact
that intelligent people disagree on the force of the same evidence for the truth of Christianity lends strong support to
the important role that our passions and desires seem to play in accepting the Christian faith. Sin can certainly
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true and comes from God.”308 Through Scripture and the prompting of the Holy Spirit, God
communicates to us the good news of what Jesus has done to fix our sin problem and restore us.
If Christianity is true, then Christian belief has warrant.309
Plantinga defends his Reformed epistemology against some common objections. In
response to the objection that any crazy belief (e.g., belief in the Great Pumpkin or the Flying
Spaghetti Monster) would have to be considered properly basic with respect to warrant if
Christian belief is considered properly basic with respect to warrant, Plantinga points out that it
is obvious that not just any belief qualifies as properly basic. Just because certain beliefs are
properly basic (and some—such as the existence of the external world—certainly do seem to be),
it does not follow that any belief whatsoever may be regarded as properly basic.310 Plantinga then
responds to the further objection that epistemologists within a community that hold that some
bizarre belief is properly basic with respect to warrant (e.g., epistemologists of the voodoo
community who regard their beliefs in voodoo to be properly basic with respect to warrant)
would have just as much basis for claiming this as do Christian epistemologists who make this
claim about Christian belief. Plantinga’s rejoinder first of all stresses that warrant only occurs if
the belief in question is true. If the bizarre belief in question (whether it is voodoo or something
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else) is false, then belief in it would not be warranted. The same is true for Christian belief. If
Christianity is false, then Christian belief is not warranted.311 Secondly, not just any belief
system—even if true—would be warranted. For example, Plantinga argues that belief in
philosophical naturalism—even if philosophical naturalism is true—would not be warranted
because Plantinga thinks the truth of philosophical naturalism would entail that our cognitive
faculties are not reliable.312
Plantinga’s model for warranted Christian belief has much to commend it. It is a brilliant
philosophical defense of the fact that warranted Christian belief follows if Christianity is true—
regardless of whether the Christian believer can provide arguments and evidence for her belief.
He incorporates into his model the biblical teaching that the Holy Spirit is responsible for
convicting the world concerning sin, righteousness, and judgment (Jn 16:7-11) and that none of
us choose to seek God on our own (Rom 3:10-11). God must draw us to Himself (Jn 6:44).
Plantinga is surely correct that one’s knowledge that Christianity is true does not depend upon
one’s ability to gather and evaluate the plausibility of the evidence.313 God has designed us so
that in our environment—when our cognitive faculties are working properly and are not impeded
by sin—we are able to know that the gospel is true when presented with the Holy Spirit’s selfauthenticating testimony that it is true. Since Jesus died for all people (Jn 3:16; 1 Tim 4:10; 1 Jn
2:2), Plantinga’s view is attractive in that it shows how one need not have the ability and
resources to reason one’s way to faith. If gathering and weighing out propositional evidence
were absolutely essential for anyone to be warranted in accepting the gospel, then a rather small
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percentage of people in the history of Christianity would be warranted in accepting the gospel. If
God did not design us so that we could know that He exists in a properly basic way, then far
fewer people in the world would be in a position to come to faith in Christ.
Although Plantinga’s model is insightful, I will make two slight modifications to it. The
first modification is not really a disagreement with Plantinga’s model; rather, it is agreeing with a
point that he makes but going beyond it. Plantinga is thoroughly biblical in highlighting the role
of sin in blocking one’s receptivity to the gospel, and he is correct that both one’s own sin and
the sin of those in one’s environment may impede one from responding to the gospel.314
Plantinga, however, does not expound upon this point to address whether it is always one’s own
sin and not the sin of others that is decisive in one’s failure to accept the gospel. Is it possible that
the moral or intellectual or spiritual influences resulting from the sin of others could ever be the
decisive factor in one failing to accept the gospel? I propose for theological reasons that God
ensures that it is only one’s own sin and not the influence of the sin of others that is ultimately
responsible for one never responding to the gospel. The sin of others may temporarily impede
one’s receptivity to the divine invitation and make it more difficult to accept, but in what sense
could Jesus have died for all people (1 Tim 4:10; 1 Jn 2:1-2; 2 Pt 2:1-2) if some are fully
prevented by their environment from accepting God’s grace? How could God genuinely want all
people to be saved (2 Pe 3:9; 1 Tim 2:4) if He allows some to be placed into circumstances in
which the sin of others is the decisive factor in their being lost rather than their own sin?
Plantinga’s model would do well to put the ultimate onus for rejecting the gospel on each
individual; however, given his Reformed leanings, it may be that he does not consider it
theologically important to do so.
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The second modification to Plantinga’s model is to emphasize that arguments, evidences,
and certain life experiences might in many cases be necessary for removing the barriers that
result from sin. This does not deny that anyone who comes to accept the gospel does so on the
basis of the self-authenticating witness of the Holy Spirit, and it does not deny that belief in the
gospel is properly basic. Plantinga is insightful on these points. However, room should be left for
evidences and experiences to be among the means by which the Holy Spirit removes the
obstacles caused by sin so that the gospel and the Spirit’s testimony can be seen for what they are
and the gospel can be believed in a properly basic way. Reformed epistemology may be accepted
by both Calvinists and Arminians. A Calvinist will see the testimony of the Holy Spirit as
irresistible for the elect such that one lacks libertarian freedom with respect to choosing whether
or not to accept the Holy Spirit’s testimony, whereas the Arminian will allow that one has the
ability to resist the Holy Spirit and must choose whether to follow the Spirit’s promptings.
Plantinga says his model “need take no stand” on the question of whether, for a particular
unbeliever, the Holy Spirit might be unable to cause that unbeliever to accept the gospel. While
he does say that “traditional Christian teaching” holds that the person must be willing to “accept
the gift of faith” by in some way “acquiescing” to it,315 Plantinga never clarifies what is involved
in this acquiescing. He often seems to portray the Holy Spirit as directly causing the unbeliever’s
will and mind to be changed in a way that makes the unbeliever seem passive in the process. He
speaks of faith being “given” to the unbeliever as the Holy Spirit does the work of overcoming
the effects of sin.316 The Holy Spirit “does something special” to the unbeliever so that she
supernaturally is put in a state of heart and mind to believe the gospel.317 So Plantinga is quite
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vague about how the Holy Spirit brings an unbeliever to a state in which the effects of sin on that
person’s will and mind are overcome and about the role that the unbeliever herself might play in
this. Some have interpreted Plantinga as indicating that God “zaps” a person into passively
accepting the gospel.318
In accordance with the acceptance of divine middle knowledge and the Arminian
perspective that atonement is unlimited and grace is resistible, my theodicy will take the
following position on the above issue that is left unanswered by Plantinga. The way in which the
Holy Spirit works to overcome the barriers of sin in the will and mind of each person is unique to
each person. Via middle knowledge, the Holy Spirit knows exactly what particular evidences,
life experiences, and promptings of various kinds are needed to make healthy a particular
unbeliever’s sin-infected cognitive faculties and to soften that unbeliever’s sinful will so that she
can respond to the self-authenticating witness of the Holy Spirit and come to know in a properly
basic way that the gospel is true. Because of one’s own sin and that of others, no person would
come to God without being drawn by the Spirit (Rom 3:10-11; Jn 6:44). But this process requires
our active participation and willingness to respond to the Spirit’s work in our lives. The Spirit
will ensure that nobody is lost due to the sin of others or the circumstances into which one is
placed. So long as there is some set of sufficiently non-pressured circumstances (we will soon
discuss further why lack of excessive pressure to accept the gospel is important) in which the
unbeliever would freely respond to the gospel, the Spirit will work in that person’s life to prepare
her will and mind and ultimately bring her into circumstances in which she will hear and accept
the gospel. Her accepting and knowing the truth of the gospel is not based on whatever
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propositional evidence (if any) or life experiences that the Spirit might have used to overcome
the effects of sin; rather, she comes to know that the gospel is true in a properly basic way in
response to the Spirit’s testimony once sin no longer blinds her to this truth. Even if there are no
sufficiently non-pressured circumstances in which a certain unbeliever would freely respond to
the gospel, the Spirit—despite knowing it will not lead the person to salvation—plausibly offers
various promptings and opportunities that are sufficient in strength such that the sin of the
unbeliever herself—and not that of others—is the decisive reason why she rejects the
promptings. Had her own sin not prevented her from responding to the promptings and
opportunities, she would have eventually arrived in a state of will and mind to accept the gospel
and God would have ensured that she heard the gospel and responded to it. If we are actively
involved in this way as the Spirit works with us and through us to realign our passions and our
beliefs so that the barriers of sin are overcome and we can recognize in a properly basic way the
truth of the gospel just as we were designed to do, then everyone truly has an opportunity to be
saved. All who are lost are responsible for resisting the Spirit’s work in their lives, and divine
middle knowledge allows that there is nothing that the Spirit could have done (short of, perhaps,
providing excessive pressure) to bring anyone who never accepts the gospel and is lost into a
state of will and mind in which the sin barriers that keep that person from accepting the gospel
are removed.
A Theodicy Against the Problem of the Contingently Lost
The necessary foundations have now been laid to finish fleshing out my theodicy against
the PCL. If both divine middle knowledge and the above slightly modified (or qualified) version
of Reformed epistemology are true, then it is possible to envision a way in which God could—
even if exclusivism is true—providentially arrange the world so that nobody is lost due to a lack
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of information (such as not hearing the gospel) or due to the sin and corrupting influences of
those around them. It is also possible to show how God may have ensured that as many people as
possible are saved and as few as possible are lost in a world in which humans must make a
morally significant choice to love God rather than reject Him and remain enslaved to sin.
Moreover, it is plausible that P8 is false because God can do all of this while ensuring that
nobody is contingently lost other than in ways that do not undermine His omnibenevolence.
The details of my proposal are as follows. God only considers actualizing worlds of free
creatures that are as soteriologically optimal (i.e., have as good of a ratio of saved to lost) as any
other feasible world of free creatures that (at least) meet the following two criteria: (1) the
creatures in that world exist in a sufficiently challenging moral and spiritual environment (which
minimally includes an adequate degree of divine hiddenness and an adequate degree of
temptation from an evil creature like Satan) so that their decision to love God rather than
remaining enslaved to sin is a significant one; and (2) no creature in that world is contingently
lost other than those who would freely choose to apostatize and those who would require what is
(for them) unduly overt revelation in order to be saved. The first criterion has to do with the
environment that God desires. God wants a world in which as many people as possible come to
be saved and enjoy Him forever, but He wants to ensure that the environment in which humans
accept or reject His love and grace is a morally rich and challenging one so that all who come to
be saved truly do love Him and want to be with Him forever. He thus only considers actualizing
feasible worlds in which the two parameters specified in this first criterion are upheld—even if
there are feasible worlds that do not meet this first criterion that have a better soteriological
balance than any feasible world that does meet the first criterion. The second criterion upholds
God’s love by ensuring that no person (like the inner-city teen described earlier) slips through
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the soteriological cracks; that is, the second criterion ensures that the only people who are
contingently lost are contingently lost in a way that is compatible with God’s omnibenevolence.
With these two criteria in place (along with perhaps many other criteria that are important to
God), God then sovereignly chooses to actualize one particular feasible world from among all of
the feasible worlds that meet the criteria. The world that He picks will be soteriologically optimal
within the bounds of the criteria (i.e., the world that He actualizes will have as favorable of a
balance of saved to lost as any of the feasible worlds that meet the required criteria).
The above is a broad view of what I am proposing that God may have done. I will now
draw upon Reformed epistemology and divine middle knowledge to suggest a process by which
God might ensure that nobody is contingently lost other than the two types of contingently lost
persons specified above and that nobody is lost due to a lack of information (such as not hearing
the gospel) or due to the sin and corrupting influences of others. As I lay out this process, you
will note that it focuses on Christian belief and how the Spirit works on a person to prepare that
person to accept the gospel; however, it is also plausible that the same sort of process applies to
people living in the Old Testament era as well, and I will go on to address this.
The process is as follows. First, God designs each human and the environment into which
He places humans in such a way that one who hears the gospel will come to believe it and
embrace the truth of the gospel in a properly basic way if one’s will and mind are not impeded
from doing so by sin. Second, God middle-knows under what (if any) freedom-permitting
circumstances the sin barriers of each person whom He could create would be broken down such
that the person would freely respond to the gospel in a properly basic way if he or she heard it.
Third, God providentially ensures that each person in the world is placed into circumstances in
which that person’s sin barriers are broken down unless: the person is TD (if there are any such
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persons) or the only circumstances in which the person’s sin barriers are broken down require
what is (for that person) unduly overt revelation. For each person who is placed into
circumstances in which the Spirit breaks down the sin barriers in his or her heart and mind, the
Spirit does this by carrying out steps in that person’s life that are tailored specifically to that
person to accomplish this task—steps which may involve propositional evidence and particular
life experiences. This divine arrangement of the world also involves the Spirit providing every
person in the world (whether that person is ultimately saved or not) with promptings and
opportunities such that these will only be resisted as a result of the person’s own sin and not
because of the sin of others. Fourth and finally, God ensures that each person in the world whose
heart and will are prepared to accept the gospel are ultimately presented with the gospel, and all
such persons then accept it in a properly basic way. Some of these people, however, may go on
to apostatize. Such a process is at least consistent with biblical teaching concerning the Holy
Spirit’s role in convicting the world of sin and drawing them toward faith in Christ (e.g., Jn
15:26; 16:7-11).
If the above process is true, then every lost person is lost as a consequence of his or her
own sin and not epistemological or circumstantial limitations. Notice that this process assumes
that the Holy Spirit even offers promptings and opportunities to those whom He knows will
never respond to them. These promptings will not always (in the case of every person) include
hearing the gospel, but they will be strong enough and of just the right type that they will only be
resisted as a result of the person’s own sin and not because of the sin of others.
Consider, for example, an unbeliever who remains unevangelized throughout her life.
Despite being unevangelized, she herself is responsible for never hearing the gospel. That is
because she is responsible for responding to the promptings and opportunities that the Holy
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Spirit gives to her so that her sinful mind and heart are softened. Although God knows that she
cannot be placed into any circumstances (short of, perhaps, excessive pressure) in which she
would exercise her libertarian freedom to accept the gospel, the Spirit offers her just the right
promptings and opportunities such that—had her own sin not prevented her from responding to
the promptings and taking advantage of the opportunities—she would have been led by the Spirit
down a path that would result in her sin barriers being overcome to the point that she would
accept the gospel in a properly basic way and without excessive pressure if she were to hear it. It
is also true that she (like any person in this world who never hears the gospel) is resistant to God
to the point that there is no feasible world in which she can be placed into circumstances (short
of, perhaps, excessive pressure) in which she is brought by the Spirit to a state of mind and heart
in which she would freely accept the gospel and ultimately be saved. In this way, it can rightly be
said that anyone who remains unevangelized throughout one’s life had an opportunity to be
saved. Such a person’s own sin is decisive in preventing her from being led by the Spirit to a
state of heart and mind in which she would respond to the gospel and be saved. The same is true
of those who are evangelized but are ultimately lost. Those who never accept the gospel are only
lost because there are no circumstances lacking excessive pressure in which they can be brought
by God to a state of mind and will in which their sin barriers would be overcome and they would
freely accept the gospel. Thus, there is also no feasible world in which a person who never
accepts the gospel in the actual world and is lost in the actual world would be brought by the
Spirit into a state of mind and heart in which that person would accept the gospel and be saved—
except for, perhaps, feasible worlds in which the person accepts the gospel as a result of more
pressure being placed upon that person to accept the gospel than God considers to be acceptable.
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Now, with regard to those in the actual world who are unevangelized for a time but will
eventually be brought to a state of will and mind in which they will accept the gospel once the
Spirit prepares them and presents it to them, it is important to note that some such persons may
have rejected theism and may have responded little (if at all) to general revelation and to the
Spirit’s various promptings prior to them hearing the gospel. The gospel is “the power of God for
salvation to everyone who believes” (Rom 1:16), and there is more power in the gospel than in
general revelation or in the Spirit’s promptings sans the gospel. So one need not first become a
theist or have a particular response to general revelation before God will bring her the gospel—
though general revelation no doubt serves as one of the various ways that the Spirit prompts the
unbeliever’s heart. Instead, all that is needed is that God knows it is possible for Him to bring the
unbeliever to a state of her will and mind in which her sin barriers are overcome so that she will
freely respond to the gospel in circumstances that are acceptable to God. Indeed, an unbeliever
who has yet to hear the gospel and has given no response to general revelation or the promptings
of the Spirit may need to be presented with the gospel (perhaps multiple times and in various
ways) as part of the process of breaking down her sin barriers before she eventually is sensitive
to the Spirit’s testimony that the gospel is true and recognizes this truth in a properly basic way.
So, while my theodicy holds to Christian exclusivism and contends that all people have an
opportunity to be saved, it does not simply hold that God will bring the gospel to those
unevangelized persons who respond to general revelation—the position that I described in the
first chapter that has been defended by a number of scholars.319 My position is more nuanced
than that, as it recognizes that the Spirit prompts people in a host of ways that are tailored
specifically to the person and that God’s middle knowledge of how a person would respond to
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various promptings is the crucial factor that determines what sort of revelation God provides to
the person. The key factor is not merely the response that the person has given to general
revelation and to whatever other revelation he or she already has.
Since the process I propose above focuses on Christian belief and how the Spirit works on
a person to prepare that person to accept the gospel, it is also important to note how this same
sort of process can be applied to people living during the Old Testament (OT) period. Clearly, in
the OT one did not need to hear the gospel in order to be saved since Jesus had not yet come into
the world to die for the sins of humanity. Although nobody was saved in the OT era by placing
faith specifically in Christ with a full understanding of what Christ would do for them, the Bible
is clear that people in the OT were saved by God’s grace through faith. In addition, this faith is
not mere belief that there is a god; rather, it involves putting one’s trust in the true God and
following Him. The premiere example of faith in the OT is the faith of Abraham. The Bible says
that Abraham “believed in the Lord; and He reckoned it to him as righteousness” (Gen 15:6). As
Paul makes clear in Romans 4, Abraham was saved by God’s grace through faith, and this faith
was centered upon trusting in God’s promises (Rom 4:13-21). The Bible also teaches that
Christ’s death is an atoning sacrifice for the sins of all people—even those who lived before the
time of Christ (Heb 10:1-18). Hebrews 11 recounts the faith of many OT persons, and their faith
always involves some knowledge of the true God (not just any god) and some level of active
obedience to God and trust in God’s promises. One who comes to God in faith, the author of
Hebrews says, “must believe that He is and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him” (Heb
11:6). Moreover, faith is “the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen”
(Heb 11:1). So, faith involves belief content and conviction, and this is seen in the examples of
faith given by the author. Noah believed God and prepared the ark by faith (Heb 11:7). Moses
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believed God and was willing to endure hardship, oppose Pharaoh, and cross the Red Sea out of
a trust in God (Heb 11:23-29). Abraham showed his faith by obeying God on many occasions:
moving to a foreign land; believing God that, despite his old age, he would have many
descendants and a seed that would bless the whole world; and being willing to sacrifice Isaac
(Heb 11:8-19). Even Rahab, who was not an Israelite, followed the one true God and
demonstrated her trust in God by hiding the Israelite spies (Heb 11:31). Rahab knew some
information about the true God and how He had delivered Israel out of Egypt, and she
recognized that Israel’s God must be “God in heaven above and on earth beneath” (Josh 2:11).
So even though OT saving faith does not require the exact same content as the gospel, it is
analogous in that there seems to be a need for trusting God, having confidence in His promises,
and following Him. A strong case can be made that, even in the OT, one must accept some sort
of special revelation that goes beyond a mere belief in monotheism that one gathers from general
revelation.320 In any case, for the purposes of this project there is no need to explore OT saving
faith in great detail. It is sufficient to recognize that people in the OT were saved by God’s grace
through faith. My proposal is that there is a process321 that God used in the OT that is like the NT
process I have proposed above in which the Spirit offers promptings to all people and draws
them to Himself in such a way that—unless their own sin prevents the Spirit from doing so—
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they will ultimately be brought to a state in which they are prepared to place saving faith in God
(whatever such faith might require in the OT). If any OT person resists the Spirit’s promptings
and is never brought to such a state and never saved, then I propose that God would only allow
that person to be lost if there are no circumstances (short of, perhaps, providing excessive
pressure) in which that person would freely be saved. That means that in any feasible world
(even feasible worlds in which that person lived after Christ and heard all about the gospel) such
a person would not freely come to saving faith (except, perhaps, for worlds in which the person
required unduly overt revelation that God considers unacceptable to provide to that person).
Having laid out my theodicy, it is now necessary to defend certain aspects of it in a bit
more detail in order to solidify my attack on P8. First, it is important to examine carefully the two
types of contingently lost individuals that my theodicy allows and show why it is no threat to
God’s omnibenevolence to allow them. After that, I must defend my contention that a good and
loving God would plausibly uphold the two key parameters that are part of the moral and
spiritual environment that exists in the actual world—ensuring an adequate level of divine
hiddenness and allowing humans to be tempted in certain ways and to a certain degree by an evil
creature like Satan—even though it may be the case that eliminating these parameters would
allow God to actualize a feasible world that has an even better soteriological balance.
Consider first the two types of contingently lost individuals for which my theodicy allows.
I have contended that there is biblical evidence that some are contingently lost, so I do not
dispute the truth of P9. Nevertheless, given the enormous providential control that God has via
His middle knowledge and the fact that Scripture does not mention any other type of
contingently lost person besides the two types that I identify, I have explained that I find no
reason to suppose that there any other types of contingently lost persons. Now I will make my
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case for why neither of these two types undermines God’s omnibenevolence, which is critical if I
am to show that P8 is false. Let us begin by examining one of these types: those who apostatize.
Those who commit apostasy “have once been enlightened and have tasted of the heavenly
gift and have been made partakers of the Holy Spirit, and have tasted the good word of God and
the powers of the age to come” (Heb 6:4-5). Thus, it is hard to see why God’s omnibenevolence
should be questioned if He allows such persons to live long enough for them to make the free
choice to spurn His love and reject the grace that they once accepted. Although such a person is
contingently lost in the sense that God could have taken her life while she was still saved, it may
be that doing so would rob her of the opportunity to change her mind and make her final choice.
Given that God knows that such a person would freely choose to reject His love and grace if
given time to do so, prematurely taking the life of such a person would seem to result in someone
being saved who ultimately does not want to be saved and does not want to spend eternity with
God. God’s sovereign choice to grant us the freedom to reject the greatest gift of love that
anyone will ever be offered after having previously accepted this gift surely does not detract
from His perfect love and perfect goodness. If Plantinga’s epistemological model is true, then a
person who has come to accept the gospel knows that the gospel is true on the basis of the divine
testimony. Thus, the one who apostatizes willfully rejects this great gift of love that she knows
God has revealed to her. It is not hard to see why such a rejection amounts to “trampling
underfoot the Son of God” and “insulting the Spirit of grace” (Heb 10:29). Even if there is a
feasible world in which a person who apostatizes in the actual world would have freely chosen to
be saved and would not have apostatized despite living a full life in that world, it does not seem
that God’s omnibenevolence can reasonably be questioned. God’s love and goodness ought not
be impugned because He led such a person to know and accept the truth about Him and that
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person committed the grievous sin of trampling on Christ and insulting the Holy Spirit. If one
finds this objectionable and thinks that an omnibenevolent God should only allow a person to
live long enough to apostatize in the actual world if that person would apostatize in any feasible
world of free creatures in which he or she accepts the gospel and lives a full (normal) lifespan,
then one can add to my theodicy the stipulation that God does this. I could easily add this
stipulation to my theodicy; however, I do not consider such a stipulation necessary in order to
uphold the omnibenevolence of God. If a person apostatizes in the actual world, then God’s
perfect goodness and love cannot reasonably be questioned for allowing it to happen regardless
of what choices that person would make in other feasible worlds. It may be that there are some
apostates in any world of free creatures that has an optimal soteriological balance and meets
God’s other (non-soteriological) requirements, so that may be one good reason why God permits
apostasy. Another good reason is simply the incredibly serious nature of the sin of apostasy.
Given the knowledge that the apostate has of God’s love and grace, God’s omnibenevolence
ought not be questioned if He allows some people to throw that away.
The other type of contingently lost person is one who would not freely accept the gospel
under any sufficiently non-pressured circumstances but would accept it (at least temporarily) if
she were given what for her would be unacceptably overt revelation. In this case, too, it does not
seem that God’s omnibenevolence should be called into question, for such a person has not
responded to the promptings that the Holy Spirit gave her that would have overcome her sin
barriers so that her will and mind would have been prepared to recognize the truth of the gospel
without undue pressure being placed upon her. She would not repent and turn to God apart from
God providing some revelation that is for her unduly overt. Although God could bring it about
that such a person accepts the gospel in response to such a sign, this may well not be the sort of
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acceptance that an omnibenevolent God desires. Such acceptance would be the result of the
person receiving revelation that God may consider to be coercive in some sense. God may want
to ensure that all persons who come to Him are ones who will do so without Him having to prod
them excessively. Although there are some people who are so hardened against God that they
would even reject miraculous revelation (e.g., the people of Capernaum who rejected the
miracles of Jesus in Matthew 11), it may be the case that this same revelation would exert
excessive pressure upon other people; that is, such revelation may be so powerful to certain
people that they would respond to God only because of the potent impact that it has on them. It
may even be the case that God knows that these people would genuinely turn to Him only for a
short time in response to such overt revelation and that they would not persist over time in their
genuine desire to remain committed to God after the intense initial impact of this dramatic
experience begins to wane. Paul Moser rightly contends that if God were to coerce or exert too
much pressure on a person to repent and turn to Him, it would “suppress the will, and thus the
personhood, of that person, thereby excluding that person as a genuine candidate for a loving
relationship.”322 What is excessive pressure for one person may not be excessive for another, and
a God who possesses middle knowledge would know what precise impact any particular
revelation would have on any free person. So, the fact that some people are so hardened that they
would resist even highly overt or miraculous revelation does not preclude the possibility that
others would be pressured in an unacceptable way by that same revelation. It is not obvious that
a good and loving God ought to offer highly overt revelation to a person if He knows that such
revelation is the only sort of revelation to which the person would respond—especially if He also
knows that the person receiving it would not persist in genuine faith over time.

322. Paul K. Moser, The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2008), 243.
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One might, however, raise the following objection to my suggestion that God may allow
some people to be contingently lost who would have responded (at least temporarily) only to
(what is for them) unduly overt revelation: If that is the case, then why did God provide
miraculous revelation to many people who did respond to it (e.g., the Apostle Paul on the road to
Damascus or those who followed Jesus after seeing His miracles)? There is a plausible response
to this objection. It could be that any persons who see divine miracles or other highly overt forms
of revelation and turn to God would have turned to God even if God had drawn them to Himself
in a different (non-miraculous or non-overt) way; in this way, nobody who comes to faith after
seeing miracles does so only because of the power of that overt revelation. It may well serve
God’s purposes in any number of ways to have the world play out in such a way that certain
people come to faith after seeing miraculous signs as Paul did on the Damascus road in Acts 9,
but that does not mean that such people would only have come to saving faith via such
revelation.323 One must remember that my suggestion is that God may not want to give
miraculous or highly overt revelation to any person who would require such revelation in order
to turn to God. Such a suggestion does not entail that God would not offer miraculous or overt
revelation to other sorts of people. Why, for example, did God not give miraculous revelation to
the Sodomites? Perhaps God arranged the world so that all those in Sodom who would have
repented in response to the miracles of Jesus are people who only would have responded to such
overt revelation (and perhaps they would not have maintained their faith over time even if they
had seen these miracles and repented and turned to God). God did not want to pressure them into
repentance in that way, so He did not provide them with such revelation. In addition, it is

323. For example, perhaps the Paul’s coming to faith so suddenly and dramatically after having previously
persecuted the church led many more people to turn to Christ than would have otherwise occurred. Nevertheless, it
may be the case that God could have led Paul to Christian faith slowly and less dramatically over time.
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possible that God arranged the world so that every person who saw the miracles of Jesus and did
repent is a person who would have responded to non-miraculous revelation as well. God
providentially ordered the world so that neither the Sodomites nor anybody else who would only
repent if given (what is for them) excessively overt revelation would receive such revelation, and
He likewise ordered the world so that anybody who does see miraculous or overt revelation and
subsequently comes to faith is a person who would have come to faith even without being given
such revelation.
While all of the above would be simple for a God who has middle knowledge, a key
question remains: Why should God punish the Sodomites less severely on account of the fact
that they would have responded to miraculous revelation if God considered such revelation to be
too overt to give to them? Perhaps it is the case that any person who is contingently lost and
would have at least responded to excessively overt revelation had he or she been given it will
receive some reduced punishment from God in comparison to those who are lost and would not
have responded even to such extreme revelation. The latter sort of person (perhaps Pharaoh, who
ignored the many plagues in the book of Exodus, or the people of Capernaum who saw Jesus’
miracles and rejected them) may deserve even greater punishment than the Sodomites because
such persons are hardened against God even to the point of rejecting such incredible signs.
I will now move to a defense of my contention that a good and loving God would plausibly
uphold the two key parameters of the moral and spiritual environment that exists in the actual
world even though it may be the case that eliminating these parameters would allow God to
actualize a feasible world that has an even better soteriological balance than the actual world.
Even if I undermine P8 by showing that the types of contingently lost persons that God permits
are consistent with His omnibenevolence, it would seem that God’s omnibenevolence also
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entails that He would not want to allow more people to be lost than is necessary to bring as many
people as possible to salvation. As I have indicated, my theodicy agrees in part with Craig that
God would plausibly seek to use His middle knowledge to optimize the balance of saved and
lost; however, unlike Craig, I emphasize that there may be certain features of the world that God
wants to uphold and that these features may reduce the balance of saved versus lost from what
would otherwise be feasible for God to achieve in worlds of free creatures. These features
include God’s (relative) hiddenness and His allowing Satan to tempt us. My proposal is that God
does actualize a world that has as good of a soteriological balance as any other feasible world in
which these two parameters (as well as, perhaps, other parameters) are in place, but I allow that
there may well be feasible worlds of free creatures lacking these parameters that are more
soteriologically optimal than the actual world. Although—all things being equal—God no doubt
desires as many people as possible to be saved and as few as possible to be lost, it is plausible
that He also desires that those who are saved make that decision without excessive pressure and
are sufficiently tempted by sin such that they must make a significant moral decision to choose
God over sin. If God had eliminated either (or both) of the above parameters from the moral and
spiritual environment, then it may be the case that the Holy Spirit could bring the will and mind
of even more people to the point where sin does not blind them to knowing the gospel. Perhaps,
for example, fewer people would apostatize in feasible worlds in which a creature like Satan is
not in the world bombarding them with temptations. Moreover, perhaps many people who would
only respond to revelation that is (for them) excessively overt in any world in which they are
exposed to Satan’s temptations would have responded to revelation that is not too overt for God
to give them in a world without Satan. Despite the potential negative impact that these two
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parameters might have on the soteriological balance, let us consider why each parameter seems
to be consistent with God’s omnibenevolence.
Consider first God’s relative hiddenness. There can be little doubt that God is far more
hidden from us than He could be. God could manifest Himself before each person daily,
reminding us all of the gospel and the dire consequences for rejecting it. God could ensure that
His existence and the truth of the gospel are facts that cannot reasonably be denied by anyone.
But regardless of what impact such a divine unveiling might have on reducing the proportion of
persons who will be lost, I have already indicated why a good and loving God would plausibly
not want to do this. God’s goal is not merely for us to believe that He exists or that the gospel is
true. As James 2:19 states, even the demons believe in God. Instead of mere belief, God wants us
to turn to Him and accept forgiveness in Christ and embrace Him out of love and not as a result
of excessive pressure. He wants us to give our lives to Him and allow Him to sanctify us so that
we become morally transformed and love and enjoy Him forever. Hiding Himself to the degree
that He does may be the only way that God can achieve such great goods as: increasing our trust
in Him and our reliance upon Him; increasing our desire for Him; allowing us to have the chance
to accept the gospel for the right reasons; and ensuring that we do not take God and His plan of
salvation for granted.324 So, the fact that God’s hiddenness may325 reduce the balance of saved
versus lost from what it perhaps would have been in some feasible world of free creatures in
which God is less hidden is in no way incompatible with God’s omnibenevolence.

324. Moser, The Elusive God, 107. These potential reasons are insightfully suggested by Moser.
325. Moreland and Craig suggest that if God revealed Himself more directly to all people, it might actually have
a negative impact on the number of people who are saved because many may come to resent God’s direct presence
in their lives. Even if God’s regular and direct presence might move some people to faith in Christ, it may push
many more away from Christ. There is no way for us to know what impact this would have on the soteriological
balance. See: Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundation, 144-145.
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Turning now to the second parameter, it is also far from obvious that an omnibenevolent
God would not allow Satan to tempt us—even if He could have achieved a better soteriological
balance by eliminating Satan’s temptations. It seems plausible that an omnibenevolent God may
still create a world in which an evil being like Satan exists and is permitted to tempt humans
because of God’s overriding desire to place us into an environment that requires us to make a
morally significant choice to love Him and embrace the good rather than to love what is evil. The
Bible teaches that, in this world, “the evil one comes and snatches away what has been sown” in
the hearts of some people before God’s truth can take root at all (Mt 13:19); still other people are
not willing to pursue God because of “affliction or persecution” (Mt 13:21); and in some other
cases God’s truth is choked out of a person’s heart by “the worry of the world and the
deceitfulness of wealth” (Mt 13:22). The temptations and trials that Satan puts in our lives in this
world certainly do filter out many people who are not willing to pursue God through those
challenges. Even believers are attacked by Satan and must struggle with sin and allow God to
refine them and discipline them so that they become the sort of people that God desires (Heb
12:1-11). God assists us in our struggles and helps us to resist the power of sin if we allow Him
to do so. It certainly seems reasonable that a good God would want our present lives to play out
in a moral environment in which there is enough temptation that one must make a meaningful
and difficult decision to choose God over sin and in which moral and spiritual growth will occur
as we learn to resist Satan’s temptations with God’s assistance. Allowing us this morally
significant choice and this opportunity for moral growth is important for moral agents who are
made in God’s image. Providing this environment is plausibly a great good even if it means that
more people will choose to reject God than in a world without Satan’s temptations.
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Three Attractive Features of This Theodicy
Although Scripture does not provide a specific solution to the PCL and I do not claim that
the theodicy put forward in this chapter is necessarily true, my theodicy is both plausible and
consistent with Scripture. I have responded to the PCL by making the case that P8 is neither
necessarily true nor required by Christian doctrine. If I have succeeded in showing that P8 fails,
then the PCL fails to demonstrate that P1 and P2 are inconsistent. Having fleshed out my
theodicy, I will highlight three of its attractive features as I conclude this chapter.
First of all, this theodicy allows for the truth of P9 and avoids Craig’s biblically problematic
proposal that all of the lost are TD. It makes room for what may well be instances of
contingently lost persons in the Bible. If Matthew 11 does indicate that certain people in Sodom,
Tyre, and Sidon are contingently lost, then this theodicy has the advantage of handling this
difficult passage. Likewise, if one holds (as many Christians do) that apostasy is possible, then
this theodicy provides a way to show that apostasy is no threat to God’s omnibenevolence. It
may be that there are some people who are TD, and my theodicy does not take a stance on
whether anyone is TD. Perhaps, for example, some of the people who are so bent against God
that they even rejected the miracles of Jesus are TD, but it may be the case that even these people
are not TD. It may be that they would freely repent and turn to God if they were put in a different
circumstance in which God provided them with revelation that He deems too overt for them to
receive. Even though it seems to be unbiblical to hold that all of the lost are TD, I see no reason
why some of the lost could not be TD.326 My theodicy thus takes no stance on this issue.

326. As I have contended previously, I do not consider it theologically important to make room for
unconditional election (as MacGregor does in his theodicy). One who wants to offer a theodicy that takes into
account unconditional election cannot allow the possibility that anyone who is lost in the actual world is TD—or, for
that matter, that anyone in the actual world who is saved is transcircumstantially saved.
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Second, this theodicy—unlike Craig’s theodicy and the theodicies of others who appeal to
inclusivism—upholds Christian exclusivism while showing how it is possible that everyone has a
legitimate opportunity to be saved and nobody is lost due to a lack of information or due to the
sin and corrupting influences of other people. By leveraging divine middle knowledge and a
slightly modified Reformed epistemology, I offer a plausible process for how it is possible that
every lost person is lost as a consequence of his or her own sin. This process recognizes that an
unevangelized person need not respond to general revelation in order to be brought the gospel,
making it more nuanced than the common exclusivist position that God brings the gospel to
those who respond appropriately to general revelation or to whatever revelation they have. Also,
according to my proposed process, one need not have the time, ability, or resources to reason
one’s way to knowing that the gospel is true, yet I leave room for the Spirit to use apologetic
arguments and various evidential means to break down a person’s sin barrier and prepare a
person’s heart and mind to accept the gospel. Ultimately, I show how God can ensure that every
single person who is never put into a circumstance in which she repents and turns to God was not
placed into such a circumstance because of her own sin.
Third (and most importantly), this theodicy undermines the PCL by attacking P8. I take this
to be the only biblically-consistent strategy. Although Craig opts to attack P9, I think that doing
so is wrongheaded and unnecessary. Not only does my theodicy defend the omnibenevolence of
God in the face of two sorts of contingently lost people that many Christians would agree are
indicated in Scripture, but it also contends that God’s omnibenevolence remains intact despite
two thorny features of the world that may seem to count against soteriological optimality—
God’s relative hiddenness and the temptations of Satan. This is an especially advantageous
feature of my theodicy (and one that Craig’s lacks). If successful, my theodicy reconciles Craig’s
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insight that God has plausibly optimized the soteriological balance with these two features of the
world in a way that upholds God’s perfect goodness and love.
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CHAPTER 5
THE APPLICABILITY OF THIS THEODICY TO THE BROADER PROBLEM OF EVIL
At this point I have laid out and defended my theodicy against the PCL. However, before
drawing together the key points of my overall project and providing a final summary and
conclusion, I will offer in this chapter an argument that my soteriological theodicy—or really
any Molinist soteriological theodicy that, like my own or Craig’s, suggests that a key
soteriological aim of God’s is to leverage His middle knowledge to optimize the balance of
saved versus lost—offers great benefit in responding to the broader POE. Although my theodicy
is aimed at dealing with the PCL, which is an aspect of the soteriological problem of evil (POE),
I will show how my theodicy might be leveraged in responding to the broader POE in terms of
accounting for the vast amount of suffering and evil in our present earthly existence and offering
insight into why some evil might appear to be gratuitous.
I will first contend that utilizing effectively a Free Will Defense (FWD) of the sort given by
Alvin Plantinga in response to the claim that theism is made less likely by the amount of evil in
the world would be aided by the recognition that God’s allowance of this vast amount of
suffering and evil may be due in large part to God’s use of His middle knowledge to optimize the
soteriological balance. This will involve: examining Plantinga’s defense that God may have
brought about the feasible world that has the best balance of moral good and evil; considering the
value that is added to defending Christian theism against the charge of excessive evil by
including soteriological considerations in the balance of overall good and evil; and showing that
Molinism is critical to running this useful defense. Some contend that Molinism is a hindrance to
the FWD, as it increases the responsibility of God for what creatures do with their free will. In
response, I will argue that God’s possible goal of soteriological optimization blunts the charge
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that God has an unsavory role in evil if Molinism is true. I also make the case that rejecting the
providential control that Molinism furnishes seems to strip God of His ability to guide humanity
toward the best outcomes and requires that He gambles by not knowing logically prior to
creating free creatures what sort of ratio of good and evil would result.
I will then show how the truth of a Molinist soteriological theodicy that appeals to God
arranging the world to achieve an optimal soteriological balance can aid in the defense of God’s
omnibenevolence against the charge that God ought not allow gratuitous evil. The concern about
gratuitous evil is illustrated well by the famous argument given by William Rowe. I will briefly
explain Rowe’s argument and then show how the truth of my soteriological theodicy allows one
to give a powerful response to Rowe.
I will conclude the chapter by arguing that two prominent responses to the POE that (unlike
Plantinga’s FWD) do have an eschatological and soteriological focus would be strengthened if
they drew upon Molinism and allowed that God uses His middle knowledge to carry out
soteriological optimization. Doing so would aid them in explaining why God would plausibly
allow evil in order to achieve the most favorable soteriological outcome. These two theodicies
include Eleonore Stump’s Thomistic theodicy and John Hick’s soul-making theodicy. Both of
these rightly appeal to God molding humans via suffering in order to achieve benefits that are not
fully realized within this earthly life, but their proposals are strengthened by the providential
control that Molinism affords.
Molinism and Soteriological Optimization Strengthen the Free Will Defense
It is widely recognized that Alvin Plantinga’s FWD has shown that theism is logically
compatible with the existence of some evil. This aspect of his FWD does not depend upon the
truth of Molinism, since God need not have middle knowledge in order for it to be possible that
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all free creatures that God might create suffer from transworld depravity (which is how Plantinga
shows the compatibility of God with some evil).327 Yet Plantinga goes on to contend that the
amount of evil present in the world (i.e., its severity and frequency) does not even render theism
unlikely, and this aspect of his FWD does depend upon the possible truth of Molinism. This
section will focus upon the benefit that Molinism and God’s optimization of the soteriological
balance offer to this aspect of the FWD that addresses the amount of evil in the world.
In response to the concern that God’s existence may be incompatible with—or at least
made unlikely by—the amount of evil in the world, Plantinga suggests that it may not be
possible for God to actualize a world with a better balance of moral good and evil than is found
in the actual world. He rightly stresses that the real concern is not the amount of evil (since evil
could be eliminated entirely simply by not creating free creatures); rather, the real issue is
whether God could have achieved as much good as there is in the actual world with less evil.
There are many possible worlds that have as much good as the actual world and less evil, but
Plantinga points out that it may not be feasible for God to actualize any of them. It may be that
God knows that the balance of moral good and evil achieved in this world is as good as in any
feasible world. Of course, this possibility requires an appeal to divine middle knowledge.
Besides Plantinga’s argument that God possibly actualized a feasible world that has an optimal

327. If all free creatures that God might create suffer from transworld depravity, then this would be true even if
God lacked middle knowledge and did not know that it is true. See: Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 48-51.
Recall that Plantinga’s concept of “transworld depravity,” which he uses in his FWD against the POE, is a property
that one has if one will do evil in every world in which one is a morally free agent. It is a condition a person P has in
which P would err with regard to at least one morally significant action in every world in which God could create P
with libertarian freedom. If P suffers from transworld depravity, then in every world W in which “is significantly
free in W” and “never does what is wrong in W” are included in P’s essence, God could not actualize W. So if all
creaturely essences suffer from this condition, then there is no world that is feasible for God to create that is
composed entirely of free creatures who never sin. Even though worlds of free creatures who never sin are logically
possible, Plantinga points out that the fact that it is at least possible that all creaturely essences suffer from
transworld depravity means that there may be no way that God could bring about such worlds. For more on how
Plantinga unpacks this concept, see: Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 51-53.

219

balance of moral good and evil, he also raises the possibility that natural evil may be the result of
the free actions of demons so that all evil (both moral and natural) is “broadly moral” and God
may be achieving an optimal balance of broadly moral good and evil. Ultimately, Plantinga
argues that the amount of evil in the world does not even make theism unlikely because one can
have no confidence that there is so much broadly moral evil that God probably lacks a good
reason for permitting it.328
Note that Plantinga’s focus is on the balance of broadly moral good and evil in this earthly
life. He never aims to draw into the discussion good and evil actions or good and bad states of
affairs that might occur postmortem. His argument does not involve soteriological outcomes or
how the balance of broadly moral good and evil on earth relates to the balance of saved versus
lost. His proposal certainly makes no attempt to appeal to postmortem conditions that are part of
Christian theism. His appeal to demons would not apply to the postmortem conditions that are
described in Scripture because demons will not cause natural evils in the new heavens and new
earth. God will also no longer have any need to balance moral goods and evils, as those who do
moral evil will be consigned to hell and those in the new heavens and new earth will be sinless
(Rev 20:10-21:27).
Plantinga’s defense concerning the amount of evil is brilliant, and it effectively defends
theism by showing that God’s existence is compatible with the amount of evil observed in the
world. This is all he sought to do. Yet it is possible to bolster the defense of Christian theism
against the charge that there is too much evil in the world by expanding his focus to consider not
only earthly goods and evils but all goods and evils and all good and bad states of affairs that
will ever come about if Christian theism is true—especially the ultimate good state of eternally

328. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 55-63.
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enjoying the presence of God and the ultimate bad state of suffering eternal punishment in
separation from God. In selecting which world to actualize, it might be that God considers the
balance of moral and natural goods and evils found in this earthly life to be far less significant
than the balance of those who are ultimately saved and lost. If so, then the Christian theist can
allow that it may be necessary for God to permit a worse balance of moral and natural goods and
evils in this earthly life than He could feasibly achieve because doing so might be integral to
achieving what is most important: an optimal balance of good and evil over the course of eternity
(which depends upon the balance of saved versus lost). Making this argument not only draws
into the discussion a crucial aspect of the balance of good and evil in the world (soteriological
outcomes), but it also adds an element of plausibility to the bare possibility Plantinga offers in
his FWD—an element of plausibility that is helpful in responding to evidential forms of the
POE. While Plantinga’s defense effectively shows that theism is logically compatible with the
amount of evil observed in the world, one might find his proposal so implausible that it seems
not to reduce the sting of the concern that the amount of evil makes theism unlikely. One might
find it hard to imagine that the balance of good and evil could not be better in this earthly life. So
adding the soteriological element makes it even more plausible that God could be providentially
achieving the best overall (eternal) balance of good and evil. This element makes it all the more
difficult for one to assess the likelihood that such an overall balance is being achieved by God
simply by observing the amount of suffering in this earthly existence.
This proposal also fits well with biblical teaching. Scripture indicates that the ultimate
human good is not fully realized until after this earthly life and is incomparably greater than the
suffering experienced on earth (Rom 8:18) in terms of quality and duration. The wretched state
of the lost also swamps any pleasures experienced in this brief life (Mt 16:26). Since the balance
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of earthly goods and evils carries less weight than soteriological outcomes (which are eternal),
the optimal balance of overall good and evil seemingly hinges largely on the balance of saved
and lost. The soteriological theodicy that I have put forth in this dissertation stresses that
Scripture attests that God desires for none to be lost (2 Pe 3:9; 1 Tim 2:4) and that a God who
possesses middle knowledge would likely aim for soteriological optimality (or at least an optimal
balance of saved versus lost within the bounds of certain key parameters—such as divine
hiddenness and Satan’s temptations—that God considers important to uphold). God’s
providential arrangement of the world to achieve soteriological optimality may well require a
suboptimal balance of broadly moral good relative to broadly moral evil in this earthly life, and it
seems quite plausible that this is a fair trade for an omnibenevolent God to make. My proposal
that God may well allow a suboptimal balance of broadly moral good relative to broadly moral
evil in this earthly life in order to achieve an optimal balance of saved versus lost for all of
eternity is consistent with the recognition that it may be the case that “only in a world suffused
with natural and moral evil would the optimal number of people come to know God freely” and
be saved.329
Since achieving an optimal balance of saved versus lost (within the bounds of certain key
parameters) appears to be something the Christian God would aim to do and since it affords the
Christian theist the option of allowing that there may be a suboptimal balance of moral and
natural goods and evils in this world, this proposal has great force against the charge that God’s
existence is made unlikely by the vast amount of evil observed in the world. Like Plantinga’s
own defense concerning the amount of evil, the possibility of Molinism must be allowed in order

329. William Lane Craig and Alex Rosenberg, “The Debate: Is Faith in God Reasonable?,” in Is Faith in God
Reasonable?: Debates in Philosophy, Science, and Rhetoric, eds. Corey Miller and Paul Gould (New York:
Routledge, 2014), 32.
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to run this twist on his argument. As I have argued, God surely cannot actualize a feasible world
that has an optimal soteriological balance unless He knows logically prior to creation all feasible
worlds and is able to select one that is as soteriologically optimal as any other feasible world that
has all of the key features that God requires (including non-soteriological ones).
While the above seems to show that a Molinist soteriological theodicy that affirms God’s
optimization of the soteriological balance helps to strengthen a FWD of theism—and especially
Christian theism—against the concern that there is too much evil in the world, some have
contended that divine middle knowledge only makes the POE knottier. Their objection is that
God’s responsibility for what creatures do with their free will would be greatly increased if God
has middle knowledge because such knowledge affords God enormous providential control over
creaturely free acts. The concern is that the Molinist God providentially guarantees all that
happens and thus bears much culpability for the evils that occur. Greg Welty contends that, if
Molinism is true, then “God ordains whatsoever comes to pass, and this includes ordaining that
acts of moral evil come to pass.”330 While God is not the sufficient cause of evil even if He
providentially arranges the world via His middle knowledge, “created agents are God’s gun (or
at least his bullets).” Since the “bullets are sentient” and free, they bear some blame. Yet God’s
ordering of the circumstances and knowing exactly what the free agents will do in those
circumstances means that God fires the gun and bears moral responsibility.331 For this reason
Christopher Bernard holds that the FWD without Molinism “seems to be better off than it would

330. Greg Welty, “Molinist Gunslingers: God and the Authorship of Sin,” in Calvinism and the Problem of
Evil, ed. David E. Alexander and Daniel M. Johnson (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2016), 57.
331. Ibid., 67-8.
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be if Molinism were true. With less knowledge of consequences comes less responsibility for
results” in terms of the evil done by free creatures.332
According to my proposal, however, the creaturely “bullets” that Welty contends God is
responsible for firing in this earthly life may be absolutely necessary in order to achieve
soteriological optimality. If God has middle knowledge and is arranging the world in order to
achieve an optimal ratio of saved relative to lost over the course of human history (however long
that might be), then God ought not be criticized for providentially allowing the amount of moral
and natural evils that He allows in this life. It is unclear how one could show that it is
implausible that God is doing this (so long as divine middle knowledge is philosophically
coherent, as I have argued). Consequently, we are not in a position to criticize the balance of
good and evil that we observe in the world. It seems reasonable that the Molinist God may well
allow much more evil relative to good than is feasible in this earthly life because doing so is
necessary in order to bring about the best overall balance of good and evil (taking eternal states
into account). So the argument that Molinism implicates God in an unsavory way in the evils that
occur in this life appears to lack force.
Additionally, the falsity of Molinism would raise the important problem of reckless risktaking with regard to God’s care for humanity. The Molinist Thomas Flint points out that a God
without middle knowledge “knows only probabilities” and thus “takes enormous risks in creating
significantly free beings.” God could not know logically prior to His creative decree whether all
of His free creatures would “consistently reject him” and “use their freedom to degrade others
and themselves.”333 Flint thinks a good God lacking middle knowledge ought not create a world
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of free creatures, since logically prior to creation God would not know whether the world would
turn out to have massively more evil than good. God would lack the providential control to make
it better. Flint points out that taking risks, while not always morally problematic, is clearly wrong
when: the stakes are high, one’s likelihood of success is low, and taking the risk is not necessary.
Taking such risks is especially troublesome when it involves the wellbeing of others (e.g., a
father who needlessly risks the security of his family by gambling his life savings).334
In response, Bernard thinks such risk-taking is not an insuperable problem and that the
FWD can be made effectively without Molinism. First, he claims that it is at least possible that
God has morally justifiable reasons for taking the risks that He does and that He is able without
middle knowledge to predict accurately enough what humans would do in various circumstances
based on their tendencies. Bernard suspects that this guesswork by God might allow Him to think
that He could produce a world with a “favorable [even if not optimal] pattern of moral good to
moral evil.” So long as it is possible that God has enough predictive ability of creaturely
behavior to achieve this, Bernard thinks God is justified in attempting to attain the benefits that
come from creating free creatures. Second, he suggests that God could miraculously intervene on
special occasions to keep the balance of good and evil in check without unduly undermining
human freedom, thus containing some additional risk.335
Contra Bernard, Kenneth Perszyk rightly points out that God’s goodness seems to demand
that He cannot merely get lucky in creating a world with a favorable balance of good and evil.
Clearly “creation is serious business” and “caution (not luck) is a moral category.” So “if God
didn’t (‘antecedently’) know what any (libertarian) free creatures would do,” then it is “not at all
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obvious” that creating such creatures “would be compatible with his perfect goodness.”336 It
stretches the imagination to think that the non-Molinist God would have the providential
resources to create a world of free creatures that ends up on balance being good without that
result being largely a matter of luck. Consider, for example, the comments of the non-Molinist
Robert Adams. Adams admits that God must take “trillions of risks” if He lacks middle
knowledge and creates a world of free creatures. Adams recognizes that “no matter how
shrewdly God acted in running so many risks, His winning on every risk would not be
antecedently probable.”337 If even a fraction of a percent of those trillions of guesses are wrong,
it would plausibly upset God’s providential strategies massively. One miscalculation could easily
be compounded greatly given the interconnectedness of human lives. Thus, even if the world
does contain a relatively favorable balance of moral good and evil, it does not seem reasonable
that the non-Molinist God would be in a position to know logically prior to creation that He
could achieve such an outcome without getting lucky. So while Bernard stresses that it only
needs to be possible that the non-Molinist God is able to achieve an acceptable balance of moral
good and evil in order to run a non-Molinist FWD, he overlooks the moral significance of God
not antecedently knowing that He could do this without luck.
More crucially, when one considers that God may be working to optimize the balance of
saved and lost, the non-Molinist God’s providential task becomes all the more incredible. Even if
Bernard is right that the non-Molinist God could miraculously intervene at times without
undermining divine hiddenness and human freedom and could predict human behavior well
enough to achieve an adequate balance of moral and natural good and evil in this earthly life
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(and even if God could antecedently know that He could accomplish this without getting lucky),
how is God to know what natural sufferings and moral evils would lead to the best balance of
saved and lost? How could God possibly know whether allowing horrors like the 2010 Haitian
earthquake or the Holocaust would ultimately result in a benefit to the balance of saved versus
lost over the course of human history? The complex web of reactions from all humans affected
by such events (both in the near-term and as the consequences of the events trickle down through
history) and how those reactions affect the soteriological balance is surely far beyond predictable
even for a God who lacks middle knowledge but is otherwise omniscient. Moreover, how could
the non-Molinist God allow the death of a young non-Christian who never heard the gospel or
who faced other major moral and spiritual obstacles? If God lacks middle knowledge and if (as I
have argued previously) Scripture leaves little hope for postmortem opportunities for salvation,
then the suffering resulting from such tragic and premature deaths—which are not unusual in this
world—are utterly baffling. How could a loving God who desires the salvation of such persons
end their lives when there seems to be much potential for their salvation and when there is no
way to know that the timing and circumstances of their tragic deaths will have a positive impact
on the balance of saved and lost?
So if humans have libertarian freedom (including the freedom to accept or reject God’s
gracious offer of salvation)338 and their eternal fate is sealed by their decisions in this brief life,
then the idea that God possesses middle knowledge and is optimizing the soteriological balance

338. Of course, I hold to the theological position that humans have libertarian freedom with regard to their
choice to accept God’s offer of salvation. Were one to adopt a view that denies that humans have this particular
freedom (even if one allows that humans have libertarian freedom concerning other choices), it would seem to
preclude one from making this connection between suffering and evil on the one hand and God’s providentially
aiming for optimal soteriological outcomes on the other. That is because the suffering and evil of this earthly life
would be causally disconnected from the balance of saved and lost. If humans lack libertarian freedom with regard
to their choice to accept God’s offer of salvation, then any balance of saved and lost could seemingly be achieved
regardless of what sort of balance of broadly moral evils occur on earth since God’s election would not be
dependent—even in part—upon human free choices or circumstances.
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has much value in terms of defending the goodness of God against the charge that there is too
much evil relative to good in this life. If time is of the essence and the Spirit must break down
our sin barriers and lead us to Christ in the span of this brief earthly life, then the amount of evil
that we observe is not necessarily surprising. The non-Molinist God would have to gamble on
whether many—or any—of His beloved creatures would freely be saved and must allow that
some—likely many—creatures will be lost who would have been saved if only God knew what
promptings and circumstances (including particular sufferings) would result in their freely
turning to Him. But if God has middle knowledge and is working toward the best soteriological
ends, then we are in no position to criticize the amount of suffering and evil in the world because
that suffering may be just what is needed to achieve what is ultimately best for us.
Molinism and Soteriological Optimization as a Response to Gratuitous Evil
Having seen the value that Molinism and God’s optimization of the soteriological balance
bring to offering a more robust FWD, consider now how this soteriological proposal can help the
Christian theist defend the goodness of God against the charge that God ought not allow
gratuitous evil. The concern that some evil seems to be utterly pointless and that this counts
against the truth of theism is illustrated well by the famous argument given by William Rowe.
Rowe argues as follows: (R1) “There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent,
omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting
some evil equally bad or worse”; and (R2) “An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the
occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing
some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.”339 Atheism is true if both R1

339. William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” in The Problem of Evil, ed.
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and R2 are true. We will see, however, that the truth of Molinism and God’s optimization of the
soteriological balance provide an enormous benefit in responding to Rowe’s objection by casting
doubt upon the truth of R1.
Before laying out this response to R1, it is worth pointing out that some Christian
philosophers opt not to reject R1 and instead attack R2. David Baggett and Jerry Walls, for
example, allow that gratuitous evil may simply be unavoidable in a world that contains free
creatures. They stress that things like child abuse and killings are “tragic and pointless,” and “the
world would have been better off without” such events. They do not focus on the direct
consequences of evil and instead suggest that free will may not be possible without also allowing
the possibility of gratuitous suffering. Human moral goods require free will, but God’s granting
us free will opens up the possibility that it can be abused—and, indeed, it is abused by humans.
Baggett and Walls contend that, although humans use their free will to carry out pointless evils,
this does not mean that God lacks morally sufficient reasons for giving humans free will. They
consider it likely that, in a world such as ours that includes free creatures and stable natural laws,
God must allow that there will be “more, maybe many more, sufferings than are strictly
necessary to produce relevant goods or avoid comparable things that are bad.”340
Baggett and Walls raise a fair point, and there is value in making the case that it is not
necessarily incumbent upon a theist to accept R2. God may not be able to prevent gratuitous evil
in a world of free creatures—or at least in one that is as populated as the actual world. It does
seem, though, that making this case would be especially plausible if one contends that humans
possess libertarian freedom and if (contrary to the position of this dissertation) one rejects divine
middle knowledge; for in that case it is almost inconceivable that there could be no wasted
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suffering. God would then lack the providential control over free creatures that is needed if He is
to eradicate gratuitous suffering, and He would have to take trillions of risks. Of course, we have
already seen that denying divine middle knowledge is problematic for the Christian theodicist in
important ways.
There is much value in attacking R1, and this may be accomplished by leveraging the
proposal that God might allow much of the evil that occurs in this earthly life in order to achieve
the eternal outcome of soteriological optimality (within the parameters I have identified).
Consider the following. Let AW be the actual world. Let “gratuitous suffering” (GS) be suffering
that God could eliminate without losing a greater good or causing an equally bad or worse
suffering. Let “pseudo-gratuitous suffering” (PGS) be suffering that does not in itself causally
lead to any greater good or the prevention of any equally bad or worse suffering, but either the
circumstances in which a PGS occurs lead to a justifying benefit that outweighs the concomitant
PGS or else multiple instances of PGS collectively allow a justifying good. Consider: (1) AW
contains instances of PGS but no GS; (2) God knew logically prior to creation that AW contains
an optimal balance of overall good versus evil (including soteriological outcomes) over the
course of eternity—a balance significantly better than that of any feasible world devoid of
instances of PGS; and (3) God chooses to actualize AW. If these premises are true, then R1
would be false and yet would appear to humans to be true (i.e., it may seem to us that there is GS
when we observe instances of PGS). Instances of PGS are not gratuitous because they are present
in a world with a significantly better balance of good and evil than any feasible world lacking
them. Concerning instances of GS, there is never a reason for God to permit them since they are
both eliminable and detrimental to the goodness of a world.
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To see how the circumstances in which a PGS occurs can justify God allowing the PGS,
suppose that in AW person P freely inflicts harm H on another human upon finding himself in
circumstance C (where C is a maximal world segment341 that neither includes nor excludes P
doing H), yet H leads to no greater good and avoids no suffering equal to or greater than H.
Suppose that in any feasible world in which C does not arise, the soteriological balance and thus
the balance of overall good and evil over the course of eternity would be worse than in AW;
nevertheless, H in itself does not causally lead to a good that outweighs H or to the prevention of
a suffering that is at least as bad as H since it is C that is crucial to the justifying outcomes. God
would thus have good reason to allow this PGS; yet, when we examine H, we see no justifying
goods that causally follow from it because there are none.
Additionally, multiple instances of PGS may collectively allow a justifying good. Some
“apparently unmerited, pointless” suffering may be needed for there to be compassion and
sacrificial aid for the suffering. If suffering were always deserved, then there would be no point
in relieving it; moreover, people would do what is right merely to attain beneficial outcomes.342
Divine hiddenness may also be undermined if all suffering were according to desert, as it may be
obvious that a mind behind the universe is meting out rewards and punishments. Additionally, it
may require breaking natural laws if God were to ensure that the severity and distribution of
suffering is always according to desert. So perhaps it is only possible for God to achieve the best
outcomes in developing us morally—outcomes that may be needed for soteriological optimality
and the best overall world over the course of eternity—in a moral arena in which there are

341. Recall that a “circumstance” here refers to what is often called a maximal world segment—a complete
description of the entire history of the world up until the exact moment that the agent who is part of the CCF freely
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342. John Hick, “Soul-Making and Suffering,” in The Problem of Evil, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert
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instances of suffering that are unmerited and appear random and perhaps causally lead to no
justifying benefit in themselves but are collectively beneficial in the above-mentioned way.
So, given that God is plausibly more concerned about soteriological optimality and the
overall (eternal) balance of good and evil rather than merely the balance of earthly goods and
evils, it is not reasonable to cast doubt upon God’s goodness or existence simply because there
appear to be many evils that do not causally lead to any greater good or the prevention of a worse
(or equally bad) evil. Rowe’s argument, it seems to me, has lost much traction. Similarly,
contentions like those of atheist philosopher Bruce Russell that the best explanation for why we
often do not see justifiable reasons for certain instances of evil is that there are none343 lose
plausibility in the face of the above considerations.
Molinism and Soteriological Optimization Strengthen the Theodicies of Stump and Hick
Finally, I will consider briefly the benefits that Molinism would inject into two prominent
theodicies that try to account for suffering and evil by appealing to postmortem considerations:
Eleonore Stump’s Thomistic theodicy and John Hick’s soul-making theodicy. Both of these
theodicies already appeal to God shaping humans morally and spiritually via suffering to achieve
benefits that are not fully realized until after this earthly life, but neither of them recognizes the
importance of leveraging divine middle knowledge in order to justify that God can effectively
use suffering and evil to achieve the best soteriological ends. The truth of the soteriological
theodicy that I propose in this dissertation would be beneficial to both of their responses to the
broader POE. Let us begin with Stump.
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Stump’s theodicy focuses on offering a possible explanation for the suffering of “mentally
fully functional” adults who are “unwilling, innocent” sufferers. Following Aquinas, she
identifies two types of unwilling sufferers. Unbelievers suffer “involuntary simpliciter” (IS).
They suffer unwillingly “in every way.” By contrast, suffering “involuntary secundum quid”
(ISQ) means one is unwilling to suffer “only in a certain respect.”344 A Christian suffers only
ISQ, for a Christian gives general assent to suffering by accepting that God will use it for her
sanctification. Stump suggests that all suffering is used by God to justify unbelievers and
sanctify believers. The worst thing one can experience, she thinks, is to become permanently
“psychically fragmented” and separated from God in hell. The best thing is sharing eternal union
with God in heaven.345
Although Stump’s theodicy holds that God uses suffering and evil to achieve soteriological
aims, she denies that Molinism needs to play any role in her theodicy. Stump is insightful in
identifying the best and worst states that a human can experience. She is also correct that “the
relational good of union with God is infinitely shareable without diminution, and it is available to
every human person no matter what that person’s external circumstances might be.” But even if
union with God is available to all people regardless of a person’s external circumstances, that
does not mean that this good will be freely accepted by a person regardless of that person’s
circumstances. Stump errs when she goes on to say that obtaining this good depends upon one’s
“psychic state, not his external circumstances.”346 One’s psychic state is influenced by one’s
circumstances. I have argued that one’s openness to accepting and loving God depends in part
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upon the Spirit directing one’s life experiences—including one’s experience of suffering—to
break down the barriers of sin that prevent one from accepting the grace that God makes freely
available. Doing this most effectively and without guesswork requires Molinism. If God uses
suffering (and other sorts of experiences) to prompt free human responses that lead unbelievers
toward justification and believers toward sanctification, it would require (at least in many cases)
affecting the person’s environment such that the person will respond in a beneficial way. It
would also involve God ensuring that each set of circumstances involving suffering and other
experiences that improve one person’s psychic state is compossible with circumstances that God
needs to bring about in the lives of others to improve their psychic states. This requires enormous
providential control over free creatures—control that is surely made possible only by Molinism.
People are not always rational or predictable in their responses to events in their lives—
especially emotional events that involve suffering. There may be emotional or psychological
baggage that the Spirit must clear away in order for an unbeliever to be made ready in her mind
and will to accept the gospel. Without middle knowledge God can only make an educated guess
about whether a particular instance of suffering would help a person to overcome that baggage or
whether it might only fuel further resistance to God. These complex psychological and emotional
factors that play into our free choices are plausibly not fully predictable even for a being who
lacks middle knowledge but is otherwise omniscient.
Miscalculations on God’s part concerning how a creature would respond to an instance of
suffering could have tragic effects—especially in the case of God’s attempts to use suffering to
sanctify believers. In the biblical account of Job, God allows Satan to inflict severe suffering on
Job to test him. Stump admits that even if God has simple foreknowledge, He cannot test Job on
the basis of knowing that Job would pass the test. Job’s passing of the test and God’s
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foreknowledge that this will happen would be logically subsequent to God testing Job. God
would be taking a risk.347 Stump recognizes that, if God lacks middle knowledge and must take
risks, Job might have freely responded to the suffering by cursing God. If that had happened,
God’s attempt to sanctify Job and make Job more glorious via Job’s clinging to his faith amidst
suffering would have failed; however, Stump thinks that this suffering would then have served a
different purpose for Job: it “would have contributed to his justification, rather than his
sanctification.”348 But this characterization of the outcome seems quite odd. Job was, prior to his
suffering, a man of faith and character (Job 1:1). He had clearly entered into a faith relationship
with God. If Job had died prior to his suffering, surely he would have been saved. So if God’s
attempt to sanctify Job further via extreme suffering had backfired and resulted in Job cursing
and rejecting God, this would not have “contributed to his justification.” If (as I have argued)
apostasy is possible, then it would seem to have undermined his justification. At the very least, it
would have a severely negative impact on his sanctification. Is it credible that the non-Molinist
God should take this sort of a risk? Setting a person back in his sanctification is one thing, but
risking one’s justification just to (possibly) achieve greater sanctification and glory appears to be
reckless. If, however, God has middle knowledge, then He takes no risks with anyone’s
salvation. He could allow enormous suffering in Job’s life to achieve greater sanctification for
Job, knowing that Job would certainly emerge victorious from the suffering rather than have his
faith—and possibly his eternal life—destroyed via the extreme suffering.
Like Bernard, Stump wrongly thinks that God can make the right moves by inductively
reasoning based on His observation of human behavioral tendencies and character349 and by
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being the “consummate chess master.”350 But the stakes are far too high for God to be taking
such chances with human eternal lives. Laying extreme suffering on a person of faith in the mere
hope that this will conduce to greater sanctification and glory for the sufferer while risking that
this person might reject his faith is morally dubious to say the least. Since the Bible indicates that
God is going to remove all sin from all believers in the afterlife anyway, is guessing about what
potential improvements suffering may presently bring to a believer’s sanctification worth the risk
that is involved?
One might perhaps suggest that the non-Molinist God is justified in trying to use suffering
to bring unbelievers to salvation. Perhaps for unbelievers there would be little to lose, as the
possible benefits would seem to outweigh the risk of making the unbeliever even more resistant
to God. Yet the risk remains that the suffering of an unbeliever may have undesirable and
unpredictable effects on others in some way. Even with unbelievers, the non-Molinist God takes
risks in using suffering.
Stump ultimately declines to suggest what particular mechanisms God might employ in
order to use suffering as a means of improving a person’s psychic state.351 This is a significant
omission, however. She needs to be able to justify the sort of providential control that she
attributes to God, and it does not seem that she has come close to doing this.
There is one other key way that Stump’s theodicy needs to appeal to a God who possesses
middle knowledge and is using suffering to direct humans to the best soteriological ends. In
responding to the objection that her view implies that one should not help those who suffer,

349. Stump, Wandering in Darkness, page 622 endnote 102.
350. Ibid., 226.
351. Ibid., 398.

236

Stump rightly stresses that we must always try to relieve the suffering of others even if God uses
it for good purposes. She holds that God’s sovereign plan will be achieved whether one tries to
ease the suffering of others or not.352 If one does not help the sufferer and God wants the sufferer
to be helped, then Stump suggests that God will have providentially arranged the world to use
someone else to provide help. If one does try to help the sufferer and God wants the suffering to
continue in order to achieve His aims, then he will have arranged the world so that the attempted
help does not ease the suffering. Stump’s response is excellent, but it requires Molinism. Her
response highlights that God, in order to use suffering to lead unbelievers to salvation and
believers to sanctification in the way she suggests, not only needs to know logically prior to
creation how the sufferer will respond to suffering, but He also must know how those in a
position to help the sufferer would freely respond. God’s providential control over the world
must be enormous if He is to use suffering to achieve his soteriological purposes for humanity.
Finally, consider Hick’s soul-making theodicy (SMT), which centers on God creating the
ideal environment for growing mankind morally and spiritually so that we are able to have the
eternal union with God that He desires for us. Hick stresses that God does not view humans as
His “pets” and does not aim to create a paradise for our comfort here on earth; rather, God is like
a good parent who aims to cultivate virtues in children and does not elevate pleasure above all
else. So the world, Hick says, must be judged mainly by how well it achieves soul-making.353
Hick rightly emphasizes that some degree of divine hiddenness is needed if humans are to
have the opportunity to love and follow God without coercion. There must be an “epistemic
distance” from God in an “autonomous environment” in which rejecting God and living self-
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centeredly is possible. Moreover, he stresses that moral significance would be lost from our
actions in a world with no chance of real loss or harm coming to people. There would then be no
place for virtues like “perseverance, skill, or honesty” that can only be developed in the face of
adversity.354
Hick thinks the biggest challenge to his SMT is that certain sufferings seem too extreme to
be beneficial for soul-making. Some things appear “ruthlessly destructive” and produce “sheer
loss” for the sufferer. Hick’s response is to appeal to mystery, yet he notes that this mystery
concerning why God allows such sufferings may itself point to a general reason why God allows
them: their opacity may conduce to greater virtue and faith. A world in which all suffering is
deserved and no suffering seems too severe would be flawed. Such a world would lack sympathy
and sacrificial aid for the hurting. There needs to be some “apparently unmerited, pointless”
suffering, as such seemingly “dysteleological” suffering is likely conducive to soul-making.355
Hick adds to his theodicy the possibility of endless postmortem opportunities for salvation.
Since so much suffering seems to result in no apparent soul-making, he thinks universalism is
needed to preserve “the perfect goodness of God” and the fulfillment of the divine will. There
must be no “wasted lives and finally unredeemed suffering.”356 Hick sees the “doctrine of hell,
with its implicates of permanently unexpiated sin and unending suffering, as rendering a
Christian theodicy impossible.”357
As it stands, Hick’s SMT requires neither Molinism nor God’s optimization of the
soteriological balance in this life. This is because he appeals to numerous finite lives to achieve
354. John Hick, “Soul-Making and Suffering,” 177-81.
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soul-making and salvation. This appeal eliminates the need for God to be effective in this life at
providentially drawing people to Himself. However, if universalism and postmortem
opportunities for salvation are excised from Hick’s theodicy (as they should be to maintain
consistency with the Bible), then Hick needs Molinism as a mechanism to account for God being
able to use suffering to achieve soul-making in this life. Apart from Molinism, the risk-taking
concerns raised earlier apply to the SMT as well. If God is going to use suffering effectively to
achieve the best soteriological outcomes, then something like the soteriological theodicy that I
have proposed is necessary.
Clearly, Hick’s SMT is weakened by appealing to postmortem opportunities for salvation.
First, this appeal undermines divine hiddenness and human freedom if it assumed that we retain
our memories over the many finite lives that he postulates—an assumption that would seem
necessary in order for us to benefit from what we learn in each life. Hick’s emphasis on a moral
arena that allows sufficient human freedom falls apart if we get recycled into numerous lives as
God continues to work on us relentlessly until we all are saved. Second, this appeal makes the
extreme amount of suffering that occurs in this life seem much harder to justify. If God has
unlimited time to work slowly on our hearts and “chip away” at our rebellion over millennia, he
could seemingly do this with minimal suffering rather than press for our salvation in this life via
suffering that is often quite intense. Third, I have already made the case that postmortem
opportunities for salvation do not square with what Scripture teaches, and thus such an appeal is
unhelpful in a defense of Christian theism.358
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If, however, one’s eternal destiny is determined by what one chooses in this life, then God
cannot afford to work on us slowly. It would make sense that the Spirit would utilize suffering—
even intense suffering—to prompt our wills in an uncoerced way away from rebellion and
towards Christ in this one earthly life. Since we have only one life to be drawn to God, the stakes
become much higher. Some sort of process like the one that I have proposed (that appeals to
divine middle knowledge and Reformed epistemology) seems to be needed in order to show how
the Spirit can break down a person’s sin barriers and draw a person to Christ in the most
effective and efficient manner possible. It is plausible that the Spirit would allow a great deal of
suffering at times because that may be precisely what is needed to break down certain peoples’
sin barriers. Such a process would account for the extreme lengths to which God goes in using
intense suffering for soul-making purposes in this life, and it evaporates the charge that God
takes excessive risks with our souls.
Chapter Summary
I have made the case in this chapter that a soteriological theodicy like the one I put forward
in the previous chapter that includes appeals to divine middle knowledge and God’s optimization
of soteriological outcomes has benefits beyond responding to the PCL—it is also beneficial in
defending Christian theism against the broader POE. Plantinga leverages Molinism effectively in
his FWD in response to the claim that theism is incompatible with the amount of evil in the
world. Injecting the likelihood that God would use middle knowledge to achieve soteriological
optimality further shows how Christian theism is not made less likely by the amount of evil in
this life. While some contend that Molinism makes God partially responsible for sin and allege
that God can achieve His providential aims through suffering without middle knowledge, this
chapter rejects those claims. I have made the point that it may only be in a world in which there
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is a less than optimal balance of broadly moral good and evil in this earthly life that God can use
His middle knowledge to bring about the best overall outcome for humanity—soteriological
optimality. If God may be allowing the suffering and evil that He does in order to arrange the
world in His perfect sovereignty so as to achieve the best soteriological balance (at least within
certain parameters), then one cannot be confident that God lacks justification for allowing
circumstances in which so much evil occurs. God’s use of His middle knowledge to achieve His
soteriological goals also provides a reason to think that we ought to be humble about concluding
that certain instances of evil are actually gratuitous simply because they seem to increase (and
may actually increase) suffering in this earthly life without bringing about a greater good that
occurs within this life. In responding to William Rowe’s argument, I suggested that what seem to
us to be gratuitous evils may actually be integral to the world playing out in such a way that it is
soteriologically optimal; achieving this goal is surely of primary importance, and it may not be
possible for us to see how a God with middle knowledge is orchestrating the world to accomplish
this goal. So denying divine middle knowledge reduces one’s apologetic options in making a
FWD concerning the amount of evil and in defending against the alleged gratuitousness of some
evils. Denying God’s middle knowledge does not seem to offer any clear benefits in responding
to the POE, and it raises the specter of reckless risk-taking. A Molinist soteriological theodicy
like the one I have put forward would also bolster the theodicies of Stump and Hick by justifying
how God can use suffering to mold people morally and spiritually to achieve His soteriological
aims. This is instructive in showing the importance of divine middle knowledge in the Spirit’s
ability to break down effectively the barriers of sin that prevent moral and spiritual growth while
upholding human freedom.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The aim of this project has been to offer a soteriological theodicy against the PCL that is
consistent with Scripture and is also philosophically plausible. Certainly, the PCL is a significant
challenge. Many find it difficult to think that the Christian God could be good and loving (much
less maximally good and loving) if Jesus is the only path to salvation that God has made
available—and especially if Christian exclusivism is true such that one must hear the gospel and
respond to it in this lifetime to be saved. Many skeptics and Christians alike struggle to find a
way of reconciling divine omnibenevolence with the fact that so many people who are outside of
Christ seem to lack a good opportunity to respond to (or perhaps even hear) the gospel. As we
have seen, even a scholar like John Hick who once held orthodox Christian beliefs reported that
his move away from Christianity and towards religious pluralism was a result of his concerns
about the soteriological narrowness of Christianity in the face of religious diversity and the PCL.
In light of our finitude and the fact that God has not revealed in Scripture how He will deal
with the unevangelized and others who appear to be contingently lost, anyone who offers a
soteriological theodicy against the PCL ought to do so with great humility. Although I have
made it clear that I make no claim that my proposed theodicy is true, it does seem to me that it is
plausible and may be true for all we know. I humbly offer it as a possible solution to the PCL
that does not contradict Scripture and is philosophically coherent and reasonable. That is all that
is required in order for it to be a good theodicy. In formulating this theodicy, I have assumed the
truth of Christian exclusivism. This is advantageous regardless of whether Christian exclusivism
is true. If instead Christian inclusivism were to be true, that would only provide even more
options for dealing with the soteriological POE. I have also taken the position that unconditional
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election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, and perseverance of the saints are not true. It
should be noted, however, that the truth or falsity of perseverance of the saints is not especially
important to my theodicy. Although I make room in my theodicy for the possibility of apostasy,
one could hold that there are no apostates and still make use of my theodicy. In any case, I
certainly do come at the PCL from a position that is inconsistent with Reformed soteriology.
Those Christians who do not agree with my theological starting points will need to seek a
different theodicy to deal with the concerns that are raised by the PCL. However, for the many
Christians who do accept my theological starting points, it is my hope that this theodicy will be
of great apologetic value and theological interest; moreover, I hope that it will be of great
comfort. In the remainder of this concluding chapter, I will highlight the key steps that I have
taken in our journey through the preceding chapters before offering some final reflections about
the value of what I have proposed.
Retracing the Theodical Journey
In order to make my case that the PCL is the most significant challenge within the
soteriological POE, it was necessary to begin by carefully explaining the nature of the
soteriological POE and some of the key concerns that arise within it. I emphasized that, within
the broader POE, the soteriological POE involves the alleged incompatibility between P1 (God
possesses the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence) and P2 (some
persons do not accept the forgiveness that is available via receiving Christ and are thus damned).
Since there is no explicit contradiction between P1 and P2, I explained that the only way to
demonstrate the inconsistency of these two propositions is to add other propositions to this set
such that an inconsistency is revealed. I then briefly examined two key objections within the
soteriological POE that are sometimes alleged to show an incompatibility between the Christian
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God’s attributes and the fact that many people will be eternally lost. Each of these preliminary
objections add certain propositions to P1 and P2 in an effort to reveal a contradiction between
them. I needed to explain these preliminary objections and respond to them in order to clear them
away and show that the most pressing objection is the PCL. The first preliminary objection that
we examined is the claim that a God with the attributes identified in P1 ought to be both able (P3)
and willing (P4) to ensure universal salvation, so the fact that universal salvation is not true (P2)
is alleged to conflict with the sort of God described in P1. After responding to this first objection,
I introduced a second preliminary objection. This second objection makes the case that God
ought to provide universal access to salvation but has not done so, and it does this by adding P5,
P6, and P7 to P1 and P2. After responding to this preliminary objection, the stage was set to
introduce the PCL as the key remaining objection within the soteriological POE.359 The PCL
argues that God’s possessing the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence
(P1) entails that God would not create persons who are lost in their actual circumstances but who
would have been saved if placed into different circumstances (P8). The PCL further claims that
the recognition in P2 that those who never place faith in Christ are lost plausibly makes it
unavoidable—given the lack of access to hearing the Christian gospel and other difficult life
circumstances that many non-Christians face—that at least some of the lost are only contingently
lost (P9). Thus, if P8 and P9 are both true, then we seem to have a contradiction. God’s attributes
would then be incompatible with the purported reality that some of the lost are contingently lost.
So, if the PCL is to be refuted, one must show that either P8 or P9 (or both) should be rejected.
One must show that at least one of these two premises is neither necessarily true nor required by
Christian doctrine. I eventually go on to attack P8.

359. See Table 1.1 on p. 62 for a summary of all the premises that are introduced in the two preliminary
objections and in the PCL.
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After clarifying the PCL and arguing that it is the most pressing aspect of the soteriological
POE, I began to prepare the way for laying out my theodicy. Because of the crucial place that
Molinism has in my theodicy, the first step was to provide a thorough explanation of Molinism
and unpack the core concept of divine middle knowledge before offering a robust defense of this
doctrine’s theological and philosophical viability. I also took time to provide a brief history
behind the rise of Molinism and examine the way Molina himself applied God’s middle
knowledge to soteriology. By contrasting the way Molina applied divine middle knowledge to
soteriology with the way that Francisco Suarez applied it, I illustrated how it is possible for one
to leverage Molinism in a variety of ways in support of the viability of different soteriological
perspectives. In addition, I noted how the doctrine of Molinism has seen a revival (largely due to
Alvin Plantinga) since the 1970s and how there has been much discussion in recent decades
about its biblical faithfulness and philosophical viability. Although an expansive critique of all of
the arguments for and against Molinism is far beyond the scope of this project, I aimed to offer a
concise but thorough assessment of the most prominent issues surrounding this doctrine. With
regard to the biblical evidence in favor of Molinism, I argued that three key considerations in
Scripture strongly support its truth even though there is no explicit proof-text for Molinism in
Scripture. These include the biblical evidence that: (1) God possesses counterfactual knowledge
of how humans would act in circumstances that will never come to exist; (2) humans possess
libertarian free will; and (3) God has sovereign control of the world and the ability to achieve His
precise plans. I made a biblical case for affirming all three of these points and contended that
Molinism appears to be the only way to reconcile them. With regard to the philosophical
viability of Molinism, I argued that a defense of the coherence of Molinism is all that is
necessary. If Molinism seems to be coherent and at least possibly true, then there can be no
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objection to its acceptance and to leveraging its significant explanatory power. I pointed out that
there are really only two main philosophical strategies for attacking Molinism: denying that a
counterfactual of creaturely freedom (CCF) can be true and denying that God can know CCFs
logically prior to His creative decree to actualize the world. I then offered a defense against the
most prominent philosophical arguments against Molinism that fall within each of these two
main strategies.
With my case for the viability of Molinism in place, I began to examine how some
thinkers—particularly William Lane Craig—utilize Molinism in an attempt to resolve the PCL. I
identified three general categories of strategies that have been adopted in applying Molinism to
theodicies against the PCL, and I assessed the theodicies within each of these categories. I made
a case that all of the Molinist theodicies that have been put forth have positive aspects, but
ultimately none of them are without theological and/or philosophical difficulties.
The theodicy that I identified as most promising is Craig’s theodicy. Craig’s position is by
far the most prominent Molinist theodicy against the PCL, and I carefully laid out and assessed
his view. I showed how Craig’s theodicy focuses upon three key claims: (1) it may be the case
that nobody is contingently lost because God is able to arrange the world such that all of the lost
are TD; (2) Romans 2:7 teaches Christian inclusivism, which allows that all persons—even the
unevangelized and all of the TD—have an opportunity in this life to be saved; and (3) God may
have providentially arranged the world so that it has an optimal balance of saved versus lost. I
highlighted a number of strengths in his view. Craig’s proposal appears to be philosophically
viable so long as God possesses middle knowledge. If all of the lost are TD, then P9 is false and
the PCL is undermined. If God has middle knowledge and it is at least possible that some people
could be TD, then there is no apparent philosophical reason why God could not arrange the
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world so that everyone who is lost is TD. There is also no reason why a God with middle
knowledge could not actualize a world with an optimal soteriological balance. God’s election
would then be purposeful and consistent with His perfect love and universal salvific will. God
would be aiming to do the best that He can for humanity as a whole while upholding human free
will rather than, as Suarez believed, utilizing middle knowledge merely to ensure the salvation
and damnation of specific people. Moreover, unlike the theodicies of Lake and Walls, Craig
takes seriously God’s sovereignty and providence within this present earthly existence. God does
not merely make use of His middle knowledge to clean up the PCL after this present life is over;
instead, God providentially arranges the world in such a way that the PCL is resolved. Moreover,
if inclusivism were true as Craig suggests, then even those in this world who are TD and lost
would have been given an opportunity to be saved (even though they never take advantage of it).
So Craig rightly wants to affirm that God grants sufficient grace for all to be saved—even the
lost—and genuinely wants all to be saved.
Despite the advantages and insights of Craig’s theodicy, I explained why I find biblical
grounds for departing from it at certain points. I clarified that my disagreement with Craig is
primarily because there appear to be multiple ways in which Scripture contradicts his crucial
proposal that nobody is contingently lost. There seem to be two types of contingently lost people
identified in Scripture—those who would have turned to God only if they were given unduly
overt revelation and those who apostatize. We saw that Craig himself holds to the possibility of
apostasy, so it is not clear how he reconciles this with his theodicy. I thus do not think the way
forward is to attack P9. I also disagreed with Craig’s appeal to Christian inclusivism, as it seems
to be taught neither in Romans 2:7 (as Craig contends) nor anywhere else in Scripture. In
addition, Craig’s theodicy does not address how God may well have various goals for the world
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besides soteriological optimality that may place limitations on the balance of saved versus lost
that is feasible for God to bring about.
I then laid out my own theodicy. Like Craig’s theodicy, it incorporates divine middle
knowledge and suggests that God optimizes the soteriological balance; however, there are key
differences between our theodicies. With regard to God optimizing the soteriological balance, I
emphasize that there might be well-populated, feasible worlds of free creatures that have a better
soteriological balance than the actual world. I stress that God may have certain goals that kept
Him from creating those worlds. Yet I propose that God would plausibly bring about the best
soteriological balance that can be achieved while upholding those parameters that are important
to God (e.g., ensuring a certain degree of divine hiddenness and allowing an evil being like Satan
to have a certain amount of access to tempting humanity). Perhaps the most crucial way in which
my theodicy departs from Craig’s is that I deny that all of the lost are TD. I allow that there are
contingently lost persons who apostatize and those who would have turned to God only if they
were given what is for them unduly overt revelation. I attack P8 rather than P9, and I do this by
arguing that God’s omnibenevolence is not undermined despite the fact that He allows some to
be contingently lost. This is because God’s omnibenevolence is consistent with Him allowing
both of these two types of contingently lost persons. I see no need to postulate that there are
other types of contingently lost persons, since the Bible never indicates that there are other types.
As noted, I also depart from Craig by holding to Christian exclusivism. In order to justify that all
people have an opportunity to be saved, I utilize a process that draws upon a slightly modified
version of Reformed epistemology (which I explained and briefly defended) to show how it may
be the case that God gives everyone an opportunity to be saved and how it is only one’s own sin
and not the sin of others that is decisive in one failing to come to saving faith. Scripture teaches
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that the Holy Spirit works on the hearts and minds of unbelievers, and my proposed process is
helpful in that it shows how the Spirit may utilize divine middle knowledge to provide just the
right promptings, experiences, and evidences to break down a person’s sin barrier and allow that
person to come to Christ. The process not only avoids inclusivism, but it also avoids the
oversimplified proposal of many exclusivists that God will bring the gospel to those who respond
to general revelation. I also emphasize how this same sort of process may apply in both the OT
and NT eras.
Finally, I made the case that my soteriological theodicy also offers benefits in responding
to the broader POE—both in terms of the amount of evil and the apparent gratuitousness of some
evil in our present earthly existence. If God is using His middle knowledge to optimize the
soteriological balance (even within the parameters I identified) over the course of human history
(which is surely a more important objective for the wellbeing of humanity than optimizing the
balance of good and evil within this earthly life), then this helps to show why an omnibenevolent
God may have allowed an even worse ratio of evil relative to good in this earthly life than He
feasibly could have brought about. Moreover, if God is using His middle knowledge to achieve
the best soteriological outcomes, then I showed why it becomes much harder to have confidence
that any particular instance of suffering and evil that occurs in this earthly life is truly gratuitous.
I also showed how my soteriological theodicy strengthens the theodicies of Eleonore Stump and
John Hick, which appeal to soteriological outcomes in responding to the broader POE.
Concluding Reflections
I will now offer some concluding reflections as I draw this project to a close. With regard
to my theodicy making room for there being contingently lost people, which seems to be the
proper approach in light of the biblical evidence that there are such people, it is worth noting that
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there may well be other types of contingently lost people besides the two types that I identify
(e.g., a lost person who is thoroughly evangelized and has all sorts of opportunities to accept the
gospel in the actual world and yet would have freely and without excessive pressure accepted the
gospel in some other feasible world). Although this is possible, there is no way for us to know
whether this is the case. Since the two types that I identify seem to be the only types that are
indicated in Scripture, I see no reason to speculate about there being other types. What is crucial,
however, is that my theodicy eliminates the problematic sorts of contingently lost people; that is,
nobody “barely slips through the soteriological cracks” like the inner-city teen that I described at
the end of the third chapter. Any theodicy that effectively undermines P8 must eliminate such
problematic sorts of contingently lost individuals.
It is also important to recognize that one need not be confident that either type of
contingently lost person that is accounted for in my theodicy actually exists in order for one to
find great value in my theodicy. If one thinks, for example, that nobody ever apostatizes, then
one could simply excise that from my theodicy. If one understands the comments of Jesus in
Matthew 11 about the people of Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom to be merely hyperbolic and one sees
no need to make room for contingently lost people who would only have responded to what is
for them unduly overt revelation, then one could excise this type of contingently lost person from
my theodicy. It is, however, beneficial if one does not excise either type of contingently lost
person from my theodicy because it is advantageous to show that they can be handled regardless
of whether or not Scripture indicates that such persons exist. The fact that my theodicy handles
both types and does not require that everyone (or even anyone) is TD will be an attractive feature
for many Christians. Yet my theodicy offers a number of advantages besides accounting for
these two types of contingently lost individuals. What are some of those advantages?
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One advantage is that, if one is an exclusivist, one may find great value in the fact that my
theodicy provides a more nuanced account for how God may offer all people an opportunity to
be saved than the view that God will bring the gospel to those who respond appropriately to
general revelation. One may value the process proposed in my theodicy in which Molinism and
Reformed epistemology combine to suggest how the Holy Spirit could be drawing all people to
Himself in a way that is uniquely tailored to each individual. This process ensures that all
people—regardless of their circumstances—will be saved unless their own sin prevents them
from allowing the Spirit to draw them to Himself. It allows that one need not have the time,
ability, or resources to reason one’s way to knowing that the gospel is true, yet I leave room for
the Spirit to use apologetic arguments and various evidential means to break down a person’s sin
barrier and prepare a person’s heart and mind to accept the gospel.
Another advantage of my theodicy is that it upholds God’s omnibenevolence and his
efforts to optimize the soteriological balance while recognizing that this optimization may be
within the bounds of certain limiting parameters. God’s relative hiddenness and His allowing
Satan to tempt humanity may seem to rest uncomfortably with the suggestion that God has
actualized the feasible world that has the most optimal balance of saved versus lost. If, however,
one allows that an omnibenevolent God may well optimize the soteriological balance within the
limits of these parameters, then this tension is relieved. By making this case, my theodicy
increases the plausibility of God working toward optimal soteriological ends.
Aside from the above advantages, I have highlighted in this study the powerful way in
which a soteriological theodicy such as mine can be applied to the broader problem of suffering
and evil. This has enormous apologetic value because the amount of evil in this life and the
seeming gratuitousness of so much suffering and evil may well be the most prominent
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intellectual hurdles that stand between unbelievers and the Christian faith. There is great value in
a theodicy that alleviates concerns about the contingently lost (thus fighting against the pull of
religious pluralism) while at the same time strengthening the case that theism is compatible with
the amount and types of suffering and evil in the world (thus fighting against the pull of
atheism).
Apart from its value for Christian apologetics, my proposal is also beneficial for
soteriology. The soteriological outcome God brings about on this view is purposeful, loving, and
consistent with God’s omnibenevolence and other attributes. It takes divine sovereignty and
providence seriously while preserving human freedom. It upholds Christian exclusivism. It
accepts the biblical evidence that some will be lost who would have been saved in different
circumstances. It also accounts for the reality of spiritual warfare and the biblical teaching that
God desires the salvation of all people. By accomplishing all of the above in a way that is
biblically consistent and philosophically reasonable, I believe my project offers insights for
Christian theology.
Ultimately, it is my hope that this theodicy will encourage those who are already Christians
to be strong in their faith in the face of these significant challenges and to be better-equipped
witnesses for Christ. I believe this theodicy can also help unbelievers to see that the Christian
faith is true and reasonable. Perhaps God will use this project as a weapon to demolish one more
argument “that sets itself up against the knowledge of God” (2 Cor 10:5). If it is the Lord’s will,
the proposal offered here may be at least a small part of God’s eternal plan of drawing all who
are willing into a saving relationship with Christ.
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